Science and Religion: A Critical Survey - Softcover

Rolston, Holmes

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1599470993 ISBN 13: 9781599470993

Publisher: Templeton Press, 2006

Synopsis

This landmark book, first published in 1987, is now back in print, with a new introduction by its award-winning author. An interdisciplinary approach to the central themes of scientific and religious thought, this book was widely heralded upon its publication for the richness and depth of its contribution to the science and religion dialogue.

 

“notable for its breadth and depth . . . filled with admirably argued and powerfully presented treatments of critical issues.”—Joseph Pickle, Colorado College, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science

 

“a superb and subtle book.”—David Foxgrover, Christian Century

 

“a monumental work . . . [T]he book is truly outstanding.”—John H. Wright, Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley, Theological Studies

 

“Rolston’s presentation of the methods of science, along with up-to-date summaries of the main achievements of the various sciences, is commendable for its clarity and critical acumen.”—Choice

 

According to Holmes Rolston III, there are fundamental questions that science alone cannot answer; these questions are the central religious questions. He uses the scientific method of inquiry to distill key issues from science, and then he integrates them in a study that begins with matter and moves through life, mind, culture, history, and spirit. Incorporating religious and scientific worldviews, he begins with an examination of two natural sciences: physics and biology. He then extrapolates examples from two human sciences: psychology and sociology. Next, he moves to the storied universe and world history, raising and addressing religious questions. “Never in the histories of science and religion have the

opportunities been greater for fertile interaction between these fields, with mutual benefits to both,” states Rolston. The re-publication of this book provides current researchers and students in the field an invaluable, timeless methodological resource.The new introduction offers updated insights based on new scientific research. 

About this title

About the Author

Holmes Rolston III is a world-renowned philosopher, widely recognized as the father of environmental ethics as a modern academic discipline. The winner of the Templeton Prize in 2003 and the Mendel Medal in 2005, he currently holds the position of University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University. Rolston is associate editor of the journal Environmental Ethics and serves on the editorial boards of a number of other journals. He is the author of six books that have won acclaim in both academic journals and the mainstream press.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

SCIENCE & RELIGION

A Critical Survey

By HOLMES ROLSTON III

Templeton Foundation Press

Copyright © 1987 Holmes Rolston III
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-1-59947-099-3

Contents

Preface....................................................................
vii
Introduction to the 2006 Edition. Human Uniqueness and Human 
Responsibility: Science and Religion in a New Millennium...................
xi
Chapter 1. Methods in Scientific and Religious Inquiry.....................
1
Chapter 2. Matter: Religion and the Physical Sciences......................
33
Chapter 3. Life: Religion and the Biological Sciences......................
81
Chapter 4. Mind: Religion and the Psychological Sciences...................
151
Chapter 5. Culture: Religion and the Social Sciences.......................
198
Chapter 6. Nature and History..............................................
238
Chapter 7. Nature, History, and God........................................
297
Index......................................................................
349

CHAPTER 1

Methods in Scientificand Religious Inquiry

To have a method is to have a disciplined mode of "following after" ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])truth, and in science and religion alike one intends an orderly approach to understanding,to be a methodise, but procedures in the two fields may seem very differentand even incompatible. In this overview we will broadly assess their operation so asto see whether and how far they are related or opposed. Lest the diversity in religionprove overwhelming, the plan here is to consult mainly Western theistic belief, itselfdiverse enough, as it has developed in interaction with the sciences, which have adiversity almost equal to that in theism. Despite the pluralism, these two greatepistemic lines in the West are cousins, at once kindred and independent. Whatfollows is partly a description characteristic of science and theology, but, so far asI choose good science and good religion for models, it is a prescription of how inquirythere ought to be done, perhaps not always, but at least in the present state of thesearts.

The thesis that will emerge is that in generic logical form science and religion,when done well, are more alike than is often supposed, especially at their cores. Animplication of this is that positivistic and scientistic views that exalt science anddowngrade religion involve serious misunderstanding of the nature of both scientificand religious methods. At the same time, in material content, science and religiontypically offer alternative interpretations of experience, the scientific interpretationbeing based on causality, the religious interpretation based on meaning. There arediffering emphases in specific logical form in the rational modes of each. But bothdisciplines are rational, and both are susceptible to improvement over the centuries;both use governing theoretical paradigms as they confront experience. The conflictsbetween scientific and religious interpretations arise because the boundary betweencausality and meaning is semipermeable.

