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The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider's Perspective - Hardcover

 
9780804753036: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider's Perspective

Synopsis

Since the mid-1950s, the international community has sought to ban all nuclear testing. In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty emerged after three years of intense international negotiations. However, after nearly a decade, there is no sign that the treaty will ever enter into force.

Despite the general support for and adherence to a series of national moratoria on nuclear explosive testing, it is important to understand why the effort to achieve a permanent ban on nuclear testing has experienced such difficulties and continues to travel such a problematic road. The author of this book is neither a promoter nor a critic of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but rather he provides a brief historical and analytical understanding of the events surrounding its negotiation and implementation. The author's analysis, based on his personal involvement in the CTBT negotiations, provides one insider's view of how the critical events unfolded and how they are likely to affect future nonproliferation initiatives.

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About the Author

Keith A. Hansen, Consulting Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, was involved in the CTBT negotiations and implementation activities for eight years as a member of the U.S. negotiating team.

From the Back Cover

Since the mid-1950s, the international community has sought to ban all nuclear testing. In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty emerged after three years of intense international negotiations. However, after nearly a decade, there is no sign that the treaty will ever enter into force.
Despite the general support for and adherence to a series of national moratoria on nuclear explosive testing, it is important to understand why the effort to achieve a permanent ban on nuclear testing has experienced such difficulties and continues to travel such a problematic road. The author of this book is neither a promoter nor a critic of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but rather he provides a brief historical and analytical understanding of the events surrounding its negotiation and implementation. The author's analysis, based on his personal involvement in the CTBT negotiations, provides one insider's view of how the critical events unfolded and how they are likely to affect future nonproliferation initiatives.

From the Inside Flap

Since the mid-1950s, the international community has sought to ban all nuclear testing. In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty emerged after three years of intense international negotiations. However, after nearly a decade, there is no sign that the treaty will ever enter into force.
Despite the general support for and adherence to a series of national moratoria on nuclear explosive testing, it is important to understand why the effort to achieve a permanent ban on nuclear testing has experienced such difficulties and continues to travel such a problematic road. The author of this book is neither a promoter nor a critic of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but rather he provides a brief historical and analytical understanding of the events surrounding its negotiation and implementation. The author's analysis, based on his personal involvement in the CTBT negotiations, provides one insider's view of how the critical events unfolded and how they are likely to affect future nonproliferation initiatives.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

An Insider's PerspectiveBy KEITH A. HANSEN

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2006 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-5303-6

Contents

Foreword Ambassador Thomas Graham...................................................................................................................ixAcknowledgements.....................................................................................................................................xiiiAbbreviations and Acronyms...........................................................................................................................xvPreface..............................................................................................................................................xviiIntroduction.........................................................................................................................................11. Early Efforts to Limit Nuclear Testing............................................................................................................52. Negotiations, Part 1 | A Unique Historical Opportunity for the CTBT...............................................................................143. Negotiations, Part 2 | Challenges Emerge..........................................................................................................234. Negotiations, Part 3 | End Game-India Bolts.......................................................................................................385. Implementation, Part 1 | Ratifications and Establishing the PrepCom...............................................................................466. Implementation, Part 2 | Bumps in the Road........................................................................................................597. Implementation, Part 3 | Impact of Change in U.S. Policy..........................................................................................678. Implications of Alternative CTBT Futures for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime..................................................................759. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................79APPENDICESA. Chronology of Efforts to Ban the Testing of Nuclear Weapons.......................................................................................85B. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Text.................................................................................................87C. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) CTBT Resolution and Voting Record, September 10, 1996......................................................180D. Resolution Establishing the CTBT Preparatory Commission...........................................................................................182E. Some Lessons Learned from CTBT Negotiations and Implementation....................................................................................196F. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Text.............................................................................................................201G. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document.....................209H. Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet......................................................................................................217I. UN Security Council Resolution 1540...............................................................................................................221Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................227Index................................................................................................................................................231About the Author.....................................................................................................................................233

