Masters of Political Science - Softcover

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0955820332 ISBN 13: 9780955820335

Publisher: ECPR Press, 2009

Synopsis

For a while now, political science as a discipline has been big enough (in terms of the number of academics) and analytically mature enough to justify reflections on and reviews of its achievements. In fact, there is no lack of general handbooks, dictionaries and 'state of the art' assessments (as well as 'reflective' journals such as the ECPR's own European Political Science), which are useful in helping us to understand and evaluate where we currently are and where we might still need to go. The focus of these texts, however, is on particular concepts, themes, research areas, institutions or behaviour. What they rarely do is indulge in a critical reflection on the political scientists themselves, especially those who are commonly accepted as having made the most significant contributions to the growth of their discipline. This book fills an important gap in the growing reflective literature on the political science discipline: it consists of a series of 'objective' profiles of the 'Masters of Political Science', written by political scientists who have read and studied their work and who are therefore in a position to evaluate the nature of their contributions.

About this title

About the Author

Donatella Campus is associate professor of political science at the University of Bologna. She is the author of L'elettore pigro and L'antipolitica al governo as well as numerous articles on political communication and electoral politics. Gianfranco Pasquino is professor of political science at the University of Bologna. He has also taught at Johns Hopkins University's Bologna Center for more than thirty years. Recently he has coedited the third edition of the Dizionario di Politica, edited Strumenti della democrazia, and written Le istituzioni di Arlecchino.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Masters of Political Science

By Donatella Campus, Gianfranco Pasquino

ECPR Press

Copyright © 2009 Campus and Pasquino
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-9558203-3-5

Contents

Introduction Donatella Campus and Gianfranco Pasquino, 
Chapter 1 – Robert Dahl: The Democratic Polyarchy Domenico Fisichella, 
Chapter 2 – Anthony Downs: Master of Many Models Ian Budge, 
Chapter 3 – David Easton: The Theory of the Political System Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 
Chapter 4 – S. E. Finer: The Erudite Individualist Hans Daalder, 
Chapter 5 – Samuel P. Huntington: Political Order and the Clash of Civilizations Gianfranco Pasquino, 
Chapter 6 – Juan J. Linz: An Intellectual and Personal Biography of the 'Maestro-Compositore' Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Chapter 7 – Seymour Martin Lipset: Modernisation, Social Structure and Political Culture as Factors in Democratic Thought Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, 
Chapter 8 – Giovanni Sartori: Democracy, Parties, Institutions Gianfranco Pasquino, 
Chapter 9 – Sidney Verba: His Voice Keiko Ono and Clyde Wilcox, 
Chapter 10 – Aaron Wildavsky: Civic Passion and Scientific Commitment Giorgio Freddi, 
Chapter 11 – Morgenthau: Political Theory and Practical Philosophy Angelo Panebianco, 

CHAPTER 1

Robert Dahl: The Democratic Polyarchy

Domenico Fisichella

ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS

Anyone looking back over the intellectual itinerary of Robert A. Dahl is struck by the constant reappearance of two themes that are present throughout the entire production of this American political scientist. The first theme inspires much of his subject matter. 'The First Problem of Politics – how citizens can keep their rulers from becoming tyrants' is pronounced by Dahl in Politics, Economics and Welfare, which was written with Charles E. Lindblom (Dahl and Lindblom 1953: 273). This statement, thanks to the lofty tone imparted by the use of capitals and the syntactical rhythm reminiscent of that of ancient pronouncements, would seem even from a stylistic point of view, to descend directly from the problems as posed in classical political thinking. The second theme is found in his intention to place the theories he develops within the context of a scientific investigation of advanced hypotheses. In fact, at the methodological level, Dahl wishes rigidly to interpret the requirements of analysis in modern methodological criticism. The weaving together of the two themes – the classical inspiration and the attempt at an advanced method – gives rise to a singular combination, of which we will try to examine certain fundamental elements.

The volume produced by Dahl and Lindblom is one of the first systematic attempts of the two disciplines of political science and economics to work together (an approach repeated many times in Dahl's later production) and of the reciprocal use of interpretive models created within the two sectors. Published in 1953, this book appeared after Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy by Schumpeter, which came out in 1942, but preceded Anthony Downs' The Economic Theory of Democracy, by four years.

The subject of the book is the development of a new concept of 'plan', assuming the definition of plan to be 'a rationally calculated action to achieve a goal', (1953: xx) and therefore taking for granted that an economic policy based on a plan can be enacted not only in a collective logic but also within a market economy. What is important is to verify the prerequisites for rational social action, on the one hand postulating a group of social ends, and on the other examining a group of social processes, which are instrumental (or means) for the furtherance of the ends advanced. The rationality of the action is dependent on the suitability of the means to the ends (the rational calculation of the means), and the more the ends can be 'maximized' the more the means will be able to ensure the achievement of the ends themselves.

