Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II - Hardcover

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0804789665 ISBN 13: 9780804789660

Publisher: Stanford University Press, 2014

Synopsis

Negotiating China's Destiny explains how China developed from a country that hardly mattered internationally into the important world power it is today. Before World War II, China had suffered through five wars with European powers as well as American imperial policies resulting in economic, military, and political domination. This shifted dramatically during WWII, when alliances needed to be realigned, resulting in the evolution of China's relationships with the USSR, the U.S., Britain, France, India, and Japan. Based on key historical archives, memoirs, and periodicals from across East Asia and the West, this book explains how China was able to become one of the Allies with a seat on the Security Council, thus changing the course of its future.

Breaking with U.S.-centered analyses which stressed the incompetence of Chinese Nationalist diplomacy, Negotiating China's Destiny makes the first sustained use of the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek (which have only become available in the last few years) and who is revealed as instrumental in asserting China's claims at this pivotal point. Negotiating China's Destiny demonstrates that China's concerns were far broader than previously acknowledged and that despite the country's military weakness, it pursued its policy of enhancing its international stature, recovering control over borderlands it had lost to European imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and becoming recognized as an important allied power with determination and success.

About this title

About the Author

Stephen MacKinnon is Professor of History and former Director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II

By Hans van de Ven, Diana Lary, Stephen R. MacKinnon

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2015 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-8966-0

Contents

Acknowledgments, 
Contributors, 
Introduction DIANA LARY, 
Part I: Old Empires and the Rise of China, 
1. France's Deluded Quest for Allies: Safeguarding Territorial Sovereignty and the Balance of Power in East Asia MARIANNE BASTID-BRUGUIERE, 
2. British Diplomacy and Changing Views of Chinese Governmental Capability across the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945 RANA MITTER, 
3. An Imperial Envoy: Shen Zonglian in Tibet, 1943–1946 CHANG JUI-TE, 
4. The Evolution of the Relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern during the Sino-Japanese War YANG KUISONG, 
5. Canada-China Relations in Wartime China DIANA LARY, 
Part II: Negotiating Alliances and Questions of Sovereignty, 
6. Declaring War as an Issue in Chinese Wartime Diplomacy TSUCHIDA AKIO, 
7. Chiang Kai-shek and Jawaharlal Nehru YANG TIANSHI, 
8. Chiang Kai-shek and Joseph Stalin during World War II LI YUZHEN, 
9. Reshaping China: American Strategic Thinking and China's Ethnic Frontiers during World War II XIAOYUAN LIU, 
10. Northeast China in Chongqing Politics: The Influence of "Recover the Northeast" on Domestic and International Politics NISHIMURA SHIGEO, 
Part III: Ending War, 
11. The Nationalist Government's Attitude toward Postwar Japan WU SUFENG, 
12. Postwar Sino-French Negotiations about Vietnam, 1945–1946 YANG WEIZHEN, 
13. The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan HANS VAN DE VEN, 
Conclusion STEPHEN R. MACKINNON, 
Notes, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

France's Deluded Quest for Allies

SAFEGUARDING TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EAST ASIA, 1931–1945

MARIANNE BASTID-BRUGUIERE

A review of French involvement in East Asia during World War II does not recast existing master narratives of the conflict in that area, viewed from China, Japan, or the United States. It can, however, illuminate how far the disappearance of France in the war in East Asia was the outcome of its 1940 defeat in Europe and its subsequent neutrality. And it does not obscure the lingering weight of French Indochina in shaping military and strategic issues in the confrontation with Japanese expansionism.

The French stakes in East Asia were seriously depleted by the First World War. The massive destruction and death toll at home, the heavy war debts, and the subsequent economic decline meant that French investment and power in the area, second only to Britain before 1914, fell. France's main stronghold in East Asia was Indochina, with a population of 20 million; in 1940, 46 percent of all French private assets in its colonial empire were concentrated there. Its assets in China and Japan, though diversified and not insignificant, were of direct concern only to a small lobby within the establishment, only some of whose members belonged to the larger coalition of interests involved in Indochina. In Korea, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia, its vested interests were limited and linked to its nationals in Catholic missions and to the security of Indochina.

