Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Broadview Editions) - Softcover

Kant, Iammanuel; Denis, Lara

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1551115395 ISBN 13: 9781551115399

Publisher: Broadview Press, 2005

Synopsis

“All in all, this volume is a brilliant introduction to one of the greatest works in the history of Western philosophy.” — Paul Guyer, University of Pennsylvania|Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, first published in 1785, is still one of the most widely read and influential works of moral philosophy. This Broadview edition combines a newly revised version of T.K. Abbott’s respected translation with material crucial for placing the Groundwork in the context of Kant’s broader moral thought. A varied selection of other ethical writings by Kant on subjects including our moral duties, fundamental principles of justice, the concept of happiness, and the relation of morality to religion are included, along with important criticisms of Kant’s ethics by Fichte, Schiller, Hegel, and Sidgwick.

About this title

About the Author

Lara Denis is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Ethics Program at Agnes Scott College in Decatur, Georgia. She is the author of Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant's Moral Theory (2001) and many articles on Kant's ethics.

From the Back Cover

Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, first published in 1785, is still one of the most widely read and influential works of moral philosophy. This Broadview edition combines a newly revised version of T.K. Abbott's respected translation with material crucial for placing the Groundwork in the context of Kant's broader moral thought. A varied selection of other ethical writings by Kant on subjects including our moral duties, fundamental principles of justice, the concept of happiness, and the relation of morality to religion are included, along with important criticisms of Kant's ethics by Fichte, Schiller, Hegel, and Sidgwick.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

By Immanuel Kant

Broadview Press

Copyright © 2005 Immanuel Kant
All right reserved.
ISBN: 9781551115399

Chapter One

First Section

Transition from common rational moral cognition to philosophical moral cognition

There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeedanything at all outside it, that can be held to be good without limitation,excepting only a good will. Understanding, wit, the power of judgment,and like talents of the mind, whatever they might be called, or courage,resoluteness, persistence in an intention, as qualities of temperament, arewithout doubt in some respects good and to be wished for; but they can alsobecome extremely evil and harmful, if the will that is to make use of thesegifts of nature, and whose peculiar constitution is therefore called character,is not good. It is the same with gifts of fortune. Power, wealth, honor,even health and that entire well-being and contentment with one's condition,under the name of happiness, make for courage and thereby often alsofor arrogance, where there is not a good will to correct their influence onthe mind, and thereby on the entire principle of action, and make themuniversally purposive; not to mention that a rational impartial spectator cannever take satisfaction even in the sight of the uninterrupted welfare of abeing, if it is adorned with no trait of a pure and good will; and so the goodwill appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of the worthinessto be happy.

Some qualities are even conducive to this good will itself and can makeits work much easier, but still have despite this no inner unconditionedworth, yet always presuppose a good will, which limits the esteem that oneotherwise rightly has for them, and does not permit them to be held absolutelygood. Moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and soberreflection not only are good for many aims, but seem even to constitute apart of the inner worth of a person; yet they lack much in order to be declaredgood without limitation (however unconditionally they were praisedby the ancients). For without the principles of a good will they can becomeextremely evil, and the cold-bloodedness of a villain makes him not only farmore dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than hewould have been held without it.

The good will is good not through what it effects or accomplishes, notthrough its efficacy for attaining any intended end, but only through itswilling, i.e., good in itself, and considered for itself, without comparison, itis to be estimated far higher than anything that could be brought about by itin favor of any inclination, or indeed, if you prefer, of the sum of allinclinations. Even if through the peculiar disfavor of fate, or through themeager endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this will were entirely lackingin the resources to carry out its aim, if with its greatest effort nothing of itwere accomplished, and only the good will were left over (to be sure, not amere wish, but as the summoning up of all the means insofar as they are inour control): then it would shine like a jewel for itself, as something that hasits full worth in itself. Utility or fruitlessness can neither add to nor subtractanything from this worth. It would be only the setting, as it were, to make iteasier to handle in common traffic, or to draw the attention of those who arestill not sufficiently connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to connoisseursand determine its worth.

