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Synopsis
Excerpt from Auctions With Resale Markets: A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions
The Treasury bills are then delivered to the winning bidders and can be resold at an active secondary market.
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About the Author
Sushil Bikhchandani is a Professor in the Anderson School of Management Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His teaching and research interests include auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Professor Bikhchandani has published in numerous academic journals, including Theoretical Economics, Operations Research, the Journal of Economic Theory, and Econometrica.
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Auctions With Resale Markets: A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions
Print on DemandSeller: Forgotten Books, London, United Kingdom
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Paperback. Condition: New. Print on Demand. This book explores a model of competitive bidding where bidders participate with the intent to resell and not consume. It introduces the concept of a resale market linked to the primary market, with bidders' private information affecting both the primary and secondary market prices. The author provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the primary auction and analyzes the impact of public information on bidding behavior. The book also examines uniform-price auctions, comparing expected revenues to discriminatory auctions, providing conditions under which uniform-price auctions yield higher revenue. The insights in this book contribute to our understanding of auction design, particularly in markets where resale is common, such as Treasury bill markets. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781332252213_0
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Auctions With Resale Markets A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions Classic Reprint
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PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781332252213
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Auctions With Resale Markets A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions Classic Reprint
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PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781332252213
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