Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China - Hardcover

Hillman, Ben

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0804789363 ISBN 13: 9780804789363

Publisher: Stanford University Press, 2014

Synopsis

Power and Patronage examines the unwritten rules and inner workings of contemporary China's local politics and government. It exposes how these rules have helped to keep the one-Party state together during decades of tumultuous political, social, and economic change.

While many observers of Chinese politics have recognized the importance of informal institutions, this book explains how informal local groups actually operate, paying special attention to the role of patronage networks in political decision-making, political competition, and official corruption. While patronage networks are often seen as a parasite on the formal institutions of state, Hillman shows that patronage politics actually help China's political system function. In a system characterized by fragmented authority, personal power relations, and bureaucratic indiscipline, patronage networks play a critical role in facilitating policy coordination and bureaucratic bargaining. They also help to regulate political competition within the state, which reduces the potential for open conflict. Understanding patronage networks is essential for understanding the resilience of the Chinese state through decades of change.

Power and Patronage is filled with rich and fascinating accounts of the machinations of patronage networks and their role in the ruthless and sometimes violent competition for political power.

About this title

About the Author

Ben Hillman is Senior Lecturer in comparative politics at the Crawford School of Public Policy at Australian National University. Ben has been a student of contemporary China for more than 20 years and lived and worked in China for almost 10 years. His publications on contemporary Chinese politics and society appear in leading international journals.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Patronage and Power

Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China

By Ben Hillman

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-8936-3

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments, 
Introduction. Studying the Local State in China, 
1. Village Politics and Social Organization, 
2. The Dynamics of Village-Township Relations, 
3. Political Competition in Two Townships: Elections, Violence, and Rural Social Networks, 
4. The Power Center of the Local State: The County and Prefectural Governments, 
5. Political Competition over State-Funded Programs, 
6. Political Competition over Local Resources, 
Conclusion. Patterns of Local Politics in Rural China, 
Notes, 
Bibliography, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

Village Politics and Social Organization

Local politics in contemporary rural China begins at the village level. Although not a formal level of government, the village is the basic unit of rural organization. Synonymous with the rural community, the village serves both as a moral universe and as a locus for the most important networks of rural social and economic exchange. Chinese villages have undergone rapid transformation since the dismantling of collective agriculture in the first part of the 1980s. One of the most important dimensions to this transformation has been the return to prominence of kinship as a basis for social and political organization. Despite the state's introduction of new (formal) village governance structures and laws, kinship relations exert an increasingly powerful influence over decision making within the village. Drawing on case studies of four Laxiang County villages, this chapter shows how informal institutions such as kinship shape the outcome of village elections, the distribution of resources, and the relationship between the village community and the local state.

VILLAGES AND VILLAGE ORGANIZATION

For most of China's history, imperial governments did not attempt to govern rural society below the county level. When the Communist Party attained control of China this changed. The government penetrated all areas of the countryside of Laxiang County during the 1950s. The party organized the destruction of rural elites and the traditional leadership of the villages. Landlords had their lands confiscated and many landlords were attacked and killed. The Communist government organized the farmers into agricultural collectives. By the time communes were established in the Great Leap Forward in 1958, peasants from "good class backgrounds" (i.e., those that were formerly poor or landless) had assumed leadership roles.

In the early 1960s, after the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, the collective ownership of land was placed in the hands of so-called production teams, which consisted of groups of ten or more households that worked the land together and divided up the harvest. Production teams were usually organized around natural divisions within a village, such as households on the same side of a stream or hill, or clusters of houses separated by fields from other residential clusters. Today, the households that used to belong to a production team continue collectively to own the agricultural land, even though the fields have been divided among the households to independently farm. Although the former production teams no longer carry out any functions, each retains a separate village neighborhood or hamlet leader, now known in official parlance if not everyday speech as the villager small group head ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] cunmin xiaozu zuzhang).

When the collectives were abolished in the early 1980s, the village cadres, one level up, no longer had such significant power over the distribution of local resources. With a return to household farming, families could decide for themselves how to use their own labor and could diversify into new crops and other endeavors, sparking an explosion in economic growth. No longer in control of the agricultural surpluses, rural officials at levels above the village turned to taxation. This caused a gradual breakdown in cadre-peasant relations across the countryside, especially since peasants received fewer and fewer social services for their taxes. As a result, the direct cost to families for education, health care, and other basic services increased. During the 1980s and 1990s, China's peasants began to reorganize to protect their interests. Prohibited by their authoritarian rulers from forming translocal alliances such as farmers' associations, rural communities in Chinahave, not surprisingly, turned to forms of social organization that they know and trust—kin, lineage, and clan. The revival of these prerevolutionary structures and the emergence of new sources of local power outside of the state's formal institutions are contributing to an ongoing reorganization of power in rural China, with significant consequences for patterns of governance across the country.

