Entry and Exit: Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Stopping Games This scholarly work analyzes when firms should enter or exit an industry under uncertainty modeled by continuous time and Brownian motion. It presents barrier policies and subgame perfect equilibria to explain timing decisions in single?firm and duopoly settings.
The book explains how optimal stopping and continuous-time game theory can be combined to determine when a firm should enter, stay, or leave. It uses mathematical models to show why and how barrier levels govern entry and exit decisions, and it explores how competition between two firms shapes these choices.
Readers will encounter concrete results about existence, uniqueness, and structure of equilibria, along with implications for the duration of monopoly periods and the impact of potential entrants on incumbents. The treatment blends single?firm problems with interactive duopoly analysis to illuminate strategic timing under uncertainty.
Ideal for readers of advanced microeconomic theory, contract and game theory, or operations research who want a rigorous, math?driven view of timing decisions under uncertainty.
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Seller: Forgotten Books, London, United Kingdom
Paperback. Condition: New. Print on Demand. This book examines continuous-time entry and exit subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games. It offers an in-depth analysis of a class of continuous-time entry and exit games where the stochastically changing environment is modeled through Brownian motion. When there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria, the author explicitly characterizes the equilibrium strategies, thereby providing the bounds of all possible strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The book provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium. The author extends the analysis of entry-exit decisions done either in continuous time under certainty or in discrete-time under uncertainty to continuous time under uncertainty, while directly working with continuous time without taking limits of discrete-time outcomes. They also contribute to continuous-time game theory by working with continuous time without taking limits of discrete-time outcomes. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781332259618_0
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781332259618
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781332259618
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Buchpark, Trebbin, Germany
Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar. Seller Inventory # 26073709/2