There are essentially two problems that emerge from such a stance. First, there is a problem of incompatibility – beyond empirically ascertainable limits – between the ends of social action. Let us look at the political systems of the Western area. The two authors list seven fundamental ends as being typical of the area: freedom, rationality, democracy, subjective equality, security, progress, appropriate inclusion (1953: 25). Each of these represents a 'value' for western political culture, which aspires towards their increase. Now, the observation is that the achievement of all these goals simultaneously gives rise to problems that are irresolvable both as regards structural balances and also the availability of the means themselves. Beyond certain limits for example, the maximization of rationality becomes contradictory to the goal of maximizing equality. The same is true for freedom and security, and so on.

The second problem arises from the consideration that not all the social processes hypothesised as means for the achievement of the ends are available and can be used to the same extent for all the ends. The social processes appropriate to the maximization of the value of rationality are not necessarily 'good' as instruments for the fulfilment of the values of freedom or equality. Not only this. Given that the existence of each social process requires certain essential conditions, this entails that not all the means are available and present at the same time (and even less so in high concentrations) as in no social context do the conditions exist for the simultaneous flourishing of a large number of means. From this assumption it follows that – compared to the variety of ends – in each given situation there would tend to be a scarcity of means.

To summarize: a) the ends of social action are manifold, and beyond certain levels of increase, contradictory; b) the means, on the other hand, are scarce and not all appropriate to all of the ends. This being the status quaestionis, how is the scientific discussion on politics defined within the perspective of the two authors? It is defined as the analysis of the conditions. More precisely, this is the analysis of the conditions for the selection of the values or the ends, which do not become 'maximized' only on the basis of the criteria of which is preferable, but rather on the basis of the criteria of availability of the means. And, it is also the analysis of the conditions that favour certain means rather than others.

But what are the means of social action? Dahl and Lindblom distinguish between four fundamental social processes. The first is the price system. The second is the control by leaders, or the hierarchy. The third is the control among leaders, which takes the form of negotiating or bargaining. The fourth, lastly, is the control of the leaders from above, which is termed 'polyarchy'. At this point the problem that was initially considered in terms of economic policy becomes a subject matter for political scientists. In fact, if preventing rulers from becoming tyrants is the fundamental problem of politics, it is the polyarchy which represents the concrete solution (1953: 275).

The concept of polyarchy is essential for an understanding of the intellectual history of Robert Dahl, and I will discuss the word itself later on. The word crops up in all the works of the American scholar, though not always with exactly the same connotations, and there is no doubt that in the work co-authored with Lindblom – who was above all an economist – the chapters dedicated to the expansion of the concept can be traced back to Dahl. The first definition that Dahl gives us of the notion of a polyarchy, which is to a certain extent surprising, is a definition of what it is not, and which is gleaned from the statement that 'Polyarchy, not democracy, is the actual solution to the First Problem of Politics' (1953: 275). To start with, therefore, polyarchy is not democracy. Moreover, and this is an equally significant aspect, democracy does not represent an adequate solution to the problem of preventing rulers from becoming tyrants, given that the control of the leaders is a specific function of the polyarchal process.

The relationship between democracy and polyarchy will be one of the main themes in a later book by Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (published in 1956), in which not only is the subject considered in greater depth but certain ideas are further defined and a number of themes are corrected. Meanwhile, I will attempt to reconstruct the analysis of the conditions that make the existence of a polyarchy possible, as developed in the book Politics, Economics and Welfare.

Nowadays, as Dahl states, in both small groups and complex organisations two fundamental tendencies are at work. The first is the push towards inequality of control, or towards unilateral control: a trend that Michels evoked in relation to socialist parties, when he talked about 'the iron law of oligarchy.' However, there is also a second tendency in which organisms do not operate in an exclusive form through the unilateral use of command and the manipulation of the base, but create certain relationships of reciprocity. The formula that Dahl proposes in this latter case is a 'law that counterbalances reciprocity'. In other words, while the law of oligarchy emphasises the push towards inequality, the law of reciprocity emphasises the trend towards the counterbalancing of inequalities. When this latter trend becomes strong and empowering enough, then according to Dahl, an organisation takes on the characteristics of a polyarchy.

Naturally, in order for the trend to reciprocity to be able to contrast and rebalance the trend towards inequality certain conditions are necessary. Dahl sums them up in two points: 1) the leaders must win power by competing for the support of non-leaders: 2) the non-leaders must be able to transfer their support from the leaders in power to their rivals. 'Given these two conditions, leaders will be highly responsive to the preferences of non-leaders or lose their control', (Dahl and Lindblom (1953: 283)). In other words, these two conditions help to consolidate the reciprocity of controls and to weaken unilateral control. Returning to the law of oligarchy, 'the presence of these conditions means that two or more hierarchical organisations can actually contribute to the operation of a polyarchalorganization.' Political parties, as Michels observed, tend to be oligarchic or, as we would say, hierarchical. 'But two or more political parties which are competing with one another for the votes of citizens can make a polyarchy' (1953: 283). It is true, however, that the two key conditions do not arise within an historical vacuum, nor are they merely accidental. Rather, they presuppose a whole series of other preconditions whose interdependence and interaction create the terrain in which a process of polyarchy can exist and grow.