The Village Case Studies

Because Poshan Prefecture is generally mountainous, villages tend to be smaller than in other parts of China. Poshan's population is also ethnically and culturally diverse. Despite differences in cultural practices across the four villages, there were clear similarities in the way villagers organized their affairs and the way households competed and cooperated. The most prominent feature of village life in the four villages was the resurgence of kinship as a basis for social organization. Different cultural and religious practices led to differences in the way kin groups were organized and in the obligations imposed on members, but the kinship group was nevertheless a primary basis for political organization in the four villages. In each of the villages kinship groups allocated resources, managed conflicts, and ascribed status.

Dawan Village

Dawan is a compact agricultural village of 120 households. The village sits in the middle of a long valley at an altitude of 1,800 meters. The fertile flatlands in the valley, predictable rainfall, and rich mountain pastures and forests provided an environment for a relatively prosperous rural settlement up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Dawan was one of earliest settlements in the region, but as with many other parts of rural China, population pressures significantly reduced the arable land per capita. Today Dawan's population is more than double what it was in 1950, and it shares the valley with fourteen other villages. The amount of arable land per person is 0.8 ITLμITL (one ITLμITL = one sixth of an acre), which is much less than the size of an average American or Australian suburban house lot. There are almost no cash-generating options for Dawan villagers. Even though the temperate climate is suitable to market gardening, the remoteness of the village and its poor transport links are not conducive to commercial agriculture. Dawan villagers are very poor even by rural Chinese standards, with a per capita income below 1,000 yuan (US$150) in 2011. The people of Dawan are ethnic Naxi and although intermarriage with Han Chinese and other groups is common, they maintain a distinct sense of ethnic identity. In this area the Naxi speak their own distinct language and celebrate their own festivals.

Balong Village

Balong is a semi-compact village divided into upper and lower neighborhoods that sit on the lower slopes of a long valley. Village fields are carved into the mountainside below the village and in small clearings in the forest above. Balong sits at an altitude of 2,400 meters, which affords it a mild climate. Corn, wheat, and potatoes are grown and the forests above are a source of mushrooms and wild vegetables during the summer months. People here are much better off than in nearby Dawan since the village straddles a sealed road and villagers can transport cash crops to market.

The residents of Balong are ethnic Hui, that is, Han Chinese Muslims. The Hui of Balong first arrived in the area as refugees, displaced by the Muslim rebellions of northwest China that plagued the final decades of the Qing empire. Some among them had been miners, and they used this experience to establish gold and silver mines in a nearby valley. The majority of the local indigenous population at that time was Tibetan and the Hui adopted many local Tibetan customs, in particular Tibetan diets and dress that were particularly well adapted to the climate, especially the long winters. The Hui families who first came to this area initially learned to speak Tibetan, but today Mandarin Chinese is their mother tongue.

In the late 1920s, banditry became so frequent and intense that the villagers relocated to the valley where Balong Village sits today. The women rented lands from neighboring rural communities, and learned new livelihoods such as maize cultivation, animal husbandry, and dairy production. The men kept the mines running as long as possible, but eventually abandoned them to join the women and children in Balong. The Hui brought with them a strong tradition of formal education that remains to the present era and is a reason why the average level of education in Balong is higher than in surrounding villages. Many families have members working for government agencies or in small businesses in the county seat, which raises per capita income in the village to approximately 4,000 yuan (US$600) per annum, four times that of Dawan Village.

Shanpo Village

Shanpo sits at the top of a valley, high above the other ten villages that belong to the same township. Shanpo is a semi-compact village, with a few dispersed hamlets scattered on the mountainside, enabling better access to small plots of arable land, but since the village is located at an altitude of 3,300 meters, many grain crops are difficult to grow. Villagers plant buckwheat and potatoes, both of which are their staple food. As in many other mountain villages, the people of Shanpo depend largely on animal husbandry for their livelihoods. The herders keep livestock near the village during the winter months and take them to higher altitude rangelands during the summer. In recent years, villagers have also earned cash income from logging and from the harvesting of other forest products including herbal medicines and wild mushrooms. Because of the expanding range of income-generating opportunities and differential access to them, annual per capita incomes have risen from a few hundred yuan in the 1990s to more than 3,000 yuan (US$400) in 2011.

The people of Shanpo are ethnic Nuosu, a branch of the Yi. The Nuosu have been a dominant ethnic group in southwest China since at least the Song dynasty (960–1279). Nuosu society is divided into clans that share the same surname, but each clan also belongs to a caste that forms part of a rigid social hierarchy. Nuosu ethnic and cultural identity remains strong in Shanpo. The Nuosu speak their own language, and follow their own written customary laws, which are based on mutual obligations between members of the same clan and those of other clans.

