Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) - Hardcover

Huber, John D.; Shipan, Charles R.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0521817447 ISBN 13: 9780521817448

Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 2002

Synopsis

This book explains the different approaches legislators use when they write laws.

About this title

Review

'This is a remarkable book. It is embedded firmly in the well-established 'new institutionalist' literature on comparative politics. And it extends a well-recognized debate over how (and how carefully) elected politicians delegate authority to unelected bureaucrats. Yet, for all its pedigree, it is original, innovative, and important. It is bold in its theoretical scope, impressive for its painstaking attention to empirical detail, and, for all that, a pleasure to read ... This will be the most important book in delegation since Kiewiet and McCubbins's The Logic of Delegation a decade ago.' Japanese Journal of Political Science

'... this is an outstanding book that should be read by anyone interested in legislative-bureaucratic relations.' West European Politics

'... remarkable ... This book asks a very crucial, yet little examined question ...'. Journal of Public Policy

Book Description

Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the US states.

Edition details

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication date: 2002
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0521817447
• ISBN 13: 9780521817448
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 304