Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion - Hardcover

Castillo, Jasen J.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 080478910X ISBN 13: 9780804789103

Publisher: Stanford Security Studies, 2014

Synopsis

Scholars and military practitioners alike have long sought to understand why some country's militaries fight hard when facing defeat while others collapse. In Endurance and War, Jasen Castillo presents a new unifying theory―cohesion theory―to explain why national militaries differ in their staying power. His argument builds on insights from the literatures on group solidarity in general and military effectiveness in particular, which argue that the stronger the ties binding together individuals in a group of any kind, the higher the degree of cohesion that a group will exhibit when taking collective action, including fighting in war. Specifically, he argues that two types of ties determine the cohesion, and therefore the resilience, of a nation's armed forces during war: the degree of control a regime holds over its citizens and the amount of autonomy the armed forces possess to focus on training for warfighting.

Understanding why armed forces differ in their cohesion should help U.S. military planners better assess the military capabilities of potential adversaries, like Iran and North Korea. For scholars of international politics, cohesion theory can help provide insights into how countries create military power and how they win wars.

About this title

About the Author

Jasen Castillo is an assistant professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Endurance and War

The National Sources of Military Cohesion

By Jasen J. Castillo

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-8910-3

Contents

Acknowledgments, 
Preface, 
1. Introduction, 
2. Cohesion Theory: Explaining a Military's Will to Fight, 
3. Germany, 1944–45, 
4. France, 1940, 
5. The Soviet Union, 1941, 
6. North Vietnam, 1965–73, 
7. The United States, 1968–72, 
8. Conclusion, 
Notes, 
Bibliography, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

One might say that the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade. Carl von Clausewitz

WHY DO NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS differ in their cohesion? Why do some countries' militaries fight hard when facing defeat, while others collapse? Why are some countries better than others at creating and sustaining cohesive armed forces in war? Consider, for example, the performance of the German military in World War II. Even when defeat appeared inevitable, the Wehrmacht fought tenaciously, prolonging the war and adding to the tremendous suffering it had already inflicted. In contrast, the battlefield determination of French armed forces varied widely in 1940, with some units offering stiff resistance, while others dissolved at crucial moments. As a result, France could never recover from initial German breakthroughs in early May 1940, and its military leaders, fearing an internal insurrection, pressured the civilian politicians to capitulate in late June.

What accounts for the greater cohesion of the German Army? Why did French armed forces disintegrate with their country's survival at stake? Traditional definitions of military power that focus on material capabilities offer only some clues as to why national militaries differ in their performance. Although knowing how many tanks and troops a country can send into battle can occasionally serve as a good predictor of how its military might perform in war, material capabilities alone cannot tell the entire story. Military cohesion, or the capacity of national armed forces to fight with determination on the battlefield, and to keep fighting even when a war appears lost, also plays an important role.

The historical record suggests no countries are alike in their military cohesion. Some countries can field armies capable of overcoming deficiencies in military hardware through their determination. Similarly, other countries bring superior military capabilities to the battlefield, but they cannot match their opponent's tenacity. Both France and the United States painfully discovered the importance of military cohesion while fighting in Vietnam. The balance of capabilities suggested that the North Vietnamese stood very little chance in their struggles against the Western Powers. In the end, however, strong military cohesion helped North Vietnam to outlast its opponents and emerge victorious. Battlefield determination and the staying power to endure a long, painful war trumped the balance of forces. Today, a similar dynamic appears at work in Afghanistan. The Taliban have proven a "tenacious and determined" foe hindering the nation-building efforts of the United States and its NATO allies. The pervasive nature of the insurgency has led some analysts to worry that sectarian divides in the newly raised Afghan National Army will undermine its military cohesion. Victory or defeat frequently depends on which side can field the more cohesive force.

In this study, I use the term "military cohesion" to describe two characteristics of a country's armed forces in war: (1) the capacity to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield; and (2) the ability to resist internal pressures to collapse as the likelihood of winning a war decreases. Military cohesion, therefore, refers to both battlefield performance as well as the staying power of a country's armed forces to endure difficult strategic circumstances without disintegrating. Traditionally, the literature uses cohesion to discuss the ability of small units, such as squads or platoons, to fight with determination and staying power. I broaden the concept of cohesion to encompass all of a country's military organizations during war.

