Straight Power Concepts in the Middle East: US Foreign Policy, Israel and World History - Softcover

Harms, Gregory

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0745327095 ISBN 13: 9780745327099

Publisher: Pluto Press, 2010

Synopsis

"How did the US become a world power? How did it become involved in the Middle East? What is the history and nature of its 'special relationship' with Israel? Given the increase in tensions in the Middle East, and the United States' involvement in them, news coverage is in abundance. Yet, the reportage and discussion of American foreign policy is often narrow in scope, offering little background or context. The subject is routinely treated with the vocabulary provided by government officials, presenting best intentions while conceding occasional mistakes and unfortunate incidents. As Gregory Harms demonstrates in Straight Power Concepts, the historical record bears out a different vocabulary and tells a story that sharply contrasts with the common assumptions. In this brief and accessible account, the reader is guided through the panoramic sweep of world and American history, reviewing how the US became a world power, how the Middle East became 'modern' and how Israel became an American 'strategic asset.' In so doing, the book provides a broad frame of reference, illustrating that recent developments are closer to business-as-usual and nothing resembling the rhetoric commonly used by heads of state, press secretaries, news media, and commentators. As in his highly successful book The Palestine-Israel Conflict, Harms makes complex subjects accessible to everyone, without sacrificing analytical rigour. This book should be the first port of call for students and anyone seeking clarity and a historical elucidation of current events involving the United States, Israel, and the Middle East."

About this title

About the Author

Gregory Harms is an independent scholar based in Chicago. He is co-author of the classic textbook The Palestine-Israel Conflict (Pluto, 2017) and author of Straight Power Concepts in the Middle East (Pluto, 2010).

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Straight Power Concepts in the Middle East

US Foreign Policy, Israel, and World History

By Gregory Harms

Pluto Press

Copyright © 2010 Gregory Harms
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-7453-2709-9

Contents

Acknowledgments, vii, 
Preface, xi, 
Part 1 History and context, 1, 
1 From empire to nation-state: the genesis of modernity's 500 years, 3, 
2 The rise of American power: from Columbus to the Cold War, 22, 
Part 2 Dominion and supremacy, 49, 
3 The modern Middle East and Israel: a summary, 51, 
4 The United States and Israel: the special relationship from Truman to Reagan, 70, 
Part 3 Diplomacy and influence, 119, 
5 The peace process: anatomy of an injustice, 121, 
6 The Israel lobby: anatomy of a controversy, 155, 
Conclusion, 179, 
Notes, 183, 
Select bibliography, 209, 
Index, 217, 

CHAPTER 1

FROM EMPIRE TO NATION-STATE: THE GENESIS OF MODERNITY'S 500 YEARS

In his Politics, Aristotle imparts sound and simple advice: "He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them" (bk. I, ch. 2). For our investigation into the relationships between the United States, the Middle East, and Israel, the Greek philosopher's suggestion will serve as a guiding principle. Though most surveys of the alliance might start with the post-1945 period, tracing the history according to Israel's development from its birth in 1948, the approach here — which might seem peculiar at first — will instead be to begin with a world history perspective in the context of the birth of modern Europe and its contact with the New World in 1492. There is much benefit in pulling back and allowing ourselves to see patterns over long segments of time. When larger, systemic relationships can be identified over centuries, the particular topics of our study are made much easier to analyze and therefore much easier to comprehend. An historical event is far more than the sum of its parts; and while those parts are vital, so too is the whole of the total event as well as its ambient historical context.

THE WORLD-SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

Given our goal of establishing a wide perspective in which to work, it will be beneficial to identify where we are located in the awesome expanse of world history. Therefore a framework of insight allowing for broad examination will be valuable, but one that does not impose ideological constraints. One such approach to understanding world history in its totality, established in the 1970s (though certainly working from and adding on to previously existing modes of analysis) is that of "world-systems" analysis.

Those scholars who developed this method operate from the observation that the current political and economic configuration of the world has its roots in the sixteenth century. Instead of viewing the history of global operations as a daily set of discrete national activities, world-systems analysts identify a global interdependence, one that began with Europe's conquest of the New World. According to world-systems pioneer Immanuel Wallerstein:

World-systems analysis meant first of all the substitution of a unit of analysis called the "world system" for the standard unit of analysis, which was the national state. On the whole, historians had been analyzing national histories, economists national economies, political scientists national political structures, and sociologists national societies. World-systems analysts raised a skeptical eyebrow, questioning whether any of these objects really existed, and in any case whether they were the most useful loci of analysis. Instead of national states as the object of study, they substituted "historical systems."

So what do we see when we look beyond individual national histories (for example, the story of Guatemala and its relations with its neighbors), and instead cast our view over the development of modern states and how they interact within an encompassing system (for instance, the story of why there are countries, one of which is called Guatemala, and where it stands in relation to the world-system)?

