Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now?: Your Quick Guide - Softcover

Dunt, Ian

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0995497850 ISBN 13: 9780995497856

Publisher: Canbury Press, 2017

Synopsis

'Admirably brief and necessarily brutal... Highly recommended.' — NICK COHEN, THE SPECTATOR

'Compact and easily digestible. I’d encourage anyone who is confused, fascinated or frustrated by Brexit to read this book – you’ll be far wiser by the end of it.' — CAROLINE LUCAS MP

'I would strongly recommend Ian Dunt’s excellent guide. Dunt has taken the extraordinary step of asking a set of experts what they think. I learnt a lot.' — PHILIP COLLINS, PROSPECT

Britain’s departure from the European Union is riddled with myth and misinformation — yet the risks are very real.

Brexit could diminish the UK’s power, throw its legal system into turmoil, and lower the standard of living of 65m citizens.

In this revised bestseller, Ian Dunt explains why leaving the world’s largest trading bloc will leave Britain poorer and key industries like finance and pharma struggling to operate. 

Based on extensive interviews with trade and legal experts, Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now? is a searching exploration of Brexit shorn of the wishful thinking of its supporters in the British media and Parliament.

About this title

About the Author

Ian Dunt is editor of politics.co.uk. He specialises in issues around immigration, civil liberties and social justice and appears as a pundit on BBC TV, Sky News and Al-Jazeera.

Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now? is his first book. He said: 'I wanted to write a book which could be read in a few hours, but allow someone to win arguments about Brexit for the next decade.'

Unlike other books about Brexit which look back at the EU referendum campaign, What the Hell Happens Now? looks ahead to the impact of leaving the EU on the EU.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Brexit

What the Hell Happens Now?

By Ian Dunt

Canbury Press

Copyright © 2018 Ian Dunt
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-9954978-5-6

Contents

Introduction, 
What was that?, 
What did we vote for?, 
What is Article 50?, 
What is the European project?, 
What is the single market?, 
What are the politics of the European Union?, 
What about freedom of movement?, 
What about the economy?, 
Norway, 
Switzerland, 
Turkey, 
Canada, 
The World Trade Organisation, 
How can we keep the UK together?, 
Scotland, 
Ireland, 
What are we going to do?, 
What do the Brexit ministers want?, 
How talented are they?, 
What tools do they have?, 
What is the context?, 
What happens after Brexit?, 
Postscript, 
The Experts, 
Acknowledgements, 
References, 

CHAPTER 1

What was that?

That was the worst case scenario. It is also Britain's current destination.

It does not need to happen, even now. These are not the consequences of Brexit itself. They are the consequences of a chaotic, hard Brexit. They are what happens when there is insufficient planning, insufficient thinking and a preference for emotion over reason.

Britain can prevent this from happening. All it requires is an intelligent ministerial team, a workable timetable, hundreds of trade experts, a restrained political debate and economic calm.

Britain currently has none of these things.

How did we get here? How did one of the world's most sophisticated political and economic powers find itself driving towards a cliff edge? How did the UK become so lost in rhetoric that this scenario would even be conceivable?

At the core of Britain's current dilemma is a refusal to engage with objective fact. The debate about Brexit was lost, almost as soon as it began, in a tribal and emotional dogfight which bore little relation to reality. That approach continued when the Conservative Party fell apart after the vote and was put back together by Theresa May.

The leading figures in the ministerial team handling Brexit do not seem to understand the obstacles they must overcome, or the profound consequences of failure. They have misunderstood the EU, misunderstood Article 50, misunderstood the WTO, misunderstood the economy and misunderstood the legal framework in which they must now operate.

This book is an attempt to address that. Based on extensive research and discussions with leading experts in politics, the law, markets and Europe, it maps the road ahead, with its many hazards and dangers. It is a short, readable guide to the biggest story of the decade.

The first step towards preventing a catastrophe is understanding that one is looming.

CHAPTER 2

What did we vote for?

The starting point for our current difficulties lies in the referendum question itself.

On 23 June 2016, voters in the UK were asked: 'Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union.' The results were:

Remain 16,141,241 (48.1%)

Leave 17,410,742 (51.9%)

Over one million more people wanted to leave. Unless there is a sudden and unexpected change in the political weather, Britain is leaving. But there are many different ways to leave the EU.

You don't have to be in the European Union to be part of the customs union mentioned in the last chapter. Nor do you have to be in the European Union to be in the single market.

The single market is the big trading arrangement that allows member states to sell and buy each other's goods and services as if they were in the same country. Most of the members are in the EU, but there are ways Britain can leave the EU and retain the benefits of the single market – like Norway does.

There are some other European organisations that Britain could join instead of being in the EU. One of these is the European Free Trade Association. This is an independent grouping of non-EU nations who are mostly members of the single market.

These are a few of the options the government could take:

• Leave the EU and stay in the single market and the customs union

• Leave the single market but stay in the customs union

• Stay in the single market but leave the customs union

• Leave all three

• Leave with a trade deal

• Leave without one

• Join the European Free Trade Association and stay in the single market.

