Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1797* Excerpt: ...children. In this poem, I have always taken the word Jin in the usual latitude, to signify either the act or the temper, or both, as occasion required. (6) On «fT(i; fiE» tan at&r.t; To EKStrioj, Ckveixe; at/ni? Km T)» eaiav. Origi tontra Cels. lib. 4. See Tertullian and Latlantius to the fame purpose. (7) I say» free to good and evil. The possibility of these depends not only on the freedom of will, but also on the nature of objects and desires. We can only converse with objects known: if therefore we knew no objects capable of abuse, we could not offend: we can exert only the desires we have; if therefore we had no desires capable of abuse, we could not offend: yet might the will be perfectly free in its own nature. Whether moral merit and demerit attend the actions of all free beings, we cannot tell: they probably do; because otherwise we cannot see, wherejn the use of freedom lies; any other purpose might be accomplished, probably without freedom. Note, will is to be distinguished from desire, as in the second Book will be explained. (8) Supposing the system of things to have been created or erected out of eternal principles, such as here deseribed, we may carry the hypothesis farther, and suppose those principles to be such, tint, by being arranged in a certain order, they would necessarily form a system of perfect happiness; but that, on the least deviation from that order, they would necessarily fall into misery beyond God's prevention. This supposition affords a reason for God's requiring virtue in order to happiness; a reason which may satisfy those, who think happiness ought to be the supreme end of the creation, and who maintain that God Ihould not, sis he could do otherwise) sacrisice happiness to virtue; or fliould not ...
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