As mentioned, the temporal fulcrum that the world-systems analysts focus on is the sixteenth century, or what Wallerstein calls the "long sixteenth century" (1450–1620). Prior to Columbus's arrival in the Bahamas the world existed as a system of world-empires. Each empire was a self-contained political unit. It engaged in some trade with neighboring empires, but the essential economic operation was the farming of taxes from the rural, agrarian peasantry. Empires therefore spread to the boundary limit where they could effectively exert power and collect taxes and tribute. Unlike modern states, empires' boundaries were rather fluid and adjusted with the times. The state machinery was highly centralized, usually managed by hereditary elites, and as a result of the similitude from one empire to the next, a rough balance and equivalence in power was struck; no one empire had any significant upper hand in the areas of technology, defense, economy, and politics. This of course is not to suggest that empires did not fall and get scooped up or divided by others. In general, however, the system of world-empires was a more or less stable one existing from before recorded history to roughly the 1500s.

Western Europe at this time began to undergo economic stagnation. What is referred to as the "crisis of feudalism" (c. 1300–1450) marks for some analysts and historians the threshold between the late Middle Ages and the modern period. Brought on or accompanied by famine, peasant revolts, the Black Death, and increased competition, this stagnation spurred regional powers to begin to consider the possibilities beyond the Mediterranean Sea in search of a solution to the crisis. Europe saw fit to expand the stage so as to open broader markets, gain access to gold bullion, and acquire sources of food and raw materials. Furthermore, the technology was also available — three-masted sailing ships and firearms being key innovations — to allow for further exploration and the projection of power over less-developed cultures. It was in this transition that the global configuration shifted from a world-empires system to the modern world-system, or world economy, composed of sovereign states. Though hardly an overnight transformation, as of the sixteenth century the way Western Europe did business began to change, and the world along with it.

In the system of world-empires those who derived wealth and power were the very elites to whom the empire belonged. Farmers and craftsmen, on the other hand, produced a product, sold that product, and hoped to make enough to pay for food, taxes owed, and materials for further production. In other words, the market existed for the sake of subsistence; if anyone was coming out ahead it was the ruling class. But the changes that were occurring in the sixteenth century catalyzed a massive economic reordering that remains today. The primary catalyst was the ability and desire to seek markets on a global scale. It was in everyone's best interest, from laborers to the ruling elite, to produce for the worldwide market. Increased revenue helped the governments that were emerging out of constant conflict in Western Europe to fund such conflict, and the people involved in agriculture and the trades obviously benefited from a broader source of income. Out of this transition came forth a novel idea: Instead of generating enough income to merely subsist, global access spelled the opportunity for limitless accumulation of capital. Prior to this time surplus income was generally in the hands of the ruling class, whereas the subject class, if indeed they did make any surplus monies, usually reinvested it in their businesses. But with accrual of capital being the primary objective of the burgeoning capitalist merchant class, reinvestment became another means of creating income. Thus, the capitalist world-system began to take shape.

Two key aspects of the modern world economy, both of which are mutually dependent, are the sovereign state and capitalism. As Spain and Portugal made colonial contact with South and Central America, as well as gaining access to Asian and African markets, the powers in Western Europe began to consolidate their holdings. In neither a quick nor tidy manner, the Europe that now exists on maps began to unfold. Also, the parallel development of the state-based political structure and the capitalist world economy revealed another essential component of the modern world-system: the world division of labor.

By the mid-1500s the world-system was split roughly three ways according to "production processes." Western Europe — taken here to mean Spain (under the Spanish Habsburgs), Portugal, Britain, and France — emerged as the core of the world-system. The core of the world-system is composed of states that are technologically, militarily, and economically more developed, and as a result are able to dictate relational terms to the rest of the world-system. The core establishes markets in which it can sell exported manufactured goods and in return secure raw materials to maintain production in factories. Today, Western Europe still exists in the core, along with the United States and Japan.

The second economic zone is referred to as the periphery. The peripheral states and regions are less developed, less organized, militarily weaker, and exist solely to benefit the core. South-Central America and Eastern Europe were the original peripheral zones, but over the centuries the periphery came also to include Africa and much of Asia. Today, some parts of South America and Asia exhibit traits of both zones. World-systems analysts include a third zone in the global production processes, which consists of states producing both core-like and peripheral-like products, and that share general characteristics of both those zones. These states are classified as semi-peripheral. Some twenty-first-century examples of semi-peripheral states are Brazil and India.

In the following sections, we will move from the more abstract descriptions above to look at some of the historical contours with which our world-systems framework corresponds.

LAND WORLD-EMPIRES

The world of sovereign states and its correlating capitalist world-system constitute a fairly recent development in human history. It was not until the last two or three hundred years that the present interstate system fully got under way. As mentioned, preceding this modern configuration was a world loosely organized by world-empires. However, the word "empire" can take on an array of meanings as well as apply to various eras, and therefore we should be clear about its usage. In addition, the designations "ancient" and "modern" also require some clarification.

The words "empire" and "imperial" (and "imperialism") frequently crop up in our everyday usage. Talk of corporate empires, or America's imperial behavior, or British imperialism, surrounds us, but meanings can be myriad and change over time. Even among writers and scholars there exist different approaches and debates on the subject. For the purpose of describing the dominant political structure previous to that of sovereign states, our use of "empire" (from the Latin imperium, meaning authority or command) will edge towards the traditional and the general, specifying a vast political unit comprised of multiple territories and subject peoples, and one ruled from a highly centralized locus of power, typically an emperor. This description will also incorporate the adjective "imperial." Likewise, the ideology of imperialism (owing to its -ism suffix) will simply denote the imperial thoughts, desires, and philosophies behind the creation and expansion of such systems.

