Lawyers in Society – An Overview - Softcover

Abel, Richard L

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0520203321 ISBN 13: 9780520203327

Publisher: University of California Press, 1996

Synopsis

This text offers a concise comparative introduction to the practice of law in a number of countries: England, Germany, Japan, Venezuala and Belgium. The essays guide the reader through the differing worlds of civil and common law, law in Europe and Asia, and first and third world legal systems. One contribution addresses the changing role of women in the profession (women comprise half of all new lawyers in most countries) and the changes they are bringing.

About this title

About the Author

Richard L. Abel is Professor of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles. Philip S.C. Lewis is Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Lawyers in Society: An Overview

By Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, editors

University of California Press

Copyright © 1996 Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, editors
All right reserved.
ISBN: 0520203321


1
Revisioning Lawyers
RICHARD L. ABEL*

In the fifteen years since we initiated this comparative sociology of legal professions a great deal of scholarship has appeared. Some writers have engaged, tested, qualified, criticized, or rejected the theoretical framework I developed in my contributions. Others have advanced and applied very different explanations for professional structures and lawyer behavior. Many have sought to comprehend the dramatic changes sweeping through the legal profession. This chapter reviews four major theoretical orientations: market control, competition between professions over knowledge-based jurisdictions, the ideal of professional independence, and economic interpretations.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE MARKET

In 1980, six years after I began teaching about American lawyers, I was drawn into comparative sociology by an invitation to a conference on the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Legal Services. During the following decade, I continued to address the issues implicated in the title of my contribution to that conference, "The Politics of the Market for Legal Services," a paper that was strongly influenced by Magali Sarfatti Larson's historical sociology of a wide range of professions in England and the United States.1 I began with the view that markets, like sex, were simultaneously sites of pleasure and danger. Markets permit and encourage the emergence of professions.2 They offer scope for self-expression and technical refinement and foster dreams of wealth, power, and status. Yet only a few reap these rewards, although all participants confront perpetual risk and many suffer ruin (as those "liberated" from communism are discovering).

One of the many paradoxes of market economies is that they drive actors to seek to neutralize competition, even though this is their essential

energizing force. Only the most desperate recent immigrants to a city or nation (often racial or ethnic minorities) and new entrants to the market (youths and women)—remain exposed to unrestrained competition. They must accept employment without the support of a union or protective legislation or embark on entrepreneurship that requires neither formally certified skills nor capital investment: peddling, prostitution, gardening, housekeeping, baby-sitting, window washing, house painting, taxi driving.3 Refuge from the buffeting force of competition can take many forms: controlling a market (sought by OPEC and other producers of primary goods), becoming a salaried worker for a large employer (civil service or the lifetime employment once offered by Japanese companies), securing a patent (and other monopolies over intellectual property), making large capital investments (a barrier to market entry by potential challengers). In rare instances the sanctuary is almost perfect: the De Beers diamond cartel, or the numerus clausus of some European notaries.

Those who sell services may find these strategies less effective than do those who manufacture products. There are no raw materials to corner, capital investment tends to be low, and, until recently, their intellectual products have been unprotected by law. Instead they have resorted to guilds, trade unions, and professional associations, which in turn invoke state assistance. As Larson explains, aspiring professionals must construct their commodity and then control the production of and by producers. The first step is to persuade potential consumers that the service is both valuable and too difficult for them to perform. Lawyers have several advantages in this regard. As judges and prominent members of the legislature and executive, they can use state power to grant an exclusive jurisdiction to legal institutions (over civil and criminal adjudication, divorce, adoption, and probate), complicate the task beyond lay competence, and even award themselves a legal monopoly (representation, drafting, advice, real property transfers). Having commodified legal services, lawyers must limit the number of producers by prohibiting lay competition and regulating entry to the profession by establishing educational qualifications and economic barriers, requiring apprenticeships and examinations, and by limiting opportunities to practice. Finally, lawyers must dampen competition among themselves.