The fact that France's international role in East Asia rested primarily on its sovereignty over Indochina, which its military forces could not defend against any major aggression, induced France to base its policy in East Asia on safeguarding territorial sovereignty and the balance of power as conceived by the 1922 Washington conference. Though aware that Japanese expansionism threatened French dominion over Indochina, the French government was unable to win support for a consistent international stand against Japan after the coup in Manchuria in September 1931 (the Mukden Incident). It therefore decided after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 to set aside French prejudice against the Nationalist government and to provide direct help to China by allowing arms and supplies to pass through Indochina en route to southern China. The Japanese took advantage of the French military collapse in Europe to impose on Indochina demands for logistical support for Japan and for cutting aid to China. In the face of a flat refusal of help from Britain and the United States, the Indochina authorities and the home government chose accommodation with Japan while staying on speaking terms with China and impeding as far as possible Japanese attacks on southern China from Indochina. This uneasy game lasted even after Chiang Kai-shek broke off relations with Vichy in August 1943. It ended only with the Japanese takeover of Indochina on March 9, 1945. Since 1941, local supporters of the Free French, led by General de Gaulle, had been trying desperately to get recognition and arms from China and its allies for their own resistance against the Japanese. De Gaulle's first emissaries arrived in Chongqing in December 1941. Only after Roosevelt had agreed to recognize de Gaulle's provisional government of the republic on October 23, 1944, did Chongqing take this step.

Neither in East Asia nor in Europe were the French able to impress any aspect of France's East Asian agenda on the minds of the Allies. In Indochina, the Japanese surrendered to the Chinese and British without a French representative present. The French chargé d'affaires was not invited to attend the Japanese capitulation in Beiping on September 14, although General Leclerc attended the formal surrender of Japan on board the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945.

The eclipse of French political power in East Asia after June 1940 can hardly be seen as enhancing the relative status of any of the Western Allies. The fact that none of the Allies came to the rescue of France at the end of the war suggests that such an eclipse suited them. The alternative options for a peace settlement embraced by the French were brushed aside. When, belatedly, in 1946, the British government and Ho Chi Minh gave them some thought, time had passed, and opportunities had been lost.

There were three different stages in the French shadow-play in East Asia. From 1931 to June 1940, the main themes ran from collective conciliation to a single partnership with China. June 1940 ushered in the confusion over Indochina's becoming a sanctuary. The last phase, from June to September 1945, saw the helpless abandonment of what the French had once called "the pearl of empire."

From the start, the French government did not have the slightest doubt about Japanese responsibility for the Mukden Incident. Reports of the local French consul and the French minister in Nanjing stated that although the coup had been engineered by Kwantung officers, without the knowledge or direct orders from the Japanese general staff or government, many in these two bodies endorsed it. Wilden, the French minister in Beiping, wrote that this affair was, for the Japanese military, "a fuse that would explode the gunpowder, long prepared." But he recommended extreme caution to the two officers he sent to Manchuria to gather intelligence, stressing that "it is important that neither China nor Japan get the impression that we favor one or the other side."

In the view of the French government, the best response was to bring into play the principle of collective security that had so far maintained peace in Europe. Japan had accepted the principle by signing the Briand-Kellogg Pact in August 1928. With the help of the nations that had signed the Nine-Power Treaty (1922), conciliation could be achieved between China and Japan. Given the growth of militarism in Japan, this meant a cautious and conciliatory attitude toward Japan in order not to jeopardize the position of its moderates. This was the policy of Aristide Briand, foreign minister in the government of Pierre Laval. His personal sympathy was with China, while the French press and Laval himself put part of the blame on China's disarray. Briand's cautiousness has to be understood in the context of the prevailing opinion that the brutal lesson of the Japanese army would cool Chinese nationalist zeal against France. Vietnamese insurgents had received asylum in China after the 1930 Yen Bay uprising, and a violent anti-French campaign had been launched in March 1931.

