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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining: 170 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 170) - Softcover
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The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 170)
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining (Paperback)
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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9783540095408
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely. 136 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783540095408
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
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Paperback. Condition: New. The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely. Seller Inventory # LU-9783540095408
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)
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Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 136 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783540095408
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