Adoption in IV Century Athens. This item is unavailable.Adoption in IV Century Athens

The aim of the investigation is to throw light on the adoption institution. Much attention has been devoted to the contractual nature of the adoption which was carried out inter vivos as opposed to the unilateral nature of a testamentary adoption. In the present work it is argued that the main difference between the different types of adoption was one of procedure: adoption took place in public, in the adopter's phratry and deme, no matter whether prior to the death of the adopter or posthumously. It is also argued that it was the formal recognition of the adoptee by the adopter's phtatry and deme which constituted the adoption itself and its validity, legal as well as social. Further, the tomb cult, aspects of Athenian family-life and the Athenian legislation, which regulated it, are treated to the extent to which they have a direct influence on the Athenian institution of adoption.

The main focus of this study is on the institution of adoption, so that tomb-cult as well as aspects of Athenian family life and the Athenian legislation which regulated it, are treated only in so far as they have a direct bearing on the main topic. In Athens, adoption could take place in three different ways. Firstly, the adoption could be carried out while the adopter himself was still alive - usually referred to as adoption inter vivos. Secondly, a man could nominate an heir in his will, stipulating that his beneficiary was to succeed him as his adopted son or daughter - the so called testamentary adoption. Finally, if a man died without leaving a legitimate son, whether natural or adopted, a posthumous adoption could be carried out on his behalf, without the adopter having played any active part in the procedure. It is argued here that a person was only eligible for posthumous adoption if he had already been recognized as the intestate heir of the deceased by the People's Court by an inheritance-procedure called "epidikasia" (or sometimes "diadikasia" if the court was to decide on several contesting claims).

In juridic treatments of the institution, it is seen as belonging to the sphere of "private law". Much attention has been devoted to the contractual nature of the adoption which was carried out inter vivos, as opposed to the unilateral nature of a testamentary adoption (where a testator would nominate an adoptee in his will). The difference between the two types of adoption is alleged to have been one of substance rather than procedure. In this work, however, it is argued that the main difference between the two types of adoption was one of procedure: adoption took place in public, in the adopter's phratry and deme, whether prior to the death of the adopter (inter vivos) or posthumously (testamentary and posthumous adoption). It is also argued that it was the formal recognition of the adoptee by the adopter's phratry and deme which constituted the adoption itself and its social and legal validity. Thus, the distinction between "private" and "public" begins to break down.