Collective action for a peaceful settlement was the watchword of the French position. At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on September 22, 1931, the French delegate, Massigli, called for urgent intervention through an appeal to China and Japan to stop any action that could further impair peace and security and to implement an immediate troop withdrawal.

The following day in Tokyo, the French minister, de Martel, participated in the joint appeal of the ambassadors of League members to Japan to stop further military action by the Kwantung Army. He added a warning against any movement of Japanese troops in Tianjin that could threaten the security of the foreign concessions. However, France did not join the British in asking Washington to warn Japan to abide by the recommendations of the League. De Martel advised that France not join concerted action directed only at Tokyo because it could "hurt Japanese self-esteem and make a settlement more difficult." The result of this prudence was that the Japanese press claimed that France was siding with Japan.

Further aggressive moves by Japan and growing outrage in Chinese public opinion threatened full-scale war. France agreed with Britain and the United States to separately urge Japan to implement the League of Nations resolution. De Martel visited Vice Foreign Minister Nagai on October 7 and got assurances on the retreat of Japanese troops by October 14. After new Japanese provocations and the bombing of Jinzhou on October 8, France hastened to join Britain in warning Japan that its actions might push the League to actions that would favor China. In China, the call for moderation was met with open disappointment.

On October 13, Briand assumed the presidency of the League Council. The meeting was held in Paris because of his poor health. Briand's plan was to bolster the authority of the League by enlisting American cooperation. Through his personal prestige and persuasiveness, his suggestion was endorsed by the Council, against Japanese opposition, and was accepted by the US government.

Although he was attacked in the press and by some senior officials in the Foreign Ministry for his "anti-Japanese stand," Briand tried to limit the Chinese response by refusing to declare Japan the aggressor. He had the Council dodge the issue of a deadline for the evacuation of Japanese troops. Chinese diplomats understood his tactics and agreed on November 25 to withdraw Chinese troops to Shanhaiguan and to establish a neutral zone in Jinzhou. He backed the establishment of an investigative commission, agreed to by the Council on December 10.

While critics in government circles argued that direct negotiation between the two protagonists would achieve better results than the League's slow procedures, Briand worried that Japan might withdraw from the League. Exhausted by his fruitless efforts and his illness, Briand was pessimistic over the prospect of lasting peace. Laval dismissed him from the cabinet on January 13, 1932, and he died soon after. His levelheadedness had prevented escalation to full war, but he failed to obtain a return to the status quo ante.

Laval himself took over the Foreign Ministry. He had no special interest or knowledge of East Asia, but he sought, through bilateral relations and through the League, to focus on an international agreement on disarmament, for which France needed Japanese support. Consequently, France chose not to join British and American protests against the January 28 Japanese attack in Shanghai. Berthelot, the Foreign Ministry's secretary-general, argued that a joint protest would be reminiscent of past imperialist meddling in East Asian affairs; he warned that "China does not like conspicuous protectors." The ambassador in Tokyo made a modest verbal protest to Foreign Minister Yoshizawa, stressing that "the French government attaches great importance to the international character of Shanghai and to its defense." As fighting came closer to the French Concession in February, Wilden was worried, but he got only small reinforcements of troops and arms from Paris.

France offered its good offices to Nanjing on February 3 to broker animmediate cease-fire. The proposal was readily accepted by China but rejected by Japan. Despite insistence by the Francophile Li Shizeng and by the Shanghai mayor that France was the only possible mediator, Wilden stressed that mediation could only be unofficial and coordinated with his British and American colleagues; unilateral intervention might antagonize one or the other belligerent.

On February 5, Tardieu, war minister and French delegate to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, presented a bold and detailed plan to enact France's long-standing view that the organization of collective security must precede arms limitation. The League would control a new international military force, made up of contingents from various countries. The plan was supported by Japan and China, among others, but vigorously opposed by the United States, especially President Hoover, and by Britain, not to mention Germany. Though it was not rejected outright, it was put on the back burner. To French policy makers it was clear that every effort had to be made to regain Anglo-American goodwill. In June France finally agreed at the Lausanne Conference to abrogate German reparations.