• Join the European Free Trade Association and leave the single market

• Leave everything but maintain all existing policing and security arrangements as well as European coordination on disease control

• End every single aspect of European cooperation and retreat behind the cliffs of Dover.

This mind-boggling list goes to the heart of the problem. The referendum settled a question. It did not shape the answer.

Instead we are forced to try and extrapolate a particular type of Brexit from the result and the arguments made during the campaign. It's a messy, frustrating process, but it's all we have.

Take the central slogan of the Leave campaign: 'We send the EU £350 million a week. Let's fund our NHS instead.' The £350 million figure was misleading. It failed to mention the rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher or the amount Britain gets back from Europe in funding.

The NHS promise was brazenly dropped straight after the vote. But put that to one side for a moment. Politically, what does the success of a campaign trading on that £350 million slogan mean? That Britain must not send any money to the EU? Or just pay less?

There is a big difference between the two positions. If Britain left the EU but stayed in the single market, it would cut its contribution to the EU budget but not end it. Is this enough? Or would it need to make sure that not a single penny went to the EU?

For many Leave voters, money was less important than sovereignty. Polling by the businessman Lord Ashcroft released shortly after the vote found the belief that 'decisions about the UK should be made in the UK' was the most popular argument among those who opted for Brexit. And it's undeniable that the Leave campaign's 'Take back control' slogan was effective. It encapsulated all sorts of issues, from financial contributions to the primacy of Parliament to border controls.

Others interpreted the result in a different way, saying it was a consequence of workers' sense of anger over stagnant wages since the financial crash in 2008. And it was true that most Labour constituencies voted Leave, although it is worth remembering that two-thirds of Labour voters backed Remain.

Ultimately, these were all symptoms of an underlying condition; of something much bigger and more profound. In one of the concluding paragraphs of Well You Did Ask, Ashcroft's book on the referendum, he says:

'Above all, whatever was printed on the ballot paper, the question large numbers of voters heard, and the reply they gave, was nothing much to do with the European Union. People tried to wrestle with such facts as were available, and to make sense of the competing promises and claims. But ultimately, the question many saw was: 'Are you happy with the way things are and the way they seem to be going?' And their answer was: 'Well, since you ask ... no'.'

How do you respond to that mandate? What's the policy response to a fundamental rejection of the status quo? One thing is certain: politicians should not be trusted with such big, messy questions. They are, by their nature, ideologically self-serving. They will interpret events in a way which justifies whatever opinions they hold.

And that is precisely what happened. After the referendum, Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party, said voters had given a mandate to a points-based system for immigration. This went far beyond suggesting there was a mandate for ending or reforming free movement and into the realm of saying there was a mandate on the precise system the public wanted to see it replaced with, which happened to be the one favoured by Nigel Farage. It served to demonstrate how enthusiastically politicians were suddenly ascribing a swell of popular support to whatever policy they happened to like that morning.

Meanwhile, Britain's newly installed Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, was claiming mandates for all sorts of things while unceremoniously dumping the £350 million NHS pledge which had been on the side of the campaign bus. Politicians had found a big old pot of electoral mandate and they were going to use it to paint any picture they damn well pleased.

Britain entered a political world with very few certainties, lots of emotions and a widespread feeling of democratic mission. It is a dangerous mix.

There had been a similar mixture of emotions and historic entitlement following the Scottish independence vote, but in that case, at least there had been a detailed white paper put out by the SNP making clear exactly what it would do in the case of victory. In the case of Brexit there was nothing but a collection of inaccurate and mutually incompatible statements made by various Brexiters.

One thing, though, was agreed by almost everyone. The Brexit vote had been a comprehensive rejection of freedom of movement: the right of citizens from any EU state to settle in the UK. This indeed was the main message the new prime minister, Theresa May, took from the result and there was much cross-party consensus to support her. Labour MPs reported there was rage about free movement on predominantly white council estates, just as Tory MPs returned from the shires with similar demands from the country golf club ringing in their ears. Very quickly a view took hold in the political class: the free movement of people was a symbol of a public sense of powerlessness. It must be ended.

In actual fact, even this conclusion is questionable. Once you drill down into the Brexit mandate, something interesting happens: there is a split between those who want immigration reduced no matter the cost, and those who only want immigration reduced if there is no economic cost. That is potentially important, because ending free movement will almost certainly entail leaving the single market. And leaving the single market is forecast by the overwhelming majority of experts to damage the British economy.

In April, an Ipsos Mori poll for Newsnight found 20% of Leave voters agreed with the statement:

'Britain should continue to allow European Union citizens to come to live and work in Britain in return for access to the EU single market.'

