Illusion is a longstanding problem in the philosophy of perception: how can it perceptibly appear that something is the case, though nothing corresponds in reality? A strong intuition – the Common Kind Assumption that the same account must apply to veridical perception as to illusion – seems to commit us to “weird” mental items like sense data, but an equally strong intuition is that weird items have no place in a parsimonious account of reality. D.E. Buckner takes a novel approach to this problem, arguing that perceptual states are propositional. Just as the same proposition can be true or false, so the same perceptual state can be veridical or not. Sight tells us that the stick in water is bent, even when our understanding says it is not. This semantic account of perception satisfies the Common Kind Assumption without committing us to weird items. The book is a fresh approach to the classic problem of illusion, informed by the core topics of philosophical logic: identity, existence, reference and predication. It brings together a number of disparate traditions, including twentieth-century sense datum theory and the subsequent reaction to it; Chastain’s anaphoric theory of reference; the Aristotelian notion of a substance (the this of demonstrative reference) and its accidents.
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D.E. Buckner is a graduate of Bristol University, where he later taught philosophy. He has published in the areas of philosophy of language, logic, and medieval philosophy. He previously published Reference and Identity in Jewish, Christian and Muslim Scriptures: The Same God? (2020), examining the question of whether Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptures refer to the same God, within a semantic framework acceptable to atheists and fideists. Now retired from teaching, he lives with his family in Wandsworth, London. He is curator of the web site The Logic Museum, a repository of primary sources in logic and metaphysics.
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Hardback. Condition: New. Illusion is a longstanding problem in the philosophy of perception: how can it perceptibly appear that something is the case, though nothing corresponds in reality? A strong intuition - the Common Kind Assumption that the same account must apply to veridical perception as to illusion - seems to commit us to "weird" mental items like sense data, but an equally strong intuition is that weird items have no place in a parsimonious account of reality.D.E. Buckner takes a novel approach to this problem, arguing that perceptual states are propositional. Just as the same proposition can be true or false, so the same perceptual state can be veridical or not. Sight tells us that the stick in water is bent, even when our understanding says it is not. This semantic account of perception satisfies the Common Kind Assumption without committing us to weird items.The book is a fresh approach to the classic problem of illusion, informed by the core topics of philosophical logic: identity, existence, reference and predication. It brings together a number of disparate traditions, including twentieth-century sense datum theory and the subsequent reaction to it; Chastain's anaphoric theory of reference; the Aristotelian notion of a substance (the this of demonstrative reference) and its accidents. Seller Inventory # LU-9781666963342
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Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Illusion is a longstanding problem in the philosophy of perception: how can it perceptibly appear that something is the case, though nothing corresponds in reality? A strong intuition the Common Kind Assumption that the same account must apply to veridical perception as to illusion seems to commit us to weird mental items like sense data, but an equally strong intuition is that weird items have no place in a parsimonious account of reality.D.E. Buckner takes a novel approach to this problem, arguing that perceptual states are propositional. Just as the same proposition can be true or false, so the same perceptual state can be veridical or not. Sight tells us that the stick in water is bent, even when our understanding says it is not. This semantic account of perception satisfies the Common Kind Assumption without committing us to weird items.The book is a fresh approach to the classic problem of illusion, informed by the core topics of philosophical logic: identity, existence, reference and predication. It brings together a number of disparate traditions, including twentieth-century sense datum theory and the subsequent reaction to it; Chastains anaphoric theory of reference; the Aristotelian notion of a substance (the this of demonstrative reference) and its accidents. Arguing that perceptual states are propositional, this book is a fresh approach to the classic problem of illusion, informed by the core topics of philosophical logic: identity, existence, reference and predication. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781666963342
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Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Illusion is a longstanding problem in the philosophy of perception: how can it perceptibly appear that something is the case, though nothing corresponds in reality? A strong intuition the Common Kind Assumption that the same account must apply to veridical perception as to illusion seems to commit us to weird mental items like sense data, but an equally strong intuition is that weird items have no place in a parsimonious account of reality.D.E. Buckner takes a novel approach to this problem, arguing that perceptual states are propositional. Just as the same proposition can be true or false, so the same perceptual state can be veridical or not. Sight tells us that the stick in water is bent, even when our understanding says it is not. This semantic account of perception satisfies the Common Kind Assumption without committing us to weird items.The book is a fresh approach to the classic problem of illusion, informed by the core topics of philosophical logic: identity, existence, reference and predication. It brings together a number of disparate traditions, including twentieth-century sense datum theory and the subsequent reaction to it; Chastains anaphoric theory of reference; the Aristotelian notion of a substance (the this of demonstrative reference) and its accidents. Arguing that perceptual states are propositional, this book is a fresh approach to the classic problem of illusion, informed by the core topics of philosophical logic: identity, existence, reference and predication. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781666963342
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