This concept of the "professional project," adapted from Larson, can lead to several misunderstandings. It does not require deliberation or conspiracy—although lawyers and other professionals, in desperation or at unguarded moments, often expose their self-interested motives. (The Depression provoked Germany and Greece to limit the number of lawyers and American states to lower the pass rate on bar examinations.) Even a genuine dedication to ensuring quality inevitably promotes social closure. Because I viewed market control as pivotal, I equated its fluctua-

tions with "professionalism."4 Some commentators objected that lawyers in "declining" professions seemed to be doing surprisingly well—economically, politically, and socially.5 This is true but irrelevant. I am concerned with the dramatic changes in the structure of legal occupations: the increase in market control from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century and its erosion in recent decades. That market control has declined does not refute my theory—quite the contrary. Refuge from competition is always ephemeral, as shown by breaches in even the most powerful cartels. The very rewards of success—wealth, status, and power—spur outsiders to circumvent, surmount, or destroy the barriers. Neither am I troubled by the observation that market control is not equivalent to effective self-regulation.6 Professional regulators are less solicitous of clients than of peers. And it is notoriously difficult to enforce anticompetitive rules against the self-interest of practitioners.

Some of the chapters in the original volumes on the legal profession in other countries (notably Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) adopted the framework I advanced in my chapters on England and the United States and my attempts at synthesis.7 The volumes also included two kinds of demurrers, however. Alan Paterson maintains that within the common law world, Scotland did not fit my model.8 Yet his own historical account repeatedly reveals efforts by legal professionals to control production of and by producers. As early as the seventeenth century, advocates sought to limit their numbers and raise their social status by requiring a written examination in civil law, a thesis written in Latin and defended in Latin before the entire faculty, and a public lesson in Latin to the Court of Sessions. Dismayed by their increasing numbers in the late nineteenth century, Writers to the Signet imposed a £500 entrance fee, a five-year apprenticeship, and the requirement of a liberal education. As late as 1980 the profession added the requirement of a one-year Diploma in Legal Practice, knowing that government would only fund 410 places. Paterson acknowledges that qualification as an advocate is still limited by the requirement of an unremunerated nine months as a "devil" (apprentice) followed by another nine months without income. Moreover, some of his rebuttals seem insubstantial: Scottish solicitors lack a monopoly over the administration of estates or conveyancing of real property because others can do these tasks—without pay!

If common law professions are united by the necessity to mediate the relation of their members to the market, civil law professions have experienced a different history in their relations to private employers, the university, the state, and, therefore, the market.9 Sociologists and historians have stressed these differences in writing about a wide variety of professions.10 Continental lawyers (and their colonial counterparts) have been trained in universities, rather than through apprenticeship, ever since

those institutions separated from the Church.11 Professional associations developed late and tended to be local. The state set the rules for entry and practice, with little professional input.12 And most jurists became employees of the state or, more recently, large businesses. Indeed, the several categories of law graduates—judges and prosecutors, civil servants, corporate employees, advocates, notaries and so on—do not see themselves as a single profession and even lack a common name. I belatedly recognized the magnitude of the divide between civil and common law professions.13

But although I acknowledge that Larson's framework, developed to analyze the United States and England, is inappropriate for the histories of Continental European legal professions, there is evidence that common and civil law professions are converging as a concomitant of the globalization of the economy.14 Many of the divisions within civil law professions are disappearing, while the centrality of private practice in common law professions is being eroded by the growth of public and private employment. Universities play increasingly similar roles in training lawyers throughout the world. And civil lawyers have had to adapt some of the traits of common law competitors or risk losing their most lucrative work. Even lawyers in the former communist world, who are doubly removed from common law lawyers by their civil law heritage and state-dominated economy, are exhibiting the struggle for market control. Although Michael Burrage continues to deny the centrality of the market, his observations on the contemporary Russian advokatura resonate well with Larson's theory. One informant told him that "the colleges don't want to hire more people because their incomes would be reduced. In Bukhara, Uzbekistan, they have taken a decision to freeze the number of advocates."15 Eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are witnessing contests between advocates and jurisconsults (former house counsel to state enterprises) to service the newly privatized economy.16