Scholars have advanced two kinds of arguments to explain why some countries can create and sustain cohesive militaries, while other countries cannot. One view argues that military cohesion grows out of the strong bonds of loyalty that soldiers form inside small units, such as platoons or squads; soldiers fight for their buddies, not for grand political causes. This claim, however, ignores instances where militaries fought hard even when they lacked small-unit bonds, as a result of faulty personnel policies, internal divisions, or high rates of casualties during war. Another view argues that ideology, and not small-unit ties, motivates a country's armed forces to fight hard. By forging strong connections between soldiers and their nations, ideologies create cohesive militaries, capable of enduring long and costly wars. In this view, militaries fight with a high degree of cohesion because of nationalism or devotion to democracy. Of course, sometimes militaries respond to ideological rallying cries, but at other times they ignore them. Nationalism and democracy galvanized France in World War I but failed to do so in World War II. Ideologies could play an important role, but the conditions under which they promote military cohesion remain unclear.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This book presents what I call cohesion theory to explain why national militaries differ in their staying power and battlefield determination. My argument builds on insights from both the rationalist and social constructivist literatures on group solidarity. The core idea underpinning my theory is that any large group, including a country's armed forces, motivates members to sustain collective action by both promoting and enforcing norms of unconditional loyalty among its members. Norms define individual member obligations to any group. Groups remain cohesive even under challenging circumstances because these norms motivate some members to remain committed to group goals. At the same time, these hard-core group members pressure and coerce less motivated members to do the same.

According to the theory, the relationship between a government and its military organizations determines the cohesion of its armed forces during war. Specifically, the cohesion of a country's military depends on two explanatory variables: (1) the degree of regime control over a population; and (2) the degree of autonomy the armed forces possess for training. With a high degree of control, the regime can promote an ideology of unconditional loyalty and enforce it through coercion. This level of control requires both a national ideology that demands unconditional loyalty, such as communism, fascism, or nationalism, combined with a highly repressive government with no civil society to oppose it. Regimes that dominate their societies in this fashion bolster military cohesion by creating hard-core supporters in the armed forces who fight with determination and pressure others to display a similar commitment. Some personnel are true believers, with strong ties to the regime, while others feel compelled to fight.

For many regimes, however, obtaining a high degree of control over society is too difficult or simply too repugnant to consider. Consequently, many countries create cohesive armed forces by granting military organizations the freedom to train without interference. With a high degree of autonomy, the armed forces can use training to promote norms of unconditional loyalty and trust inside their ranks. Personnel develop bonds of loyalty and trust to one another as well as their organization. These norms will motivate most units—even reserve units—to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield. Units will display a willingness to fight even after suffering the shock of local defeats, encirclement, and intense bombardment. They will also fight with flexibility, capable of performing without tight command and control, as well as avoiding panic. Strong internal ties inspire personnel in battle and sustain them in times of defeat.

To maintain the cohesion of its armed forces in war, then, governments face several choices: they can exert a high degree of control over the country, they can allow military organizations the autonomy to train, they can do both, or they can fail to do either. Taken together, these two variables, regime control and organizational autonomy, produce four ideal types of national armed forces, each capable of fighting with different degrees of cohesion.

A high degree of regime control and organizational autonomy for the armed forces creates messianic militaries. I describe them as messianic because the regime's ideology advances a national mission that galvanizes the armed forces in war. Because it believes the military will remain faithful, the regime allows the armed forces autonomy to forge strong internal bonds of their own. Messianic militaries fight with a high degree of cohesion. They exhibit strong staying power: the regime's hard-core supporters fight under all circumstances and pressure others to do the same, even if victory looks impossible. They also display strong battlefield performance: strong internal bonds within the armed forces enable most units of messianic militaries to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield.

When a high degree of regime control undermines the autonomy of the armed forces, states field authoritarian militaries. These militaries draw their cohesion from the regime's ability to demand and enforce unconditional loyalty from the population. A high degree of regime control bolsters staying power, giving the armed forces the ability to fight even when victory looks impossible. Zealous followers fight and coerce others to do the same. However, they fight with less battlefield performance. Without autonomy, a country's military organizations cannot form strong internal bonds of their own. The state does not trust the military with the autonomy to create loyalty within the ranks. Devoid of these internal military bonds, most units will fight with determination but lack the ability to fight with flexibility on the battlefield.

In contrast, a regime exercising a low degree of control and permitting a high degree of autonomy for the armed forces will create a professional military. I label them as professional because with autonomy the armed forces can concentrate on training for warfighting and, thereby, create their own internal bonds of loyalty. Under these conditions they develop a corporate identity centered on their expertise and responsibility to the county. The armed forces serve as trustworthy organizations, with the singular purpose of preparing and fighting the country's wars. With a focus on training, strong organizational bonds develop, enabling the military to show strong battlefield performance: most units fight with high levels of determination and flexibility on the battlefield. Without strong regime control, however, professional militaries will slowly lose their staying power as the probability of victory decreases. A hard-core group of regime supporters will not exist to coerce the armed forces to fight when defeat looks imminent.