1. THEORIES, CREEDS, AND EXPERIENCE

The Hypothetico-deductive Method and Theory-laden Facts

Whether there exists an overall scientific method is open to question, since theprocedures of electronics engineers, plant taxonomists, and social psychologists areso diverse. In a generalized way science mixes observation, theory, and inference,but these ingredients with their blending are more complex than at first appears,and not until something of this complexity is appreciated can one appreciate ascientific method and then profitably ask how far religious inquiry differs from it.Let us begin by saying that a scientist attempts to operate out of theory in an if-thenmode "over" the facts. A schematic of this would find a theory (the hypothesis)arising out of the facts, followed by deduction back down to further empirical-levelexpectations, those then being related back to observations to confirm or disconfirmthe theory, more or less, and to generate revised theory, from which new conclusionsare drawn, after which the facts are again consulted (Figure 1.1). This is sometimescalled the hypothetico-deductive model, but we are using a more expanded versionof it than that phrase usually implies, and also noticing already that a theory comesto have a developmental history.

Such facts quickly become theory-laden. When the engineer reports that thecurrent through the meter is ten amperes, or the zoologist discovers that thevertebrates are related to the tunicates, the larval notochord of the latter and thespinal chord of the former having evolved from a long-extinct hypothetical ancestor,their facts come within and are partially products of their theoretical frameworks.Fabricated concepts and laws are used to trace and to classify naturalevents, and the facts so obtained do not come nakedly but rather filtered throughthese constructs. In the more theoretical sciences, those likeliest to affect cosmicbelief, there is often a tenuous combination of speculative abstraction with senseobservation, linked by hundreds of intervening hypotheses, as in the experimentsthat verify the time dilation of relativity theory by measuring the supposed decayof muons at high velocity, all translated into streaks on photographic plates andmeter readings. The geneticist maps a gene by back inference from statisticalphenotypic expressions. The biochemist decodes the amino acid sequence in aprotein by observing certain colored stains or layers of material in an ultracentrifuge.Molecular biochemistry contains highly theoretical construction of modelsof unobservable entities and processes—for instance, the lac-operon geneticsequence—to account for observed gross phenomena at great distance from thepostulated microentities. Geology has become a unified science only in recentyears, with the appearance of plate tectonics, but that supertheory stands at agreat inferential distance from the immediate observation of fault lines, subsidencemeasurements, chart tracings that indicate oceanic ridges, and magnetometerreadings from which are inferred prehistoric reversals of Earth's magneticfield.

Even in the plainer bare world there are no centimeters, or calories, or lines oflatitude and longitude; nor can it be Tuesday, 1:30 p.m. (EST), for these are allconceptual overlays on nature. The center of gravity in a rock is as much assignedas discovered. Still, one may reply, at least there are some evident natural kinds; thereare tunicates and genes, there were trilobites in the Cambrian period, and Yosemite'sHalf Dome is made of quartz monzonite. But even these facts do not comeunalloyed with the theories by which they were obtained. There is always somedefinition or decision about theoretical kinds in what counts as a tunicate, a gene,quartz monzonite, or the Cambrian period, as these are fitted into explanatorytheories.

The whole numbers may seem natural enough until we add, divide, and multiplyby zero and infinity, and with some artificial innovation must define what theseoperations will mean. The point in science is to mix theory and fact appropriately,and not to pretend that they can be insulated from each other. The naked fact ismostly a mythical entity; facts are contextual truths. To believe in pure facts is tobelieve "the dogma of the immaculate perception." The "facts" are always to someextent "artifacts" of the theory. The "facts" are preceded by "acts" that set up thefacts. The facts are seldom, if ever, immediately given; they are arranged for, indeed,chased down on long hunts by those armed with powerful theories. Even wheretheoretical concepts can be cashed in for observations in a fairly straightforward way,the cash-in rules come out of the theory, not the observations, and such rules canchange in the course of the development of the theory.

