Entry and Exit: Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Stopping Games This scholarly work analyzes when firms should enter or exit an industry under uncertainty modeled by continuous time and Brownian motion. It presents barrier policies and subgame perfect equilibria to explain timing decisions in single?firm and duopoly settings.
The book explains how optimal stopping and continuous-time game theory can be combined to determine when a firm should enter, stay, or leave. It uses mathematical models to show why and how barrier levels govern entry and exit decisions, and it explores how competition between two firms shapes these choices.
Readers will encounter concrete results about existence, uniqueness, and structure of equilibria, along with implications for the duration of monopoly periods and the impact of potential entrants on incumbents. The treatment blends single?firm problems with interactive duopoly analysis to illuminate strategic timing under uncertainty.
Ideal for readers of advanced microeconomic theory, contract and game theory, or operations research who want a rigorous, math?driven view of timing decisions under uncertainty.
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Seller: Forgotten Books, London, United Kingdom
Paperback. Condition: New. No Jacket. Print on Demand. Entry and Exit: Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Stopping Games This scholarly work analyzes when firms should enter or exit an industry under uncertainty modeled by continuous time and Brownian motion. It presents barrier policies and subgame perfect equilibria to explain timing decisions in single?firm and duopoly settings.The book explains how optimal stopping and continuous-time game theory can be combined to determine when a firm should enter, stay, or leave. It uses mathematical models to show why and how barrier levels govern entry and exit decisions, and it explores how competition between two firms shapes these choices.Readers will encounter concrete results about existence, uniqueness, and structure of equilibria, along with implications for the duration of monopoly periods and the impact of potential entrants on incumbents. The treatment blends single?firm problems with interactive duopoly analysis to illuminate strategic timing under uncertainty. How continuous-time models describe demand, randomness, and optimal stopping decisions. Why barrier policies (specific entry and exit thresholds) arise as optimal strategies. How subgame perfect equilibria are characterized in both monopoly and duopoly settings. How the presence of competition can shorten or extend the life of a monopoly depending on demand dynamics.Ideal for readers of advanced microeconomic theory, contract and game theory, or operations research who want a rigorous, math?driven view of timing decisions under uncertainty. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781332259618_0
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781332259618
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781332259618
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Buchpark, Trebbin, Germany
Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar. Seller Inventory # 26073709/2