Although Terence Halliday tendentiously titled his book about the Chicago Bar Association Beyond Monopoly, lawyers and other professionals remain deeply concerned about their relation to the market.17 English solicitors have strenuously fought to retain their monopoly over conveyancing (real property transactions), and, in turn, have challenged the Bar's monopoly of advocacy in the higher courts.18 More than half a century after the American legal profession erected the present entry barriers, it continues to repel new challenges. The administrators of the bar in the nation's capital became concerned that law graduates were finding easy admittance to the District of Columbia bar through the Pennsylvania bar exam: Those who correctly answered 133 of the 200 multiple-choice questions on the multistate examination gained exemption from

the essay portion. An official complained, "It's the Tijuana of the law admissions world." The District resolved to eliminate this loophole while shaming Pennsylvania into requiring entrants to pass the essay examination as well.19 About the same time the American Bar Association refused to accredit the Massachusetts School of Law, rejecting the argument that it cut tuition to less than half that of elite law schools used practitioners as adjunct professors and electronic data bases and interlibrary loans to save the large capital investment in law books. The school has threatened an antitrust action against the ABA.20

The health care industry exhibits even more numerous and intense battles over turf as subordinate occupations challenge the dominance of doctors. In the 1930s nurses could not take blood pressure; in the 1950s they could not perform EKGs. In Arizona today, however, nurse practitioners can make their own diagnoses, charging thirty-five dollars a visit, and can write prescriptions; twenty other states also allow nurse practitioners to write prescriptions. A 1986 report by the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress estimated that 60 to 80 percent of basic health care could be performed by nurses. A 1993 study by the American Nurses Association found that nurse practitioners gave more accurate diagnoses and took more comprehensive medical histories than doctors. The American Medical Association's senior vice president for medical education dismissed these studies as "inconclusive" because they looked at "a limited number of services": "We draw our sword and make our line in the sand at nurses practicing independently."21 (Perhaps he meant the staff of Asclepius. In any case, the metaphor, overused by George Bush following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, seems inconsistent with Hippocrates' exhortation to "first do no harm"; apparently this applies only to patients, not rebellious subordinates.) Nurses are making inroads elsewhere, especially areas in which doctors apparently have little interest: women's health, service in rural communities, care for urban homeless. Cost is a primary reason—the average income of nurses is just one-fourth that of doctors. Yet the AMA insists that "replacing physicians with lesser prepared personnel may increase the medical risk to patients and the ultimate cost of care." Medical association PAC fundraising brochures refer to all competitors as "quacks" and warn, "Don't let reform fowl [sic] up health care."22 Optometrists, psychologists, pharmacists, and physician's assistants seek the right to prescribe medicine. Psychologists note that 87 percent of psychotropic drugs are prescribed by doctors with no training in mental health. Yet the California Medical Association continues to justify its opposition to increasing nurses' responsibility in terms of the "extraordinarily large differences" in "educational requirements."23

In developing my theoretical framework I argued that the market imperative compels service producers to seek not only to control supply but

also to stimulate demand. The latter strategy has grown in importance as supply control has eroded with the expansion of university education (and its increasing centrality as the entry route into professions), movements for gender and race equality, and attacks on restrictive practices. I agree with critics that professional motives for stimulating consumption are complex and ambiguous.24 Just as professionals justify supply control as ensuring quality, so they justify demand creation as increasing access (while disregarding the tension between these two goals). Furthermore, the investment in and manifestations of demand creation vary across time and national cultures. Professions that still enjoy a decent competence can afford to indulge the gentleman's disdain for trade.25 Yet English solicitors, who sneered at American "cowboys" for advertising and contingent fees, now indulge in the former and flirt with the latter.

Law enjoys distinct advantages in creating demand, just as it does in controlling supply. As judges, legislators, administrators, and advocates, lawyers construct the rules they later mobilize on behalf of clients. The revolving door between government and private practice allows lawyer regulators to turn around and sell their knowledge of how to evade the law (although this may be less common in civilian countries). Fame (or notoriety) as an innovator often brings repeat business, as did the first poison pill defense to a corporate takeover and the first successful palimony claim.26 In adversary systems, work by one lawyer usually makes work for others. (Indeed, although legal scholars and policy makers often invoke Weber for the proposition that law creates the certainty and predictability essential to commerce, lawyers actually foster uncertainty on behalf of their clients and themselves. If law were certain, after all, lawyers would be superfluous.)27