Similarly, the terms "ancient" and (especially) "modern" are used in a variety of meanings and contexts. In keeping with our remote look at world history, it will suffice to adhere to the periodic divisions generally agreed upon by historians when attempting to map key benchmarks in the Western world. The ancient period can basically be sectioned off between 3000 BC and 500 AD. The fall of the western half of the Roman Empire marks the beginning of the medieval (from the Latin medium aevum, meaning middle age) period, or Middle Ages, from 500 to 1500. The past half-millennium, beginning with Western Europe's arrival in the New World, the dawn of overseas empires, and the Reformation, encapsulates the modern period, from 1500 to the present. This tripartite division will serve as a loose frame of reference, though it should be noted that such periodizations are merely historiographic devices used by scholars to aid them in understanding their material, and are neither divisions within the history itself nor precise demarcations. Similar to the variance and disagreements with the use of empire and imperial, scholarly debate continues regarding periodization, as well as the seemingly endless subdivisions that are also employed, for example, "early modernity." Nevertheless, this rudimentary vocabulary will suit our purposes in looking at the transition between the ancient world-empire system and the modern world-system.

It is far back into the ancient period, or antiquity, that we can trace empire's roots as the predominant and most influential political structure. As early as the first civilizations inhabiting Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq) one can see the advent of such systems. Though perhaps not as vast or sophisticated as the Persian or Roman empires 2–3,000 years later, the city-states in Sumer (c. 3500–2400 BC) serve as prototypes for what we see develop later throughout the ancient world. Their narrative introduces us to powerful, semi-legendary figures such as Sargon, the Akkadian conqueror of Sumer, and the Amorite king of Babylon (a Sumerian city-state), Hammurabi — known best perhaps for his law of retaliation (lex talionis), or "eye for an eye." The conquering, expansionism, and subjection that characterized the early politico-military activity in Mesopotamia applies, if perhaps loosely, to our concept of empire. However, it is not until the tenth century BC that we start to see the onset of polities that fit squarely within our scheme.

In approximately 900 BC the Assyrians, a civilization that developed formidable military power after centuries of living under external forces, forged an empire that approximated their desires. With a determined, expansionist mindset the empire grew from a cluster of humble localities along the Tigris into an imperial arc stretching from Egypt up through modern Israel/Palestine, and into Syria and north-central Iraq. In efforts to control trade routes between western Asia and the eastern Mediterranean, the Assyrian Empire became what is termed a "universal" power. Proving that draconian ruthlessness achieves results (at least for a while), the Assyrian leadership ruled with a brutality considered excessive even for the time. Their empire was characterized by massive deportations, and various torture and killing techniques. But fear eventually turns to hatred, and as the empire slowed down for various reasons, the list of enemies it had accrued was ready and willing to help bring the Assyrians to their knees. After the empire fell in 612 BC, Mesopotamia returned more or less to its independent, pre-imperial way of life. The next unifying political force to sweep across the region took a less tyrannical approach and would change the Near East and Western civilization forever.

The Persians, a group that came from modern-day Iran, formed a vast empire sprawling from northern Africa to the Indus River winding through modern-day Pakistan. Their empire, which started in 539 BC under the Achaemenids, would only last 200 years, succumbing to internal conflict, corruption, and finally defeat by Alexander the Great in the Battle of Issus. However, in this relatively short period of time (roughly the duration of the United States' existence so far) the Persian Empire managed to unify much of the Middle East. Economically, politically, geographically (with the construction of highways and systems to transmit information), the empire's vast groups of subject peoples began to think regionally instead of tending exclusively to independent entities at the local level. As world historian J. M. Roberts notes, "In so far as the story of antiquity has a turning point, this is it. An independent Mesopotamian tradition going back to Sumer was over. We are at the edge of a new world."

Similar developments and innovations were taking place around this time in those regions that would eventually become the modern states of China and India. Egypt in the ancient period offers much to study as a long-standing, powerful empire, yet as with China and India, it lies beyond our focus due to its relative insularity and existence outside our historical path of inquiry. It should also be mentioned that in Africa, generally speaking, there is not much in the way that adheres to our use of empire. The continent's political landscape was characterized more by individual monarchical polities and urban centers, with higher concentrations in the northwest. Likewise, this holds true for the Americas, where large-scale formations are not visible until later, with the emergence of groups like the Maya in the first millennium AD and the Aztecs and Incas in the early second. For our goal of tracing the pedigree of Western Europe's eventual supremacy, the ancient Near East is where our tale begins, for it was the social, political, and military activity in Mesopotamia that provided the matrix for Greco-Roman culture, which in turn was the crucible of Western modernity.

(Continues...)

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Edition details

• Publisher: Pluto Press
• Publication date: 2010
• ISBN 10: 0745327095
• ISBN 13: 9780745327099
• Binding: Paperback
• Language: English
• Number of pages: 240