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Rings in Auctions: An Experimental Approach: 447 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 447) - Softcover
Book 89 of 126: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Synopsis
In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.
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Synopsis
This book deals with experimental studies in economics. It investigates experimentally collusions in first-price auctions with private values. Since the main aim of the study is to see which mechanisms are used when the subjects may collude, the participants are allowed to communicate as long as they want, before they made their bids, but after they have known their private valuations. Moreover, the winner is allowed to make side payments to losing bidders. The subjects have to invent the mechanism they want to use by themselves. The theoretical possibilities are not explained to them. Four mechanisms have been observed. For each of them, we provide a game theoretical analysis and we compare the data with the theoretical prediction.
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Rings in Auctions
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Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale - But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to elim. Seller Inventory # 4895811
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Rings in Auctions
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale - But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. 'The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader' (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2. 188 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783540619307
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Rings in Auctions
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale ¿ But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. 'The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader' (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 188 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783540619307
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Rings in Auctions : An Experimental Approach
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale - But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. 'The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader' (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2. Seller Inventory # 9783540619307
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Rings in Auctions | An Experimental Approach
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Rings in Auctions | An Experimental Approach | Angelo Artale | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | x | Englisch | 1997 | Springer | EAN 9783540619307 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. Seller Inventory # 101402437