How such theories are originated, as distinct from their subsequent verification,has proved troublesome to analyze, and recently it has seemed that the context ofdiscovery is more important, more interesting, than is the later context of justification.Given a certain set of observations, what theory will fit them? In catalogingnatural types or in formulating simple regularities one is tempted to say that scienceworks by induction, a logic that leads in toward a concluded general principle frompremised particular occasions. Here the contribution of the scientist can seemminimal, even though the law vastly overprojects what can be verified. But thegenerating of theories is more complex; the scientist comes up with models andabstractions, such as "lines of force in an electromagnetic field," or "covalentbonding," or "black holes," concepts that no doubt come by mulling over the data,but in which he also contributes creative hypotheses that require the stroke ofgenius.

These initial ideas may come in the laboratory or at study but are sometimesreported to come in unusual circumstances. While dozing by the fire, August Kekulédreamed a reverie of gamboling atoms and snakes, one biting its own tail, out ofwhich the great chemist that night developed the chain-linked ring structure ofbenzene. Fred Hoyle regarded as pivotal in triggering the steady-state theory of theuniverse a curious personal incident in which he lost a screw or nail and could neverfind it, as though it had forever vanished. He reversed the experience to conceiveof the spontaneous creation of matter. Albert Einstein reported that he initiatedhis relativity theory, partly at least, "in vision" late one night, and he greatlyemphasized the free play of the imagination, first and charismatic, only later to beput sternly to observational test. Hans Adolf Krebs, on the other hand, reporteda long and steady step-by-step deciphering of the citric acid cycle. Both elementsare present in Charles Darwin and difficult to separate. But if eurekaism is oneextreme, dull inductivism is another. There is much inspiration whenever a fertilehypothesis is born. The logic of such inception has proved elusive; it involvessomething beyond either induction or deduction, and there seems to be no recipefor cooking up theories. This is perhaps necessarily so proportionately as it is creative.Revolutionary science is more chaotic here than is normal science.

Verification and Falsification

Crucial though the question is of how one gains a novel theory, the real test comeswith its verification. Given a theory (T), what observations (O) follow? Here deductionis in order, at least in a broad sense; logic leads out from premised generalprinciples to particular conclusions, in the mathematical phases of science, whereone has formal laws and initial conditions, this can be exact and necessary deduction,but elsewhere it is less so. Atomic theory is only partially metric, and what couldbe deduced from the atomic table about the properties of as yet unfound elementswas suggestive and imprecise. Often a theory permits the deduction only of a rangeof possible alternatives, and we must sometimes deduce in a weak, nontight sense.Still, a fertile theory will suggest new observations that can be made to check it. Herewe often presume that our logic is paralleling a causal chain, that a law causallyproduces an observed event, the narrower sense of the hypothetico-deductive orcovering-law model. But the principle here is broader than this, including whateverparticular events or observational structures follow from general theoretical models:

If T, then O

Given: O

Therefore: T

Alas, however, this procedure commits the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent,since some quite variant theory (T') might as well or better explain theobservations in question, and the history of science is replete with examples of this.On the other hand, if the observations fail (not-O), then the theory is refuted, bymodus tollens, an elementary principle of valid argument:

If T. then O

Given: not-0

Therefore: not T

Science then first appears to be caught in a rotten asymmetry: no amount of positiveobservations can prove a theory, while a single negative observation will destroy it.We can be definitely wrong, but only vaguely right! This asymmetry has led somescientists to concentrate on falsification, counting discontinuing instances as moreweighty than confirming cases.

What happens in actual science is that positive observations do in some way tendto establish the theory, although it is difficult logically to specify just how. Again,it is tempting to say that positive observations by induction render the theoryprobable, while conceding that this is never hard proof even in science and recognizingthat the rational status of induction is flawed, especially so far as future predictionsfrom the theory involve a kind of backing into the future. Positive observationscorroborate or strengthen the theory, although they cannot clinch it. We get noproofs; we get at best plausibility arguments.