Yet demand creation has significant drawbacks, which may explain the reluctance of many lawyers to engage in it. What the profession touts as altruism can appear to outsiders as self-interest, especially given the deep public ambivalence toward the act of litigating and the content of many legal rights.28 Whereas supply control tends to benefit all professionals, demand creation advantages entrepreneurial lawyers, forcing all to become more competitive. Some forms of demand creation also tend to concentrate demand and thus the dependence of producers on corporate consumers or governmental third-party payers (for legal aid).29

Common law professions display an increasing commitment to creating demand. American lawyers have launched prepaid insurance plans, established clinics to offer mass-produced routine services, and invested heavily in advertising.30 English lawyers have documented "unmet legal need" to justify increases (or prevent decreases) in the legal aid budget. The Law Society launched the Accident Legal Advice Scheme to encourage victims to file tort claims.31

The profession remains deeply ambivalent about such activity, however. A New York lawyer had to sue his bar association to obtain permission to use client testimonials, which only three other states allow.32 A decade after their fourteen founders met secretly for the first time, the National Association of Law Firm Marketing Administrators has a thousand members, who compete for the ABA's "Dignity in Advertising" awards.33 Yet, what offers economic rewards to individual lawyers may impair the profession's collective status. A personal injury lawyer in Birmingham, Alabama, promoted himself by emblazoning his name on wrist watches, baseball caps, and chairs donated to churches and by offering bumper stickers warning: "BACK OFF! MY LAWYER IS ROBERT NORRIS." He went too far, however, when he sent a twenty-five dollar wreath to the funeral of a nineteen-month-old baby who died when a day-care worker left him in a closed van for four hours. Attached was a card to the family: "Please accept our deepest sympathies in the loss of Randy. We know you are presently being faced with many difficult decisions and will soon be faced with others. If we may be of assistance to you in any regard, do not hesitate to contact us at 870-8000." He was suspended for two years.34 Even the American Trial Lawyers Association, whose 65,000 members have the greatest interest in seeking individual clients, was so embarrassed after several prominent lawyers flew to Bhopal that it passed a resolution condemning lawyers "who go, uninvited, to the scene of a disaster and advertise for prospective clients." A District of Columbia lawyer who had rushed to both Bhopal and the DuPont Plaza fire in San Juan responded contemptuously that the ATLA leaders "would love to wake up and find they'd gone to Harvard and been asked into a partnership at Cravath, Swaine & Moore."35 The California Trial Lawyers Association has sponsored a bill that would significantly restrict television advertising. Larry H. Parker, who makes extensive use of that medium, complained that "those country club lawyers don't like guys like me taking cases from them."36

Health services providers have been pioneers in stimulating demand, perhaps because the potential rewards are so enormous. Public relations firms, representing 60 percent of Los Angeles doctors and all New York hospitals, ensure that their clients appear in newspapers and on television. A New Orleans urologist sent a Time magazine article about a new prostate cancer test to all his patients with a note proclaiming: "We offer this!"37 Doctors ordered tests at laboratories in which they had a financial interest until Medicare refused reimbursement. A General Accounting Office study found that doctors were three to five times more likely to order CAT scans, MRIs, ultrasound, and other diagnostic procedures when they had invested in the firm providing the service. The AMA senior vice-president and general counsel rationalized: "If you have the

equipment at your fingertips and you operate it yourself, you have complete confidence in the results, and you're more likely to use it.... the real issue for patients is whether they will get the tests they need, not whether they are getting too many." T2 Medical Inc. has been helping doctors set up home health care companies, promising profits of up to $20,000 a year from referrals for an initial investment of about $3,000. Medicare and Medicaid, however, have stopped reimbursing for physical therapy, radiology, home health services, or hospital services in which the doctor has an interest.38