Pubu Village

Pubu is a Tibetan village that lies in a fertile valley at an altitude of 1,900 meters. It comprises twenty-nine households, dispersed along a river. Unlike the compact farming communities typical of lowland China, Tibetan settlements tend to spread out along mountain slopes to take advantage of microclimates and sunlight and to improve access to arable land and water. Like most communities in this mountainous region, the Pubu villagers practice a mixed economy of agriculture and animal husbandry. However, whereas the climate is conducive to agriculture, the surrounding lands are steep and difficult to farm. Villagers grow barley on the flattest lands, and corn and potato on the slopes.

Within the Pubu economy, the pastoral sector is by far the most important. Arable land is scarce, but there are rich mountain pastures above the village that can support large numbers of livestock. Household wealth is measured by livestock numbers—moderately wealthy families keep between 20 and 40 head of cattle, and the wealthiest families have close to 100. While Tibetan households are economically independent, the pastoral sector demands cooperation between households. Men from the village move their cattle in search of the green high altitude grasses in the summer months. Families with only a few head of cattle place them in the care of relatives in order to put their labor to more productive use, and a share of the dairy product is usually paid in return for the service.

The surplus generated by animal husbandry has long provided villagers with currency for trade. According to oral histories, traditionally the local Tibetans had been forced to trade their goods for grain so that they could pay their taxes. The Pubu villagers learned to trade further and further afield to increase their returns. They ventured as far as Lhasa to the west and Chengdu to the east trading in horses, tea, and medicine. Trade has meant that Pubu villagers have looked beyond their village for sources of income. This has also influenced villagers' attitudes toward education. Whereas many farmers in surrounding rural communities do not see the benefit of formal education, Pubu villagers understand it as a way out of rural poverty. Some villagers work as teachers in local schools and as administrators in state enterprises. The annual per capita income in Pubu is 4,000 yuan (US$580).

CHANGING PATTERNS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

One of the most notable changes of the reform era has been the declining significance of the production teams. During the collective era, the production team was the main unit of administrative control and the main mechanism for the distribution of economic rewards. Since the return to household farming, it is no surprise that the collective teams play a less significant role in village life, but the process of their demise is less understood. Dawan Village was divided into three production teams of 20–30 households during the collective era. Each of these teams had an elected team leader, an accountant, and a cashier. According to Dawan's former accountant, when these roles became redundant, the former leaders simply returned to household farming. But this did not mean a disintegration of village leadership—rather, the leader of the largest of the three teams and the largest of the village's kin groups began to assume control of the whole village. Since the 1980s there have been several struggles between the former teams over control of the village, reflecting changes in the relative power of kin groups and attitudes toward the quality of village leadership. Not surprisingly, the dominant group is usually the largest, or, to put it another way, the one that can mobilize the most muscle in times of conflict.

A similar transformation occurred in the Nuosu village of Shanpo. This village had previously been divided into two production teams. During the 1980s, after the return to family farming, the teams merged and one of the former team leaders assumed control over the whole village. However, unlike in Dawan, there have been no struggles over the leadership or conflicts between the former teams. The reason for this lies in the strong clan structures of Nuosu society. All Shanpo villagers belong to the same clan, and the division of the teams did not reflect any social differences between the villagers. When the teams became redundant, the Nuosu simply reverted to centralized clan leadership. The chief of the clan took over the leadership of the village, representing villagers in their dealings with the township. The village did not hold elections for village head, because the chief of the clan became ex officio head of the village.

In Balong the two former production teams maintained their separate group identities largely because the teams represent long-standing social boundaries between two rival kin groups. The teams maintained separate leaders who were nominated and elected by their members. Generally speaking, one team would tend to wield greater influence in village affairs at any given time. The leader of the dominant team would also become de facto leader of the entire village, representing both groups in their dealings with the township and higher levels of government. The relative strength of the teams was measured in terms of numbers, but also in terms of the resources. As control over resources shifted, so too did the balance of power between the former production teams. A key source of influence was the connection between villagers and local government officials. Such connections were often based on kin ties, but could also be based on shared experiences. Given the state's dominance in the regional economy, official connections were highly valued. Villagers respected village leaders who had the ear of local officials. In Balong, the relative influence of the kin groups waxed and waned according to their perceived links to higher authorities.

THE IMPORTANCE OF KINSHIP ORGANIZATION

As noted above, a prominent feature of village life in the post-Mao era is the reemergence of kinship groups as a basis for rural social organization. With the introduction of household contract farming, the disintegration of production team leadership, and the uncertainty of economic reforms, families naturally looked to kin for mutual support and protection. However, kinship also mattered during the prior collective era. The Communists sought to destroy kinship and lineage power with the initial land reforms, but the subsequent reorganization of agriculture sometimes strengthen these groupings. The traditional residential patterns had been left intact, which meant that the production teams were largely based upon groupings of kin, and kin-based cohesion was reinforced through common membership in a production team.

(Continues...)

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Edition details

• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Publication date: 2014
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0804789363
• ISBN 13: 9780804789363
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 216