On the other hand, on closer inspection, those negative observations that firstappear to offer hard disproof also soften. Theories are not tested purely and simplybut in conjunction with various presumed or unknown intermediate factors, calledauxiliary hypotheses (A), such as those pertaining to instruments, to irrelevant orabsent influences, etc., and one can typically adjust for upsetting circumstances soas to salvage the central theory:

If (T + A), then O

Given: not-O

Therefore: not T and/or not-A

Something has been falsified, but what? Some variant auxiliary hypothesis (A') willallow deducing the obtained observations while retaining the theory. Thus, theauxiliary belt of surrounding hypotheses becomes a protective cushion. In mostpractical and theoretical science we are reduced to saying: if T, then probably O.But then not-O no longer refutes the theory, especially where this is an occasionalnot-O.

But it may be, of course, that the error is rather in the body of the theory itself.Newtonian theory predicted planetary movements reasonably well, except that theorbit of Uranus was irregular, and some astronomers suspected that the theory mightbe faulty. In a celebrated triumph of mathematical astronomy, John Couch Adamsand Urbain Jean Joseph Leverrier introduced the auxiliary hypothesis of an unknownplanet that was disturbing Uranus' orbit, and thus Neptune was found and IsaacNewton confirmed. Later, when aberrations in the perihelion of Mercury werefound, Leverrier again suggested the auxiliary hypothesis of an innermost planet,Vulcan, whose influence was perturbing Mercury. But no such planet was found.Perhaps it was lost in the solar glare? Eventually the trouble proved to lie inNewtonian theory, and relativity theory came to replace it and to explain thesediscrepancies in Mercury's behavior. The problem is to know when to "put in someepicycles" to protect a theory and when to suspect the core theory itself.

Every theory is held in the face of certain anomalies, margins of error, and soon. For so simple a law as that for the distance (S) traveled in a specified time(t) under the acceleration due to gravity (a), S = 1/2at², the observations never fitthe theory exactly, since the theory specifies a perfect vacuum. We also have toassume that there is no magnetism present countering the gravity, but to check thisone needs a theory of magnetism and a measuring device built on the theory. Ingenetics and biochemistry one is constantly invoking as yet unknown genetic codings,enzymes, or repression or induction effects to explain departures from thenorm. The theoretical imbalance in corroboration and falsification abstracted above,by the time it is emplaced in the practice of science, loses much of its asymmetry.

At the same time, really stubborn discontinuations are more unwelcome thanrepeated confirmations are welcome. The structural asymmetry probably does mean,contrary to a certain sense of fair play, that in science (and in religion too, we shallsoon maintain) you want to try to hit an opposing theory not where it is muscularbut rather in the soft underbelly where it is weak; you ought to evaluate a theory(or a creed) more on its weaknesses than on its strengths.

In more complex and partly established theory there are large amounts ofconfirming and some disconfirming observations, and one has to decide just howgood the evidence is. That decision is rational, perhaps progressively corroboratedas science settles into a theory, but often it is more discretionary and less tidy thanis admitted by those charmed by an ideal of absolute demonstration. Every comprehensivetheory has got to argue away some of the evidence it faces. Sometimes wedo not believe the theory because it is not confirmed by the facts; but sometimeswe do not believe the "facts" because there is no theory that confirms or predictsthem and they go against a well-established theory that we have. We could handlethis exception, if we had a little more time to deal with it! Meanwhile, an anomalymakes a poor logical fit in what theory we do have. Then again, experiments canbe quite repeat able and quite wrong, where the conceptual framework repeatedlygives you the wrong result. You can step on a bathroom scale and get 150 poundsevery time, when your weight is really 160 pounds. Hidden faults and errors arerepeatable. Theories cast light, but may also put some things in shadow.

Crucial experiments are infrequent, if indeed they exist at all. Hardly anywhereis there a simple verification or falsification, and the more massive the governingtheory becomes, the less convenient these procedures are. The evidence for the bigtheories, which make any metaphysical difference, is never of the here-and-now,before-your-very-eyes sort. What counts for a good theory is its ability to drawtogether and make sense of the available experiential material, and in this therelationship between theory and observation is often indirect and interactional.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from SCIENCE & RELIGION by HOLMES ROLSTON III. Copyright © 1987 Holmes Rolston III. Excerpted by permission of Templeton Foundation Press.
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Edition details

• Publisher: Templeton Press
• Publication date: 2006
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1599470993
• ISBN 13: 9781599470993
• Binding: Paperback
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 408