Nevertheless, Tokos Medical Corp. has been pushing its "Dr. Deal" program, in which doctors invest in companies leasing its fetal monitoring device and get 15 percent of the payments from patients for whom they prescribe it. A $1,000 investment produces an average annual income of $5,000 and the prospect of up to $22,500.39 Although pharmaceutical companies long have offered doctors incentives to prescribe their products (free samples, expensive family vacations), they now seek to speak directly to consumers. An ad by the Glaxo Institute for Digestive Health asked rhetorically: "It's only heartburn. I should learn to live with it... right? Attention heartburn sufferers. It's time to talk to your doctor." The National Mental Health Association ran a media campaign to "increase public awareness" about depression, without revealing that it was paid for by Eli Lilly and Co., the makers of Prozac. The Marion Merrill Dow Pollen Forecast Hotline not only gave pollen counts to allergy sufferers but also warned that over-the-counter medicines, unlike its own, could cause drowsiness. Searle Pharmaceuticals developed a "Day-to-Day Dialogue on Arthritis" to promote its Daypro medicine.40 CIBAGeigy pushes Actigall for gallstones; only the small print reveals that the expensive pills must be taken twice daily for years and fail to dissolve most gallstones. The company maintained: "The ads are a source of information just like a newspaper article or a TV news report." Upjohn promotes Rogaine for baldness and Seldane for allergies. Burroughs Well-come took full-page ads urging readers to be tested for HIV—without mentioning that it makes AZT.41

A wide variety of commentators on the professions have made the market the core of their analyses, focusing on efforts at social closure, endogenous and exogenous influences on supply and demand, and the growing role of the state in subsidizing consumption.42 Nevertheless, critics of the original volumes of Lawyers in Society (and my two books on American and English lawyers) have advanced a number of objections to market control theory.

Several felt I overemphasized the economics of social closure while neglecting the other dimension of Larson's "professional project"—collective mobility. I accept the criticism. I may have been misled by my

starting point—an attempt to understand American lawyers, who were preoccupied for decades with material improvement, which they pursued through state bar associations. Now that most enjoy comfortable incomes (and some are obscenely wealthy) the profession has become increasingly concerned with honor. In the summer of 1993 a disgruntled former client went on a rampage in a San Francisco law firm, killing three lawyers, a law student, a legal secretary, a client, two trust company employees, and ultimately himself. The California State Bar president responded with a call for a "cease-fire" on lawyer jokes, which were "nothing more than hate speech." He also advocated heavier penalties for ordinary crimes when the victims were lawyers (as occurs for crimes against police, judges, and political officials). In response, the Miller Brewing Co. withdrew its popular television commercial showing cowboys roping lawyers carrying briefcases.43 Opposition from professional associations to law firms engaging in "ancillary practice" or lawyers entering multidisciplinary partnerships appears to be motivated less by economic concerns than by the fear of losing status from being subordinated to the much larger, better organized Big Six accounting firms.44 Mark Osiel and Michael Burrage go much further, insisting that the professional project was exclusively concerned with status and indifferent to money.45 This is both historically incorrect (as my chapters and books demonstrate) and theoretically incoherent (since status and wealth are inextricably connected). In a capitalist society, personal impoverishment tends to undermine professional status (as suggested by the fate of the clergy), and the acquisition of wealth confers its own status (however vehemently those mired in genteel poverty may contemn the nouveau riche).

Others have criticized the notion of a "project" for treating the profession as too monolithic and for obscuring internal tensions.46 I not only agree but also feel that the identification of professional fractions helps explain the interplay between market control and collective mobility (which possess different salience for each subgroup). Theodore Schneyer has charted the complex factional politics shaping the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct.47 Ronen Shamir, refining Christine Harrington, has made a convincing argument that upper and lower strata American lawyers displayed very different reactions to the emergence of the regulatory state during the New Deal. Solo practitioners, suffering both falling demand during the Depression and growing numbers as legal education expanded, sought to bar nonlawyers from practicing administrative law. Elite lawyers, who derived more business from regulation, sought to judicialize administrative action to preserve the symbolic integrity of the rule of law.48 Some personal injury lawyers demand the right to chase ambulances, while their professional organization, ATLA, seeks to distance itself from notorious vulgarity. Professional stratification also

emerges in Seron's finding that younger lawyers, generalists, and those in the inner city favor advertising, whereas older lawyers, specialists, and suburban practitioners oppose it.49

II. KNOWLEDGE AND JURISDICTION

The most ambitious revision of sociological theories of the professions since we completed our comparative project is Andrew Abbott's emphasis on the relationship between knowledge and jurisdiction.50 Abbott makes two claims: interprofessional competition for market shares is the central feature of the system of professions; and competition is conducted through the medium of knowledge claims. This reorientation has several virtues. It directs attention away from the social structural characteristics (associations, credentialing, self-regulation) professions share with other occupations and toward the distinctiveness of what professionals do.51 Abbott thereby problematized the structural-functional claim that professionals deploy expertise, just as social closure theory problematized the structural-functional claim that self-regulation was necessary and sufficient to ensure quality and altruism.