Chapter One

Early Efforts to Limit Nuclear Testing

As early Cold War confrontations intensified, the Soviet Union and United States began testing increasingly powerful weapons, and fears of a possible exchange of devastating nuclear strikes increased. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), those countries refusing to align themselves with either the West or the East during the Cold War, began calling for a halt to nuclear weapons testing. In the UN in 1954, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, an early leader of the NAM, made one of the earliest and most notable public calls for the cessation of all nuclear testing (Bunn 1992). However, the intensity of the Cold War prevented the nuclear weapon states for several more decades from heeding the call. Former President Eisenhower noted his disappointment that reaching a general disarmament accord, including a ban on nuclear testing, had not been possible during his presidency (Eisenhower 1965). The level of suspicion between the primary adversaries of the Cold War and the lack of means for acceptable verification made meaningful arms control agreements, including a ban on nuclear testing, unattainable at that time.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

As knowledge of the nature and effects of fallout from the atmospheric tests of the 1950s increased, international pressure grew to take some steps to reduce the potential environmental and health hazards associated with such testing. It became apparent that no region was untouched by radioactive contamination, and the issue of continued nuclear tests drew widened and intensified international attention.

Efforts to negotiate an international agreement to end nuclear tests began in the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1955, but verification and other issues prevented an agreement. In the early 1960s the negotiations switched venue to the newly formed Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The United Kingdom, United States, and USSR took the lead and finally were able to achieve agreement in 1963 on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which bans all subsequent testing anywhere except underground. The three countries signed the Treaty and opened it to all states for signature. Over 100 countries have signed the Treaty (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996).

Although a comprehensive ban proved to be out of reach, the LTBT prohibits a nuclear weapon test "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits such tests or explosions underground, if they cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions are conducted. This Treaty went a considerable distance toward relieving international concerns about hazards of nuclear testing. However, the Treaty had only a limited impact on the nuclear weapon states, which continued developing and expanding their nuclear weapon capabilities and arsenals through increased underground testing. Although the nuclear weapon states never matched their pre-LTBT single-year high of over 140 tests, annual testing maintained a high rate of over 50 tests after the LTBT was signed. This rate of testing subsided only in the late 1980s (Koplow 1990).

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

A decade later, in 1974, the Soviet Union and United States once again bowed to international pressure and negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which further restricted nuclear testing by limiting the yield of underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons-considerably less than the multi-megaton tests permitted under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Equally important were the initial steps taken to introduce on-site monitoring of test ranges (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996).

The TTBT took the international community one step closer to a comprehensive ban. The 150 kiloton limit prevented the full-yield testing of larger megaton-sized nuclear warheads and provided a significant limitation on the development of new large weapons. And for the first time, the United States and USSR agreed to exchange data on nuclear tests as part of the verification regime. However, neither side ratified the Treaty until 1990, following signature in 1976 of a separate agreement to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (referred to in Article III of the TTBT) and agreement in 1990 on additional bilateral verification provisions that provided for limited on-site monitoring of nuclear testing.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

In preparing the TTBT, the United States and Soviet Union recognized the need to establish an appropriate agreement to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, given that there is essentially no distinction between a nuclear explosive device used as a weapon and one used for peaceful purposes. Such a treaty was negotiated and signed in April 1976. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) governs all nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside the weapons test sites specified under the TTBT and restricts such explosions to the same yield limitations as under the TTBT. Such peaceful explosions are to be carried out in accordance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty restrictions and in a way that ensures that no weapons-related benefits precluded by the TTBT are derived. The United States ratified both the TTBT and PNET in December 1990.

Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban

In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration made another U.S. attempt to negotiate a trilateral comprehensive ban with the Soviet Union and United Kingdom. However, continuing suspicions among the Cold War adversaries prevented agreement, especially on the intrusive verification measures that would be required to monitor activities under a comprehensive ban. Eventually, other actions, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, scuttled any chance of achieving the trust required to negotiate such an agreement.

