Game Theory Evolving – A Problem–Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction - Softcover

Gintis, Herbert

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0691009430 ISBN 13: 9780691009438

Publisher: Princeton University Press, 2000

Synopsis

The study of strategic action (game theory) is moving from a formal science of rational behaviour to an evolutionary tool kit for studying behaviour in a broad array of social settings. In this problem-oriented introduction to the field, Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human (and even animal) behaviour. "Game Theory Evolving" is innovative in several ways. First, it reflects game theory's expansion into such areas as co-operation in teams, networks, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, the connection between biology and economics, artificial life simulations, and experimental economics.Second, this book - recognizing that students learn by doing and that most game theory texts are weak on problems - is organized around problems, and introduces principles through practice. Finally, the quality of the problems is simply unsurpassed, and each chapter provides a study plan for instructors interested in teaching evolutionary game theory. Reflecting the growing consensus that in many important contexts outside of anonymous markets, human behaviour is not well described by classical 'rationality', Gintis shows students how to apply game theory to model how people behave in ways that reflect the special nature of human sociality and individuality. This book is perfect for upper undergraduate and graduate economics courses as well as a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioural sciences.

About this title

About the Author

Herbert Gintis is Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts,Amherst, and coauthor (with Samuel Bowles) of Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought.

From the Back Cover

"Mathematically rigorous, computationally adroit, rich in illuminating problems, and engagingly written, Game Theory Evolving will be invaluable to students and researchers across the social sciences."--Joshua M. Epstein, The Brookings Institution and Santa Fe Institute

"Herb Gintis weaves classical game theory together with recent work in experimental economics, biology, evolutionary game theory, and behavioral economics. His book has something new, possibly something to argue with, but always something intriguing, for everyone."--Larry Samuelson, University of Wisconsin

"For anyone interested in game theory as a conceptual framework for investigating and thinking about strategic behavior in the social world, broadly interpreted, this book is a must reference work. Herb Gintis is to be congratulated for integrating a large literature on theory, evolution, experimental and field observations into an accessible treatise."--Vernon Smith,University of Arizona

"There is a great need for a problem book in game theory, and Gintis is correct to emphasize that learning game theory requires the solving of problems."--Michael Suk-Young Chwe, New York University

"Simply to have all this material in one place is refreshing and a big step forward. Gintis is careful on technical detail and clearly loves these models."--Colin Camerer,California Institute of Technology

"Game Theory Evolving is the most up-to-date textbook in game theory on the market. Gintis covers an extraordinary range of topics, including some of the most recent developments in theory, with both stylistic verve and mathematical rigor. More importantly, he shows how the theory illuminates a great variety of real-world situations that both students and professors can relate to."---H. Peyton Young, The Johns Hopkins University and The Brookings Institution

Edition details

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Publication date: 2000
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0691009430
• ISBN 13: 9780691009438
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 568