This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology.
The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology.
In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible.
The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology.
The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology.
In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible.
The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality.
"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.
£ 4.46 shipping within U.S.A.
Destination, rates & speedsSeller: Michener & Rutledge Booksellers, Inc., Baldwin City, KS, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condition: As New. Still shrinkwrapped; Philosophical Studies Series; 8vo 8" - 9" tall; 364 pages. Seller Inventory # 204265
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Best Price, Torrance, CA, U.S.A.
Condition: New. SUPER FAST SHIPPING. Seller Inventory # 9789401773850
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 24375372-n
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # ABLIING23Apr0412070060356
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: PsychoBabel & Skoob Books, Didcot, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: As New. 1st Edition. Like new, unread, shop store room stock. CE. Used. Seller Inventory # 608184
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 24375372
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Condition: New. In. Seller Inventory # ria9789401773850_new
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: California Books, Miami, FL, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # I-9789401773850
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germany
Buch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology.The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology.In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible.The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality. 388 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9789401773850
Quantity: 2 available
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Mason, OH, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology.The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology.In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible.The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9789401773850
Quantity: 1 available