Post-Cold War Euphoria

No additional steps toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban were taken during the 1980s, except for the negotiation of the additional verification provisions in support of the TTBT mentioned above. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic end to the Cold War brought forth renewed international calls for the end of nuclear testing along with the total elimination of existing nuclear arsenals. In the United States, such calls began to resonate in Congress, which was eager to realize a "peace dividend" from the end of the Cold War rivalry with the former Soviet Union.

Unilateral Moratoria

On a couple of occasions during the Cold War, the United States an/or the USSR had unilaterally declared and observed brief moratoria on testing in an effort to influence the actions of each other and the attitudes of the international community. In 1958, President Eisenhower announced a U.S. moratorium on testing, which the Soviet Union joined until it resumed testing in 1961. In 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev announced a Soviet moratorium on testing, but the United States rejected the moratorium and continued testing. The Soviets then resumed testing in early 1987 (Bunn 1992).

In 1992 following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress passed the Exxon-Mitchell-Hatfield legislation, which required a unilateral U.S. moratorium on testing, except for safety purposes, along with a commitment to seek an international treaty banning all nuclear testing by 1996 (Lockwood 1992). Even though his Administration opposed such a moratorium, President George H. W. Bush signed the legislation and began to seek the means for maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of testing. At the time, Russia and France were already observing unilateral moratoria, and the United Kingdom could not test without U.S. permission, because the British used the Nevada Test Site for their test explosions. Of the five nuclear weapon states, only China was uncommitted to a moratorium on testing.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Pursuing a permanent ban had not been a policy of either the Reagan or Bush administrations. However, with the election of the first Democratic administration in 12 years, calls for a permanent ban on testing regained senior-level policy attention, and the new Administration began seriously to explore whether the United States could live with a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The Clinton Administration's policy review in 1993 led to a large boost in spending for research to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in exchange for negotiating a permanent ban (Graham 2002).

The new U.S. Administration, along with the leadership of the other nuclear weapon states, also had its eyes on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference scheduled for the spring of 1995. Having decided that the indefinite extension of the NPT would be the best outcome for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the nuclear weapon states launched an uphill fight to achieve this objective. It was clear that additional promises to the non-nuclear weapon states, such as the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), would be required. Working with like-minded countries, in 1994 the United States was able to get the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) to begin the active negotiation of such a Treaty. (See exhibit "Conference on Disarmament" for more details on this UN-affiliated international negotiating forum.)

By early 1996, in response to intense international pressure, every declared nuclear weapon state had announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, except China, which announced a unilateral moratorium only after completing its test program in July of that year. Due in great measure to U.S. leadership and pressure, along with significant hard work and intense negotiations by key international players, these efforts culminated in the successful negotiation of the CTBT, which was opened for signature in late September 1996. However, as would soon be clear, decisions made and positions taken during the "end game" of the negotiations, along with subsequent actions taken by several key countries, have delayed the Treaty's implementation and make uncertain whether the CTBT will ever enter into force. In turn, this has negatively affected the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (See exhibit "Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" for more details on international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.)

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The CD is the single, multilateral negotiating forum for the international community to address arms control and disarmament issues. Its members may discuss or negotiate any agreement upon which they can achieve consensus. It, or one of its predecessor organizations (mentioned below), has negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

During the Cold War, those countries most involved in arms control efforts sought to negotiate international agreements through small groups of nations. Initially, this involved only some of the nuclear weapon states, but later all five of the nuclear weapon states and a growing number of non-nuclear weapon states joined in. Those non-nuclear weapon states that were also part of the Non-Aligned Movement were known in the CD as the Group of 21 (G-21) countries. Although the G-21 later expanded its membership to 29 countries, it retained its original "G-21" designation.