At the end of our three volumes (chapter 8 in this volume) we commended such a redirection, and we welcome the studies that have begun to emerge. Many concern the ways in which lawyers transform client experience and motivation into legal claims and remedies—mostly in family disputes,52 but also in commercial matters53 and civil litigation generally.54 Others look at the role of lawyers in negotiation.55

Competing claims to knowledge often illuminate fluctuations in the market for legal services: for instance, the rivalry between English solicitors and accountants since the mid-nineteenth century,56 the success of employed German jurists in retaining their role in banking while being reduced to paralegals in the insurance industry,57 the efforts of Rechtsanwäilte to retain corporate work,58 and the campaign by Parisian judges to expand their role in economic disputes.59

I do have reservations about Abbott's theorization, however. First, his emphasis on knowledge is far from original. More than twenty years earlier two French sociologists stressed the importance of knowledge in analyzing university hospitals, as did two American lawyers in mapping competition between lawyers and others in the United States and England.60 Second, Abbott explains a fairly narrow segment of professional life. Most professionals are not engaged in competition with outsiders most of the time. As Abbott clearly states, professional jurisdictions tend to be entrenched for lengthy periods, both in law and, to a lesser extent, in public opinion.

Third, it is very difficult to ascertain what professionals know and how they are using that knowledge. This indeterminacy imbues the theory with a strongly postmodern quality, allowing it to explain everything (and therefore, perhaps, nothing). The elusiveness of any independent measure of knowledge tempts the analyst into circularity and tautology—the attribution of knowledge to professions that have secured their jurisdictions. Mark Osiel, for instance, asserts that common lawyers enjoy a broader jurisdiction than their civilian counterparts because the former must exercise practical judgment in the absence of code and theory.61 I find this both empirically dubious and virtually untestable.

The theory of social closure insists that professions justify their anti-competitive practices by demonstrating a connection to quality. Because knowledge claims are so hard to test, theorizations based on them can lose their critical edge (another trait often associated with postmodernism), lapsing into structural-functional complacency. Shapiro, for instance, asserts that professions are defined "by the quantities and qualities of knowledge they acquire and practice." "Lawyers... are specialists in a particular language who gain that special knowledge by training. What they do is speak that language as a means of representing individuals."62 Sterett maintains "it is clear that whether or not practitioners study or use 'the law,' society does expect and take account of some presumed expertise."63 Halliday ascribes the authority of professional organizations to "knowledge mandates."64 But lawyers may actually speak jabberwocky and claim knowledge that is either factitious or irrelevant. Abbott cannot be blamed for this misreading. He consistently characterizes professional knowledge as a social construct, offering a nuanced analysis of how knowledge claims are advanced and challenged, succeed and fail. Others have described the role of professional ideology in shaping and defending jurisdictions and the differences between knowledge claimed and deployed by both teachers and practitioners.65

Perhaps the best antidote to mistaking professional pretensions for proficiency is to look at the knowledge actually deployed. Many professions have supplemented entry barriers with mandatory continuing education. Once again, medicine is in the forefront. But consider this advertisement.66

The 4th I.A.C.D. Conference on CONSCIOUS IMMORTALITY
Continuing Education credits for medical professionals
CME approved 7.5 hours for physicians, Category I;
CEU approved 7.5 hours for Registered Nurses;
Certificates issued to all conference attendees.
Lectures understandable to the General Public.

RAYMOND A. MOODY, JR., M.D., Ph.D., Author of Life After Life, Reflections on Life After Life, The Light Beyond and Reunions. (The Latter is about Encounters with the Departed Loved Ones, which he will talk about at the seminar.)

KENNETH RING, Ph.D. Author of Life at Death, Heading Toward Omega.

BRUCE GOLDBERG, D.D.S., M.S. Author of Past Lives-Future Lives.

