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Excerpt from Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers
This paper analyses the implications of incomplete information for strategic trade policy. It revisits in an incomplete information context the simple but powerful point made by Brander and Spencer (1985) that in an oligopolistic industry, unilateral government intervention can shift rents by providing a strategic advantage.
The analysis is motivated by the observation that informational asymmetries between firms and policymakers are often quite acute in trade policy. In the US for example, when firms petition for antidumping or countervailing duty investigations, the investigators rely on proprietary information frequently provided by the petitioners. Even senior officials within the US International Trade Commission express concern that the information used in injury investigations is inadequate and biased. For instance, Commissioner Cass has stated, Professional statisticians would be appalled to see the sort of judgments drawn by most commissioners from the information presented to us (quoted in Bovard p. Another hi gh-ranking itc official has been quoted, If you look at the way the itc has to do business, we have industry analysts who get information from the industry and the only way you can get that information is to be on a friendly basis with the industry definitely has the power to censor the information that comes out of the itc (bovard, p. The potential for informational asymmetries is most obvious in the case of infant industries, where the cost structure of emerging enterprises is evolving, and possibly unique to each enterprise. But it also afflicts mature industries, where efficient targeting may be compromised by long-standing relationships between regulators and managers that serve to obscure information from central authorities.
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Paperback. Condition: New. Print on Demand. This book explores strategic trade policy â" governmental intervention designed to favor domestic firms in international markets. It does so by modeling the effects of incomplete information and its impact on the government's ability to enact policy effectively. Critically, the author notes that, while there are many who warn of the difficulty of enacting strategic trade policy effectively, there is limited research on how exactly this is undermined and how policy can be modified. The book insists that government objectives diverge from those of private firms and that this is especially true in the context of international trade. The author utilizes regulation theory to explore governmental and firm relationships in trade policy and reveals the ways in which these relationships differ from those in other policy contexts. They then proceed to analyze a situation where the government must address informational asymmetries between itself and the firms that it seeks to favor. They argue that, without perfect information, the government must alter the optimal policy to manage the rent-seeking behavior of these firms and that this has a negative impact on the effectiveness of strategic trade policy generally. The author explores how this effect is magnified or reduced under different conditions, such as unilateral or bilateral intervention or under different participation constraints. This book is a crucial resource for those interested in international trade and policy. It offers new and nuanced insights into how governments can seek to favor domestic firms in international markets and will be of interest to economists, policymakers, and business leaders alike. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781334431760_0
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