Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
Seller: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, United Kingdom
Hardback. Condition: New. Seller Inventory # LU-9781009589420
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices. Hedging, rather than balancing or bandwagoning, is the predominant behaviour of non-great powers under uncertainty. This Element theorises strategic hedging through a two-level framework explaining when, how, and why states hedge, drawing on multidisciplinary insights and Indo-Pacific cases. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781009589420
Seller: CitiRetail, Stevenage, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices. Hedging, rather than balancing or bandwagoning, is the predominant behaviour of non-great powers under uncertainty. This Element theorises strategic hedging through a two-level framework explaining when, how, and why states hedge, drawing on multidisciplinary insights and Indo-Pacific cases. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781009589420
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 75 pages. 6.00x0.31x9.00 inches. In Stock. Seller Inventory # x-1009589423
Quantity: 2 available
Seller: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. 2026. hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Seller Inventory # V9781009589420
Seller: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germany
Buch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices. Seller Inventory # 9781009589420
Seller: AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australia
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices. Hedging, rather than balancing or bandwagoning, is the predominant behaviour of non-great powers under uncertainty. This Element theorises strategic hedging through a two-level framework explaining when, how, and why states hedge, drawing on multidisciplinary insights and Indo-Pacific cases. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781009589420
Seller: Rarewaves.com UK, London, United Kingdom
Hardback. Condition: New. Seller Inventory # LU-9781009589420
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Ireland
Condition: New. 2026. hardcover. . . . . . Seller Inventory # V9781009589420
Quantity: Over 20 available