Finally, countries with a low degree of regime control as well as a low degree of military autonomy will produce apathetic armed forces. These organizations fight with a low degree of cohesion for two reasons. Without military autonomy, the armed forces cannot instill norms of unconditional loyalty and trust across most of its members. As such, they will display weak battlefield performance: only elite units will fight with determination and flexibility in combat. This means that reserve units, critical in long wars and conflicts requiring large forces, will unlikely display tenacity in battle. Similarly, without a high degree of regime control, the government will lack a hard-core group of supporters willing to fight and coerce others to fight even if defeat in war appears inevitable. After a few defeats, apathetic militaries will quickly lose their staying power, as the armed forces voice their opposition to the war and their battlefield units disintegrate.

WHY STUDY THE SOURCES OF MILITARY COHESION?

The question of what motivates a military during war is important for policy-makers and scholars alike. How governments and military organizations can create forces with maximum staying power remains an open question. For governments and military organizations, it is no easy task to convince individuals to risk injury and perhaps death in combat to defend their country. Moreover, the issue of motivation does not pose a problem only for nation states. The fighting units of nonstate actors, insurgency movements and terrorist organizations, for instance, often rely on highly motivated members to carry out very dangerous military operations, or, in some cases, to give their own lives in support of a cause. For example, members of the al Qaeda terrorist network, by their capacity to conduct attacks in several countries in spite of widespread pressure by the international community, by their tenacious fighting ability in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by their willingness to engage in suicide attacks, have demonstrated the dangers a highly motivated adversary can pose to international security.

Understanding why armed forces differ in their cohesion should help U.S. military planners assess the military promise of potential adversaries, such as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Ultimately, planners want to gauge prospects for defeating potential opponents on the battlefield, what analysts commonly describe as net assessments. Analysts performing net assessments of potential adversaries commonly examine material capabilities, but they should also attempt to discern a variety of nonmaterial factors, such as the willingness of an enemy's forces to fight. Taking the cohesion of an opponent's military into account can provide a more detailed picture of an adversary's capabilities.

For example, militaries armed with modern technology operated by well-trained personnel may do well on the battlefield but lack the staying power for long, inconclusive wars. Arguably this describes the pressures democracies face when fighting counterinsurgencies abroad. Alternatively, ethnic or political divisions, for example, might keep an opponent's forces from performing effectively on the battlefield, becoming the Achilles' heel of an otherwise formidable country. Still further, some regimes possess a coercive apparatus strong enough to resist a powerful attacker, even when defeat looks inevitable. Such estimates might have improved the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the tenacity and coercive power of the Baathist regime's most ardent supporters, the Fedayeen Saddam, surprised coalition forces.

This study on the sources of military cohesion should interest students of security studies, and international relations more generally, for three reasons. First, it offers a broad and systematic definition of military cohesion that encompasses not only battlefield performance but also the ability of military organizations to avoid the pressures of collapse when victory seems unlikely. Recall that military cohesion is the capacity of a country's military units to fight with determination and flexibility in combat while enduring difficult strategic circumstances. In this way, military cohesion represents a national-level phenomenon that applies to all of a country's military organizations. Looking at military cohesion from this vantage point follows a growing trend in the field of international security that examines the domestic and societal sources of military effectiveness. More important, this definition allows scholars to better conceptualize and understand variations in staying power. On the one hand, national militaries rarely fight to the last soldier; even Nazi Germany's armed forces eventually surrendered. On the other hand, national militaries rarely collapse without a fight; even the French Army in 1940 took and inflicted casualties. This study helps explain the range of outcomes in cohesion between these two extremes.

Second, the book's theory helps identify which national armed forces could fight with enough cohesion to adopt the doctrine and tactics required for success on the contemporary battlefield, what Stephen Biddle calls the "modern system." Although scholars have paid increasing attention to issues of military effectiveness, they have focused primarily on why armed forces differ in skill, not will. Cohesion represents a crucial determinant of who wins and loses on the battlefield. Militaries might understand what the "modern system" requires for victory, but nonetheless lack the determination and flexibility to employ it.

Finally, cohesion theory could help scholars explain the success of collective action in several types of groups, not only national militaries but also insurgent and terrorist groups. The challenge of motivating individuals to risk their lives in combat is at the center of the collective-action problem, a subject of interest to a variety of disciplines. Economists, political scientists, social psychologists, and sociologists remain deeply divided over why some groups can achieve collective goals and why others are stymied by the free-riding tendency of individuals when pursuing collective action. The view of individuals as self-interested actors, largely the view in economics and the dominant perspective in political science, contends that individuals require either coercive or pecuniary incentives to persuade them to engage in collective action. When convinced they will gain more from participating than from sitting on the sidelines, individuals will participate in groups to secure collective goals.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Endurance and War by Jasen J. Castillo. Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Edition details

• Publisher: Stanford Security Studies
• Publication date: 2014
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 080478910X
• ISBN 13: 9780804789103
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 328