Items related to It Started with Copernicus: Vital Questions about Science

It Started with Copernicus: Vital Questions about Science - Softcover

Parsons, Keith

 
9781616149291: It Started with Copernicus: Vital Questions about Science

Synopsis

A unique approach to the philosophy of science that focuses on the liveliest and most important controversies surrounding science

Is science more rational or objective than any other intellectual endeavor? Are scientific theories accurate depictions of reality or just useful devices for manipulating the environment? These core questions are the focus of this unique approach to the philosophy of science. Unlike standard textbooks, this book does not attempt a comprehensive review of the entire field, but makes a selection of the most vibrant debates and issues.

The author tackles such stimulating questions as: Can science meet the challenges of skeptics?  Should science address questions traditionally reserved for philosophy and religion? Further, does science leave room for human values, free will, and moral responsibility?

Written in an accessible, jargon-free style, the text succinctly presents complex ideas in an easily understandable fashion. By using numerous examples taken from diverse areas such as evolutionary theory, paleontology, and astronomy, the author piques readers' curiosity in current scientific controversies. Concise bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter invite readers to sample ideas different from the ones offered in the text and to explore the range of opinions on each topic.

Rigorous yet highly readable, this excellent invitation to the philosophy of science makes a convincing case that understanding the nature of science is essential for understanding life itself.

"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.

About the Author

Keith M. Parsons is professor of philosophy at the University of Houston-Clear Lake. He is the author of Rational Episodes- Logic for the Intermittently Reasonable; God and the Burden of Proof- Plantinga, Swinburne, and the Analytic Defense of Theism, among other books; and the editor of The Science Wars- Debating Scientific Knowledge and Technology.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

It Started With Copernicus

Vital Questions About Science

By Keith Parsons

Prometheus Books

Copyright © 2014 Keith Parsons
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-61614-929-1

Contents

PREFACE, 9,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, 15,
Copernican Questions, 2006, 15,
It Started with Copernicus, 2014, 16,
CHAPTER ONE: COPERNICAN QUESTIONS, 19,
What Was Copernicus's Revolution?, 20,
What Happens When Your World Changes?, 29,
Copernican Questions: Rationality and Realism, 38,
More Questions: Method, Naturalism, and Meaning, 41,
The Plan of the Book, 45,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER ONE, 49,
CHAPTER TWO: IS SCIENCE REALLY RATIONAL? THE PROBLEM OF INCOMMENSURABILITY, 53,
Incommensurability of Standards, 59,
Incommensurability of Values, 65,
Incommensurability of Meaning, 71,
Evaluating Meaning Incommensurability, 74,
Conversion: A Concluding Case Study, 85,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER TWO, 90,
CHAPTER THREE: A WALK ON THE WILD SIDE: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, POSTMODERNISM, FEMINISM, AND THAT OLD-TIME RELIGION, 97,
The Constructivist Challenge, 97,
Postmodernism Attacks!, 113,
Is "Objectivity" What a Man Calls His Subjectivity?, 125,
Is Science Godless?, 134,
Conclusion, 148,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER THREE, 150,
CHAPTER OUR: ASCENDING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND TRUTH, 159,
The Evils of Whig History, 160,
Social-Constructivist History, 163,
Does Science Converge toward Truth?, 172,
Assessing Laudan's Critique of Convergent Realism, 177,
Scientists' Own Realism, 188,
Could We Be Wrong about Everything?, 194,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER FOUR, 199,
CHAPTER FIVE: TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES?, 205,
Electrons: Real Particles or Convenient Fictions?, 207,
Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism, 211,
Do We Observe through Microscopes?, 215,
But What about Things That Are Really Unobservable?, 223,
So What Really Is the Goal of Science?, 232,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER FIVE, 242,
CHAPTER SIX: MYSTERIES OF METHOD, 247,
Induction and Deduction, 247,
Aristotle: The First Methodologist, 249,
Bacon: Scientific Method Renovated?, 260,
The Hypothetico-Deductive Method, 272,
Hume on Induction, 277,
Popper and the Rejection of Induction, 281,
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) to the Rescue?, 298,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER SIX, 301,
CHAPTER SEVEN: IF YOU HAVE SCIENCE, WHO NEEDS PHILOSOPHY?, 305,
The Limits of Science?, 305,
The Breakdown of Philosophy, 308,
Naturalizing Epistemology, 317,
Naturalizing Ethics, 341,
Philosophy in an Age of Science, 352,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER SEVEN, 359,
CHAPTER EIGHT: SCIENCE, SCIENTISM, AND BEING HUMAN, 363,
Mind: Physical or Spiritual?, 367,
Science and the Human Image, 388,
Ape, Angel, or Neither?, 414,
FURTHER READINGS FOR CHAPTER EIGHT, 418,
INDEX, 423,