The CD, which began functioning in 1979, had an initial membership of 40 countries providing broad geographical representation. In 1996, the membership was expanded to 66 by including many of those countries that previously had been observers (UN Member States may request to participate as observers.) As of June 1996, the membership of the CD included Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.

The CD is the successor to earlier Geneva-based negotiating fora, including the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68-the first multinational forum to include nonaligned countries), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78).

The CD has a special relationship with the United Nations: it reports annually to the General Assembly and is supported by the UN budget and Geneva-based staff. However, it adopts its own Rules of Procedure and its own agenda. The CD conducts its work by consensus, which makes agreement on meaningful issues challenging, but it gives participating countries confidence that they can protect their interests. It also better ensures the commitment of member states to any agreements negotiated by consensus. Any treaties that are negotiated by the CD are passed to the UN General Assembly and then opened for signature.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

The nuclear nonproliferation regime came into being during the Cold War as the result of global and regional efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The "regime" represents the establishment of an international norm against the possession, testing, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and their components, such as weapons-grade fissile material.

The heart of this regime has been the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968. Now subscribed to by 186* countries, the NPT recognizes two categories of countries: nuclear weapon states (i.e., those that had developed and exploded a nuclear weapon as of January 1, 1967), and non-nuclear weapon states (i.e., those which had not). It requires the nuclear weapon states to (1) refrain from transferring such weapons "to any recipient whatsoever," (2) share nuclear technology with non-nuclear weapon states for peaceful purposes, and (3) reduce and eventually eliminate their weapons. In return, the non-nuclear weapon states are to refrain from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons, but they may pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as reactors for research or for generating power.

The NPT followed earlier treaties, which ban nuclear weapons in the Antarctic, Outer Space, and in Latin America. Subsequently, the NPT has been joined by other treaties codifying nuclear weapon-free zones in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. The monitoring of nuclear facilities under the NPT was turned over to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which routinely inspects nuclear facilities declared by member states.

The NPT calls for review conferences every five years to examine the status of implementation. These conferences have been used by the nonnuclear weapon states in large measure to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable for their obligations to share technology and to disarm. The Treaty also allowed for a one-time opportunity after 25 years to extend its duration without an amendment. The NPT would have expired in 1995; but the nuclear weapon states promised, among other things, to negotiate a CTBT in order to secure the NPT's indefinite extension. Most countries believed that the negotiation of a CTBT would be a major contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (See Appendix G, "1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document," Decision 2, "Principles and Objectives", par. 4(a).)

The history of the NPT has been mixed, and questions are being raised about the viability of its future. On the positive side, the international norm against nuclear proliferation has limited the number of countries that currently have nuclear weapons. However, three countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have never signed the NPT and have or are believed to have nuclear weapons. Because India and Pakistan developed and tested nuclear weapons only after the NPT was completed and entered into force, they are not recognized formally under the NPT as nuclear weapon states. Most observers believe that Israel also possesses nuclear weapons, but Israel has never confirmed this. Moreover, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in early 2003, and it claims to have developed nuclear weapons. Some other countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, have clandestinely conducted nuclear weapons development activities in non-declared facilities, thus exposing a significant weakness in the Treaty. Moreover, there is no sign that the nuclear weapons states, despite considerable efforts to reduce their stockpiles, are ready to give up their nuclear weapons. Thus, the fate of the NPT remains unclear.

Given the inherent limits of the NPT to prevent all nuclear proliferation, some countries have undertaken new efforts outside the NPT to prevent or halt proliferation. The U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative is credited with having contributed to the dismantling of Libya's nuclear weapons program (Bush 2004). And the UN Security Council recently passed Resolution 1540 calling on all states to take measures to prevent proliferation to terrorists. (See Appendix I, "UN Security Council Resolution 1540," p. 221.)

(Continues...)


Excerpted from The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treatyby KEITH A. HANSEN Copyright © 2006 by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission.
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