There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute worthof the mere will, without making any allowance for utility in its estimation,that despite all the agreement with it even of common reason, there mustnevertheless arise a suspicion that perhaps it is covertly grounded merely ona high-flown fantasy, and that nature might have been falsely understood inthe aim it had in assigning reason to govern our will. Hence we will put thisidea to the test from this point of view.

In the natural predispositions of an organized being, i.e., a being arrangedpurposively for life, we assume as a principle that no instrument is tobe encountered in it for any end except that which is the most suitable to andappropriate for it. Now if, in a being that has reason and a will, its preservation,its welfare - in a word, its happiness - were the real end of nature,then nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement in appointing reasonin this creature to accomplish the aim. For all the actions it has to executetoward this aim, and the entire rule of its conduct, would be prescribed to itmuch more precisely through instinct, and that end could be obtained farmore safely through it than could ever happen through reason; and if, overand above this, reason were imparted to the favored creature, it would haveserved it only to make it consider the happy predisposition of its nature, toadmire it, to rejoice in it, and to make it grateful to the beneficent cause of it,but not to subject its faculty of desire to that weak and deceptive guidance,and meddle in the aim of nature; in a word, nature would have preventedreason from breaking out into practical use and from having the presumption,with its weak insight, to think out for itself the project of happiness andthe means of attaining it; nature would have taken over the choice not onlyof the ends but also of the means, and with wise provision would haveentrusted both solely to instinct.

In fact we also find that the more a cultivated reason gives itself over tothe aim of enjoying life and happiness, the further the human being fallsshort of true contentment; from this arises in many, and indeed in those mostpracticed in the cultivated use of reason, if only they are sincere enough toadmit it, a certain degree of misology, i.e., hatred of reason; for afterreckoning all the advantages they draw, I do not say from the invention ofall the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which alsoseem to them in the end to be a luxury of the understanding), they neverthelessfind that they have in fact only brought more hardship down ontheir shoulders than they have gained in happiness, and on this account inthe end they sooner envy than despise human beings of the more commonstamp, who are closer to the guidance of mere natural instinct and do notpermit their reason much influence over their deeds and omissions. And wemust admit this much, that the judgment of those who very much moderatethe boastful high praise of the advantages that reason is supposed to supplyus in regard to happiness and contentment with life, or who even reduce itbelow zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful toward the kindness of theworld's government; but rather these judgments are covertly grounded onthe idea of another aim for their existence, possessing much greater dignity,for which, and not for their happiness, reason has been given its whollyauthentic vocation, and to which, therefore, as a supreme condition, theprivate aims of the human being must for the most part defer.

For since reason is not sufficiently effective in guiding the will safely inregard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs (which it in partitself multiplies), and an implanted natural instinct would have guided usmuch more certainly to this end, yet since reason nevertheless has beenimparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one that ought to have influenceon the will, its true vocation must therefore be not to produce volition as ameans to some other aim, but rather to produce a will good in itself, forwhich reason was absolutely necessary, since everywhere else nature goesto work purposively in distributing its predispositions. This will may thereforenot be the single and entire good, but it must be the highest good, andthe condition for all the rest, even for every demand for happiness, in whichcase it can be united with the wisdom of nature, when one perceives that theculture of reason, which is required for the former, limits in many ways theattainment of the second aim, which is always conditioned, namely ofhappiness, at least in this life, and can even diminish it to less than nothingwithout nature's proceeding unpurposively in this; for reason, which recognizesits highest practical vocation in the grounding of a good will, iscapable in attaining this aim only of a contentment after its own kind,namely from the fulfillment of an end that again only reason determines,even if this should also be bound up with some infringement of the ends ofinclination.

But now in order to develop the concept of a good will, to be esteemed initself and without any further aim, just as it dwells already in the naturallyhealthy understanding, which does not need to be taught but rather only tobe enlightened, this concept always standing over the estimation of theentire worth of our actions and constituting the condition for everythingelse: we will put before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains thatof a good will, though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances,which, however, far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable,rather elevate it by contrast and let it shine forth all the more brightly.

