Stabilization is essential to set the conditions for strategic success in post-major combat operations environments. A great deal of effort is expended in planning and executing combat operations. However, surprisingly less effort goes into the planning and execution of stability operations, despite the criticality of this stage to establishing the desired end-state. Iraq has demonstrated the pitfalls of inadequate planning for or ineffectively executing stabilization. Many of the conditions that contributed to the insurgency in Iraq were directly or indirectly related to the coalition's ineffective stabilization of the country. The majority of the problems could have been solved if the lead agency would have asserted control over the operation. From the end of major combat operations in May 2003, until the Coalition Provisional Authority was disbanded and sovereignty established in June 2004, Iraq stabilization was led by the Department of Defense (Defense). The United States then established an embassy and stability operations were led by the Department of State (State), working in concert with the Iraqis. Neither State nor Defense was successful. This thesis explores the question, which U.S. government department or agency should have responsibility for Stability Operations in a post-MCO environment? Two of the most critical principles to stabilization, unity of effort and security, serve as the framework for analyzing over seven years of Government Accountability Office data to determine which U.S. government department is best-suited for leading stability operations. Nothing short of strategic success relies on the U.S. capably conducting stability operations.
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - Stabilization is essential to set the conditions for strategic success in post-major combat operations environments. A great deal of effort is expended in planning and executing combat operations. However, surprisingly less effort goes into the planning and execution of stability operations, despite the criticality of this stage to establishing the desired end-state. Iraq has demonstrated the pitfalls of inadequate planning for or ineffectively executing stabilization. Many of the conditions that contributed to the insurgency in Iraq were directly or indirectly related to the coalition's ineffective stabilization of the country. The majority of the problems could have been solved if the lead agency would have asserted control over the operation. From the end of major combat operations in May 2003, until the Coalition Provisional Authority was disbanded and sovereignty established in June 2004, Iraq stabilization was led by the Department of Defense (Defense). The United States then established an embassy and stability operations were led by the Department of State (State), working in concert with the Iraqis. Neither State nor Defense was successful. This thesis explores the question, which U.S. government department or agency should have responsibility for Stability Operations in a post-MCO environment Two of the most critical principles to stabilization, unity of effort and security, serve as the framework for analyzing over seven years of Government Accountability Office data to determine which U.S. government department is best-suited for leading stability operations. Nothing short of strategic success relies on the U.S. capably conducting stability operations. Seller Inventory # 9781249428855