For a start, 'a polyarchy requires social indoctrination and habituation in the process and the desirability of democracy' (1953: 287). While polyarchy is not the same as democracy, for it to operate it is nevertheless necessary that both leaders and common citizens perceive democracy as a value. This is, then, a peculiarity of the relationship between polyarchy and democracy: while it is true that democracy as a goal of social action is conditioned by the availability of the means or the social processes, it is also true that democracy, as a value in itself, conditions the actual working of the polyarchal social process. Effectively, in the complex game of political partners, means and ends would appear to be mutually conditioning and conditioned.

The second precondition emphasises the need for a basic consensus as regards the 'rules of the game', concerning the fundamental issues and the methods that facilitate peaceful competition and allow citizens freely to transfer their votes from the governing leaders to the opposition (1953: 294). The logic of this second condition is that the models of citizen orientation as regards the political process (the 'political culture' as Gabriel Almond and his followers would put it) must have an area, or a level, of generalised homogeneity, without which dissent will involve not only those in power and their actions, but would also risk involving the foundations of the political regime itself, thus endangering the very institutions that could resolve conflicts peacefully.

The other four preconditions set out by Dahl can be quickly summarised: a considerable degree of social pluralism, that is to say a variety of social organisations each of which has a wide measure of independence; a relatively high degree of political activity and popular participation; the inability to win elections as the main obstacle to the access of positions to political power; and the presupposition of a society that has an appreciable level of psychological security, resulting from limited differences in wealth and income, and perhaps from widespread education (1953: 302–19).

This rapid summary is because – apart from the aspects of substantial theory – I am interested at this point in outlining Dahl's argumentative procedure and the logical syntax as they take form in this early work. Two essential problems, however, remain open: the issue of the relationship between democracy and polyarchy, which has certain ambivalent aspects; and the question of measuring techniques, which are of utmost importance in a discussion that is rich in expressions such as 'considerable degree', 'appreciable level', relatively high rate', and which in general is set out in terms of maximization and of appropriateness/adequacy of the means to the ends.

THREE CONCEPTIONS

As mentioned earlier, Dahl deals in depth with the relationship between democracy and polyarchy, and sets out his point of view in the book A Preface to Democratic Theory. The author distances himself from the idea of a single theory of democracy, but talks rather of 'democratic theories' (Dahl 1967: 1). One could make a long list of possible democratic theories, and Dahl himself puts forward some proposals. However, his analysis is limited to a few representative types of democratic theory: in particular to Madisonian democracy, populist democracy and polyarchal democracy. It should be noted that Dahl thus abandons the, albeit ambiguous, contraposition between democracy and polyarchy that had been outlined in the book co-authored with Lindblom. In this volume the idea of polyarchy is clearly a theory of democracy.

One of the central preoccupations of the Madisonian concept of democracy is the establishment and conservation of a 'non-tyrannical republic'. But what is tyranny? Dahl's interpretation of Madison's vision paints tyranny as any serious violation of a natural right, and this is engendered when all powers – legislative, executive and judiciary – are concentrated in the same hands, and, as such, an aggregation involves the elimination of those external controls that alone guarantee full respect of individual rights. As Alexander Hamilton said so succinctly, 'give all power to many and they will oppress the few: give all the power to few and they will oppress the many' (Dahl 1967: 7). From such a perspective, at least two conditions are necessary to guarantee the existence of a republic that is not tyrannical: that the concentration of all the power in the same hands is avoided at all costs; and that those factions are controlled so that they are unable to operate successfully against the rights of citizens or the interests of the community.

According to Dahl, the means which Madisonian democracy foresees for the fulfilment of such conditions are the organisation and the functioning of a system of constitutional checks and balances, and the division of powers. However, this is the point of the doctrine most open to criticism. Actually, the Madisonian concept boils down to a fundamental political mechanism, that of reciprocal control among leaders (1967: 21). The reason is easy to explain: in its essence, Madisonian democracy does not forget its origins as a political system aimed at protecting the 'natural rights of the well-born and the few' (1967: 83). In this sense, the accent is placed above all on the rules of the constitutional game, since in a republic of 'the well-born and the few', what counts is the action of these minorities and of the mutual checks, which come down to – as Politics, Economics and Welfare shows us – a process of bargaining. Once the process of bargaining and the mutual control between minorities has been sorted out, one is more than half way there.

Dahl puts forward three reservations about this concept. First, it does not state that the mutual control between leaders, considered sufficient to avoid tyranny, requires that a separation of powers be written into the constitution. Second, it does not fully weigh the significance of the psychological reality that comes into play with checks on behaviour. Third, and most importantly, the Madisonian-theory overestimates the importance of constitutional checks and underestimates the mechanisms of social checks and balances that exist in any pluralistic community. 'Without these social checks and balances it is doubtful that all of the intragovernmental checks on officials prevent tyranny; with them it is doubtful that all of the intragovernmental checks of the Madisonian system as it operates in the US are necessary to prevent tyranny' (1967: 21–22). While these are the main criticisms made of Madisonian democracy, the populist theory of democracy provokes another type of criticism.

(Continues...)

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Edition details

• Publisher: ECPR Press
• Publication date: 2009
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0955820332
• ISBN 13: 9780955820335
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 260
• Editor: Donatella Campus, Gianfranco Pasquino