CHAPTER 1

COPERNICAN QUESTIONS


On May 24, 1543, Europe's foremost astronomer lay dying. The story goes that Nicholas Copernicus was on his deathbed when he received from the printer the first copies of his great work De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium—On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres. This work proposed nothing less than a radical revision of the established view of the universe. Copernicus argued that the earth is not the immovable center of the universe but rather is part of a solar system. He proposed that the earth, along with its sister planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, are arrayed in a series of concentric circular orbits about the sun (or, to be precise, a point very close to the sun). Copernicus was not the first to make this startling suggestion; several thinkers in ancient Greece had entertained the notion of a heliocentric (sun-centered) cosmology. But by Copernicus's day, the geocentric (earth-centered) cosmology had gained the full support of science, philosophy, and, most important of all in those days, theology. So deeply entrenched was the geocentric view that Copernicus's system was inevitably regarded as shocking, absurd, or perhaps even heretical. Yet despite the opposition of scientists, philosophers, and the church—which famously condemned Galileo for defending the Copernican view—the heliocentric theory had won by about 1650.

The Copernican Revolution, like the Darwinian revolution of the nineteenth century, impacted not just science but something deep within the human psyche. Anyone who has followed the recent debates over "scientific creationism" or "intelligent design theory" knows that the Darwinism continues to elicit passionate feelings. In a sense, we are also still coming to terms with Copernicus.


WHAT WAS COPERNICUS'S REVOLUTION?


Just what was so radical about Copernicus's theory, and why did it shock so many of his contemporaries? Why did others find it so inspiring that it is fair to say that the whole Scientific Revolution began with Copernicus? To answer these questions we have to get deeper into the history. Merely to say that with Copernicus science moved from an earth-centered to a sun-centered cosmology is hardly adequate to understand the depth and breadth of a transformation so profound that it really marks the beginning of the modern world and the demise of the medieval one.

New theories do not arise in a vacuum. They are proposed in the face of established theories that have served long and honorably and have faced down many previous challengers. So, when new theories win, old theories lose. The fate of discarded theories is not pretty. They become the objects of mirth or pity as later generations find it hard to imagine how the universe could ever have been conceived in such terms.

Such condescension is inappropriate. As the saying goes, the past is another country, and when we disdain past views merely because they are old, we are behaving like someone who laughs at the customs and beliefs of other cultures. This does not mean that we must regard past theories—or even the customs and beliefs of other cultures—as equal to our own. The point is that theories accepted by people in previous centuries, including theories long since recognized as false, were in their day eminently reasonable views that explained the universe in ways that were rigorously logical, coherent, beautiful, satisfying, and comprehensive. The intellectual pillars of the late medieval worldview included the teachings of the church, of course, but also the doctrines of two eminent thinkers of pagan antiquity, the philosopher/scientist Aristotle and the astronomer Claudius Ptolemy.

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) is always ranked with Plato as one of the two greatest philosophical intellects of the ancient world. Aristotle studied under Plato, but he developed a distinct philosophy of extraordinary scope and power. He thought about everything and had important things to say about almost every conceivable topic. As opposed to Plato, whose mind ascended to the transcendent realm of eternal essences, Aristotle's intellect was focused on the physical world. The painting The School of Athens by the Renaissance master Raphael, depicts Plato and Aristotle as its two central figures. As they walk, engaged in animated debate, Plato is pointing heavenward while Aristotle gestures with his palm down and his arm forward and parallel to the ground, as if to emphasize his concern with the earthly It may seem odd that so this-worldly a thinker as Aristotle could have become the intellectual paragon of deeply religious intellectuals of Christian Europe. How this happened is one of the most remarkable stories in intellectual history.

By the late centuries of the first millennium, during the so-called Dark Ages of Europe, Aristotle's writings, except for a few of his works on logic and method, had been lost to the Latin-speaking scholars of the West. By contrast, in the East, in the intellectual centers of Muslim culture, the works of Aristotle were very well known and were the focus of much brilliant scholarship. However, during the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth, much philosophical literature, including the lost works of Aristotle, became available to scholars in the Latin West. These scholars were stunned to find in the works of a pagan philosopher a system of knowledge more comprehensive and sophisticated than anything they possessed. To get some idea of the effect, imagine what it would be like if today archaeologists unearthed tablets of ancient hieroglyphics which, when translated, contained science and philosophy more advanced than our own. Aristotle made so powerful an impression that Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), perhaps the leading Christian thinker of the Middle Ages, referred to Aristotle simply as "The Philosopher." In The Divine Comedy, Dante called Aristotle "The Master of Those Who Know."

However, many of the more conservative elements in the church were alarmed by the influx of Aristotelian ideas. In the year 1277, the Bishop of Paris issued an edict condemning 219 distinct propositions derived from or inspired by the philosophy of Aristotle. It is true that there were some glaring inconsistencies between what Aristotle taught and what the church believed. For instance, Aristotle held that the world had existed forever; the church taught, as it says in the biblical book of Genesis, that the earth was created in six literal days. It took the genius of Aquinas and others to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy and Christian orthodoxy.

