How do polycentric governance systems respond to new collective action problems? This Element tackles this question by studying the governance of adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. Like climate mitigation, climate adaptation has public good characteristics and therefore poses collective action problems of coordination and cooperation. The Element brings together the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework, a theory of polycentricity combining rational choice institutionalism with social network theory, to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers to coordination they perceive, the collaborative relationships they form, and their assessment of the quality of the cooperation process in the policy forums they attend. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the Element finds that polycentric governance systems can address coordination problems by fostering the emergence of leaders who reduce transaction and information costs. Polycentric systems, however, struggle to address issues of inequality and redistribution.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
Seller: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, U.S.A.
hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Seller Inventory # mon0003749903
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 47329336
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 47329336-n
Seller: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, United Kingdom
Hardback. Condition: New. How do polycentric governance systems respond to new collective action problems? This Element tackles this question by studying the governance of adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. Like climate mitigation, climate adaptation has public good characteristics and therefore poses collective action problems of coordination and cooperation. The Element brings together the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework, a theory of polycentricity combining rational choice institutionalism with social network theory, to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers to coordination they perceive, the collaborative relationships they form, and their assessment of the quality of the cooperation process in the policy forums they attend. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the Element finds that polycentric governance systems can address coordination problems by fostering the emergence of leaders who reduce transaction and information costs. Polycentric systems, however, struggle to address issues of inequality and redistribution. Seller Inventory # LU-9781009475945
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 75 pages. 6.00x0.31x9.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. Seller Inventory # __1009475940
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Condition: New. In. Seller Inventory # ria9781009475945_new
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 47329336-n
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. How do polycentric governance systems respond to new collective action problems? This Element tackles this question by studying the governance of adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. Like climate mitigation, climate adaptation has public good characteristics and therefore poses collective action problems of coordination and cooperation. The Element brings together the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework, a theory of polycentricity combining rational choice institutionalism with social network theory, to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers to coordination they perceive, the collaborative relationships they form, and their assessment of the quality of the cooperation process in the policy forums they attend. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the Element finds that polycentric governance systems can address coordination problems by fostering the emergence of leaders who reduce transaction and information costs. Polycentric systems, however, struggle to address issues of inequality and redistribution. This Element combines the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers they perceive, their collaborative relationships and their assessment of the policy forums they attend. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781009475945
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 47329336
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Ireland
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # V9781009475945
Quantity: Over 20 available