Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, University of Tubingen, language: English, abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent ownership structure can alleviate the agency problem and limit managerial expropriation of small shareholders. Since stock options and other forms of equity are frequently used as compensation for managers, special emphasis is placed on the question of how managerial ownership can affect agency costs and firm value. To evaluate the impact of ownership patterns on shareholder value, this paper surveys and reinterprets scientific advances in the corporate governance literature. A significant part of the analysis covers the interrelation of inside ownership, corporate policies, and shareholder value; as well as the role of endogeneity.
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Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, University of Tubingen, language: English, abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent ownership structure can alleviate the agency problem and limit managerial expropriation of small shareholders. Since stock options and other forms of equity are frequently used as compensation for managers, special emphasis is placed on the question of how managerial ownership can affect agency costs and firm value. To evaluate the impact of ownership patterns on shareholder value, this paper surveys and reinterprets scientific advances in the corporate governance literature. A significant part of the analysis covers the interrelation of inside ownership, corporate policies, and shareholder value; as well as the role of endogeneity.
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Ownership Structure and Investor Protection | Inside Ownership and Firm Valuation | Marco Klapper | Taschenbuch | 28 S. | Englisch | 2012 | GRIN Verlag | EAN 9783656224129 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: GRIN Publishing GmbH, Waltherstr. 23, 80337 München, info[at]grin[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. Seller Inventory # 106406581