I pass over all actions that are already recognized as contrary to duty,even though they might be useful for this or that aim; for with them thequestion cannot arise at all whether they might be done from duty, sincethey even conflict with it. I also set aside the actions which are actually inconformity with duty, for which, however, human beings have immediatelyno inclination, but nevertheless perform them because they are driven to itthrough another inclination. For there it is easy to distinguish whether theaction in conformity with duty is done from duty or from a self-seeking aim.It is much harder to notice this difference where the action is in conformitywith duty and the subject yet has besides this an immediate inclination to it.E.g., it is indeed in conformity with duty that the merchant should notovercharge his inexperienced customers, and where there is much commercialtraffic, the prudent merchant also does not do this, but rather holds afirm general price for everyone, so that a child buys just as cheaply fromhim as anyone else. Thus one is honestly served; yet that is by no meanssufficient for us to believe that the merchant has proceeded thus from dutyand from principles of honesty; his advantage required it; but here it is notto be assumed that besides this, he was also supposed to have an immediateinclination toward the customers, so that out of love, as it were, he gave noone an advantage over another in his prices. Thus the action was doneneither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but merely from a self-servingaim.

By contrast, to preserve one's life is a duty, and besides this everyone hasan immediate inclination to it. But the often anxious care that the greatestpart of humankind takes for its sake still has no inner worth, and its maximhas no moral content. They protect their life, to be sure, in conformity withduty, but not from duty. If, by contrast, adversities and hopeless grief haveentirely taken away the taste for life, if the unhappy one, strong of soul,more indignant than pusillanimous or dejected over his fate, wishes fordeath and yet preserves his life without loving it, not from inclination orfear, but from duty: then his maxim has a moral content.

To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides this there are somesouls so sympathetically attuned that, even without any other motive ofvanity or utility to self, take an inner gratification in spreading joy aroundthem, and can take delight in the contentment of others insofar as it is theirown work. But I assert that in such a case the action, however it mayconform to duty and however amiable it is, nevertheless has no true moralworth, but is on the same footing as other inclinations, e.g., the inclinationto honor, which, when it fortunately encounters something that in factserves the common good and is in conformity with duty, and is thus worthyof honor, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for themaxim lacks moral content, namely of doing such actions not from inclinationbut from duty. Thus suppose the mind of that same friend of humanitywere clouded over with his own grief, extinguishing all his sympatheticparticipation in the fate of others; he still has the resources to be beneficentto those suffering distress, but the distress of others does not touch himbecause he is sufficiently busy with his own; and now, where no inclinationany longer stimulates him to it, he tears himself out of this deadlyinsensibility and does the action without any inclination, solely from duty;only then does it for the first time have its authentic moral worth. Evenmore: if nature had put little sympathy at all in the heart of this or thatperson, if he (an honest man, to be sure) were by temperament cold andindifferent toward the sufferings of others, perhaps because he himself isprovided with particular gifts of patience and strength to endure his own,and also presupposes or even demands the same of others; if nature has notreally formed such a man into a friend of humanity (although he would notin truth be its worst product), nevertheless would he not find a source withinhimself to give himself a far higher worth than that which a good-naturedtemperament might have? By all means! Just here begins the worth ofcharacter, which is moral and the highest without any comparison, namelythat he is beneficent not from inclination but from duty.

To secure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly), for the lackof contentment with one's condition, in a crowd of many sorrows and amidunsatisfied needs, can easily become a great temptation to the violation ofduties. But even without looking at duty, all human beings always have ofthemselves the most powerful and inward inclination to happiness, becauseprecisely in this idea all inclinations are united in a sum. Yet the precept ofhappiness is for the most part so constituted that it greatly infringes on someinclinations and yet the human being cannot make any determinate andsecure concept of the sum of satisfaction of them all, under the name of'happiness'; hence it is not to be wondered at that a single inclination,which is determinate in regard to what it promises and the time in which itssatisfaction can be obtained, can outweigh a wavering idea; and the humanbeing, e.g.,



Continues...

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Edition details

• Publisher: Broadview Press
• Publication date: 2005
• ISBN 10: 1551115395
• ISBN 13: 9781551115399
• Binding: Paperback
• Language: English
• Number of pages: 216