Aristotle wrote a treatise on astronomy, which was known to medieval scholars by its Latin name De Caelo(On the Heavens). Like all educated people of his day, Aristotle recognized that the earth is a sphere (that Christopher Columbus set out to show that the world is round is a silly but oddly persistent notion). He held that the earth stood forever as the immobile center of the universe, the hub around which everything else revolved. He also held that the cosmos is spherical, or rather a set of nested spheres centered on the earth. Aristotle endorsed the standard view that our world is composed of the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. Further, each of these elements has a natural motion. He held that each element has weight or lightness as an innate property. Innately heavy elements like earth will tend to move in a straight line toward the center of the universe; light elements, like fire, will tend to move directly away from the center. In Aristotle's universe, up and down had absolute meanings, referring to directions toward or away from the world's center. Objects composed of the four elements can deteriorate or waste away, and the elements themselves can be changed into one another. So, the physical objects we encounter daily are unstable and impermanent; they are created and destroyed.

For Aristotle, the heavens are very different from the earth, being composed of entirely different material and obeying different laws. Each heavenly body is situated on its own sphere, and each such sphere is part of a rather-complicated system of perfectly transparent crystalline spheres, each having its center at the center of the earth. The system of spheres has to be rather complicated since the movements of the heavenly bodies are complex. For instance, the sun not only makes its daily journey across the sky, but once a year it makes a complete circuit of the ecliptic, the path of the sun through the zodiacal constellations. The various rotations of the heavenly spheres, each rotating at a different uniform speed around its own axis, account for these complex motions of the heavenly bodies. The heavenly spheres are composed of a sublime substance called "aether," an indestructible fifth element. The natural motion of the aether is not up or down but to move eternally in a perfect circle. The moon occupies the lowest level of the heavenly spheres, followed by Mercury, Venus, the sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the realm of the fixed stars (Uranus and Neptune were unknown to the ancients).

As you can see, there is nothing naive or primitive about Aristotle's cosmology It is a highly sophisticated, if premature, attempt to make systematic sense of our bewildering universe. Aristotle's system is also very beautiful, with its radiant heavenly bodies carried along on aethereal crystalline spheres. Remarkably, it is a system that is also highly congruent with common sense. Making the earth the immovable, solid center of everything certainly feels right. We still naturally speak of the sun rising and setting even though we have known for centuries that this is an optical illusion caused by the rotation of the earth on its axis. It still looks like we are standing still and the heavenly bodies are moving around us. For most practical purposes, it is fine to think this way Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Aristotle's cosmology fits well with Christian theology The central place of earth, the humanly abode, is perfectly congruent with the theological view that the cosmos is the great stage where the drama of human redemption is acted out. Also, the distinction Aristotle made between the imperfect sublunary (below the moon) realm, where things decay and die, and the perfect realm of the heavens made good sense for Christians. After all, human sin has corrupted the earth, whereas the visible heavens border on the realm of God and his angels and so approach the perfection of the divine.

Claudius Ptolemy's dates are not well known, but he seems to have done most of his work around the middle of the second century of the Common Era. Ptolemy's astronomical writings represent the culmination and synthesis of the great tradition of Greek astronomy Yet he was an original and creative thinker who did far more than merely compile or summarize the work of his predecessors. It is fitting that Claudius lived in Alexandria, which for several centuries had been the intellectual center of the Hellenistic and Roman world. Ptolemy's writings, like most of Aristotle's, were long lost to the West. Once again, Arabian scholars came to the rescue, compiling Ptolemy's astronomical works into a book that they simply called Almagest,, which is Arabic for "The Greatest."

For Ptolemy, the aim of astronomical theory was to provide a geometrical model of the heavens that would "save the appearances." An astronomical model "saves the appearances" when its geometrical representation of the heavenly bodies accurately predicts their positions and movements. For instance, when our model accurately tells us that at a given time Mars will be in a certain place and will be observed to move in a certain way then our model succeeds to that extent. Further, for Ptolemy and the other ancient astronomers, the mathematical model had to meet certain stringent requirements. The model had to represent the motions of planets in terms of uniform motion around perfectly circular paths. Why perfect circles? There were aesthetic and even religious reasons for insisting on perfect circles. After all, the heavens were divine, and surely the divine must move in the most beautiful way. A more "scientific" motivation for preferring circles might be that circles seemed the simplest figures. Scientists try to provide explanations that are no more complicated than they have to be. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the insistence on modeling the heavens in terms of uniform motion along perfect circles eventually led to insufferable complexity.


(Continues...)
Excerpted from It Started With Copernicus by Keith Parsons. Copyright © 2014 Keith Parsons. Excerpted by permission of Prometheus Books.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.