Since the attempt to check the development of the Sino-Japanese crisis through an international peace plan appeared to be deadlocked, Wilden was instructed to join any unofficial conciliatory steps with his foreign colleagues. A French proposal for the settlement of the Shanghai Incident was submitted to the League Council, accepted by China and Japan, and served as the basis for the agreement of May 5, 1932.

Japan now tried to abort the growing international consensus to curb its ambitions. Since France was the main proponent of consensus and had the least vested interest in China, Japan tried to lure it away from the other powers. The attempt started with rumors of a "secret Franco-Japanese entente" that were spread in early February 1932 in the American, British, and Chinese press. US secretary of state Stimson believed them so readily that Paris had to take great pains to counter them. Repeated official and private denials succeeded in stopping the press campaign and in placating the State Department but not in removing the prejudice over Paris's alleged sympathy with Japan, which lingered in American and British leading circles until the end of the war, producing unwarranted and obnoxious outbursts.

Enticing France into some kind of agreement and stoking Anglo-American prejudice against it through leaks about "secret deals" seemed good tactics to Japanese officers; many of them were French trained and had useful connections with the French establishment. A Japanese counselor in Warsaw suggested in March that as Japan was isolated in Asia, France was isolated in Europe; the two countries would benefit from a political alliance following a trade agreement. On April 20, the Vice Minister of War Hata asked de Martel for a loan, which Paris quickly refused on the grounds that France could not finance war in China. A new diplomatic offensive started in July 1932. On July 7 in Tokyo, the vice minister of war, General Koiso, asked again for a loan, which Foreign Minister Herriot refused "politely," on the grounds that the French money market was so tight that its resources had to be kept for domestic purposes. On July 9 in Geneva, Colonel Kobayashi, military counselor of the Japanese delegation at the League, proposed an alliance with Japan, arguing that it would "protect France against Russia and Indochina against Communism," and he requested that General Claudel, the French member of the Lytton Commission, be instructed to favor Japan. The French delegate, Massigli, explained that the requests ran counter to the principles of French diplomacy. He refused to transmit them to Paris but did report on them. Secretary-General Léger instructed Massigli by telephone that this was "unacceptable; any reply should be avoided." At the end of July, the French consul in Harbin was offered a large sum for French interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway and privileged investment opportunities in Manchuria. Again, in early September, War Minister Araki urged an alliance in a private talk with the admiral of the French Far Eastern naval forces, and Matsudaira, a close associate of the minister of foreign affairs visited the French chargé d'affaires for the same reason.

On August 19, 1932, Yoshida, then ambassador to Italy, proposed to Herriot a formal alliance, but he was met with a firm refusal. Japanese military attachés and diplomats spread extravagant rumors that France supported Japan and that if the French alliance failed, Japan would get German support. In the foreign press, the devastating image of a pro-Japanese France lingered, despite Herriot's strenuous efforts to kill it with official denials.

France's resolute stance against an alliance with, or leaning toward, Japan was reiterated many times to the Japanese government in the months before the publication of the Lytton Report. In September 1932, Stimson traded the American position on German claims to equal rights at the coming disarmament conference for French endorsement of the United States' position on Manchukuo and Japan. Soon after the Japanese recognition of Manchukuo (August 24), Herriot took steps to block loans floated for Japan or Manchukuo by small French banks.

The United States did not demand French approval of the Lytton Report. The rejection was in line with the principled refusal to recognize Manchukuo, reiterated by French leaders and officials since February 1932. Keeping to that position was not to please the United States but to please the Soviet Union; France signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union on November 29, 1932, and wanted the Soviet Union as a member of the League.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II by Hans van de Ven, Diana Lary, Stephen R. MacKinnon. Copyright © 2015 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Edition details

• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Publication date: 2014
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0804789665
• ISBN 13: 9780804789660
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 336
• Editor: Van De Ven Hans, Lary Diana, MacKinnon Stephen