A June poll by YouGov for the Adam Smith Institute found 42% of Leave voters thought Britain should pursue a Norway-style model inside the single market. An Ashcroft poll in the same month with a sample size of 12,000 found 21% of Leave voters thought immigration was a cause for good. These results remained broadly the same after the referendum. An Ipsos Mori poll published in mid-October found 45% of Britons wanted single market membership prioritised in negotiations with the EU, over 39% who wanted immigration prioritised.

You find the same results in poll after poll after poll: somewhere between 20% and 40% of Leave voters are either indifferent to levels of immigration or would not be prepared to see them cut if hurts the economy, or refuse to support an exit from the single market.

Take that 20%-40% support away and Leave would not have won. Add it to the Remain vote and you have no mandate to end the free movement of people. So even here, in the one measure which is treated as unarguable, there is no clear mandate.

But regardless of its objective legitimacy, the immigration mandate was the most common interpretation of the Brexit vote. It was accepted by most MPs in the main parties (although not by Jeremy Corbyn's Labour leadership team) and enthusiastically embraced by anti-immigration tabloids. It has become received wisdom that something must be done about freedom of movement. It is a nonnegotiable 'red line'.

The consequence is that Britain either has to convince its EU partners to reform the rules on freedom of movement or leave the single market. It is arguably the biggest decision Britain has made since the end of the Second World War.

We mentioned several possible approaches to Brexit earlier, but in truth only one distinction matters: do we stay in the single market or not? That is the choice behind a soft or hard Brexit.

If Britain stays in the single market, the consequences of Brexit to most people's day-to-day lives are relatively modest. If we do not, the other connections we keep with the EU are barely relevant: the big decision has been made.

To many people, this may come as a surprise. There was very little mention during the campaign of the choices Britain would have to make. Precious few commentators or MPs made the basic point that politics – and indeed life itself – is usually made up of choices over competing goods and competing bads. It is simply not enough to say that one wants everything. You very often have to choose.

Instead, the campaign was conducted in broad, colourful, almost childlike terms.

Leave wasn't an alternate economic or political model. It was a blank canvas which people could project their hopes, aspirations and frustrations onto. This was the only way you could get voters from the shires to vote with those from post-industrial towns in the north. It was a fantasy land of universal expectation.

This vague, laughably optimistic debate took place against a backdrop of social media echo chambers. Increasingly people were getting their news from Facebook, where they could tune out views they didn't agree with and create a constantly self-affirming information feed which served only to confirm all their preexisting prejudices. Right-wing populists, trading in vivid and resonant stereotypes and dog-whistle messages on immigration, dominated the news agenda. By the end of the referendum campaign, truth counted for nothing.

And that wasn't just on the Leave side. Remain too issued some unhelpful, plainly self-interested warnings, like David Cameron's allusion to a third world war or George Osborne's pledge of a punishment Budget.

But the worst sins were committed by the Leave campaign, whose insiders readily admitted they had no interest in the facts. As Aaron Banks, the millionaire funder of Leave. EU said: 'Facts don't work. You have got to connect with people emotionally. It's the Trump success.'

Increasingly, acknowledging the difficulties we face in leaving the EU is considered to show a lack of faith in Britain. Those in favour of Brexit have closed their ears to discussions about complexity. A political culture has taken hold where baseless optimism is prized over sobriety.

Trade association bosses going to visit David Davis in the summer were first ushered into a room by civil servants. There, they were briefed that they needed to go into the meeting saying that they were very excited by the possibilities of Brexit. Anyone who felt differently tended to be asked to leave in the first five minutes.

Now the Brexit ball of fuzzy mandate and heated emotion is about to crash headfirst into an immovable object: European bureaucracy. Welcome to Article 50.

CHAPTER 3

What is Article 50?

Article 50 is the European Union rule that must be invoked by any country wishing to leave. Unlike pretty much any other European law ever written, Article 50 is very short. Here it is in full (though you can skip it and continue reading):

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention.

In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.

That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

The important fact is that Article 50 is brutal. Insofar as it was ever expected to be used, it was as a punishment mechanism. 'I wrote Article 50, so I know it well,' the former Italian prime minister Giuliano Amato said shortly after the Brexit vote. 'My intention was that it should be a classic safety valve that was there, but never used.'

That can be demonstrated by the fact that Article 50 is functionally impossible, insanely restrictive and lacking in any detail. Amato put it into the Lisbon treaty specifically to counter British complaints that there was no way to escape the EU.

Article 50 will make any country that leaves the EU suffer. If another leader 'is as mad as Cameron' and offers a referendum on leaving the EU, Amato warned, they should know that: 'When it comes to the economy, they have to lose.'

Article 50 has all the signs of being jotted down on a single piece of A4, yet it is the process by which Britain must extricate itself from the largest trading bloc in the world.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Brexit by Ian Dunt. Copyright © 2018 Ian Dunt. Excerpted by permission of Canbury Press.
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Edition details

• Publisher: Canbury Press
• Publication date: 2017
• ISBN 10: 0995497850
• ISBN 13: 9780995497856
• Binding: Mass Market Paperback
• Language: English
• Number of pages: 192