DONINGA L. REYES, Ph.D. Author of Two Souls (an Out-of-the-Body Experience).

CLAUDIA JENSEN, M.D. Counselor on Consciousness Awareness.

SUSAN STORCH, RN, BSN, M.A. Lecturer on Conscious Dying, a thanatologist practicing hospice nursing, working in L.A. HIV/AIDS community.

The rapid expansion of the global economy is creating new markets for professional services, which offer an excellent opportunity to test theories about knowledge and jurisdiction.67 I want to enter a preliminary caveat, however. Clients include multinational corporations, foreign governments, and parastatals. Transnational practice possesses the exotic allure earlier enjoyed by exploration, colonialism, diplomacy, the Grand Tour, and jet-setting. Material and social rewards are high. Yet for all but the smallest legal professions, transnational practice will remain an esoteric specialization, preoccupying only a small minority of members (while perhaps accentuating professional stratification).

Globalization shifts economic activity from within states to their interstices or across their borders, where rules are either absent or new and unclear. National cultures clash, upsetting and obstructing informal understandings among entrepreneurs. Conflicts can be taken to a variety of forums, each using different techniques and requiring appropriate expertise. With established jurisdictions dislocated, competition thrives among nations and disciplines. The knowledge on which new jurisdictional claims can be based is transitory and fluid. Consumers (corporations, financial institutions, and states) are expert. The stakes are high: the formation and termination of large enterprises (mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy and reorganization), deal-making, and relations with and among national and transnational states (licensing, regulation, antitrust, and government contracts).

The principal competitors in this domain are lawyers, accountants, management consultants, and, to a lesser extent, investment bankers. The struggle is most intense in Europe and the Far East. Accountants have significant advantages: numeracy, computer literacy, the size and inter-

national character of the Big Six, existing ties with multinational corporations (for which they conduct audits), expertise in tax, and a strongly entrepreneurial attitude.68 But lawyers make the rules. American lawyers (and to a lesser extent English solicitors) have the advantages of firm size, a focus on corporate work, and aggressiveness; many, however, lack knowledge of civil law systems and European languages. European lawyers have sought to update their knowledge by forging links with innovative legal academics and acquiring further education in the United States. Competition has forced national legal professions to close ranks against outsiders: French avocats and conseils juridiques finally united some twenty years after a failed attempt in 1971; German Rechtsanwälte defied the ban on multistate partnerships; the distinction between English solicitors and barristers is eroding. European firms, increasingly multinational (and even multidisciplinary), are emulating the size and structure of American firms.

But knowledge is not the only terrain of contestation and is often little more than a rationalization. National legal professions have resorted to a wide variety of protectionist strategies: limiting practice to citizens; demanding a lengthy, unpaid apprenticeship; setting an examination in the local language or law; excluding outsiders from certain functions (litigation, land transfers, probate, and family matters); demanding extortionate payments to local compensation and indemnity funds; insisting on reciprocity from the lawyer's home jurisdiction (and every subjurisdiction in federal polities); limiting advocacy by employed lawyers; and prohibiting multinational and multidisciplinary partnerships. Status concerns may be as important as market share: All lawyers fear dominance by accountants, and all other lawyers fear dominance by Americans.

III. THE IDEAL OF PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE

A number of writers have sought to reclaim the ideal of lawyer independence from the static functionalism of Parsons or Carr-Saunders and the apologetics of professional associations. Robert Gordon's revisionist account of the emergence of the American corporate bar in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is the leading example.69 As a critical legal historian, Gordon seeks to demonstrate the relative autonomy and importance of ideology as a counterweight to excessively materialist and necessitarian theories. He boldly proclaims his theoretical idealism: "Lawyers have slid into the modes of reaction, schizophrenia, and privatistic denial of any public role not from any innate depravity of the profession, but from the poverty of modem liberalism."70 He argues that elite corporate practitioners exhibit several kinds of autonomy. Lawyers

develop new legal forms, transactions, claims, and remedies, which can have unanticipated and even adverse consequences for their clients. Some lawyers display fidelity to the internal coherence of legal doctrine (expressed in terms of logic, science, or art), seeking to systematize and reform it. Some expose incompetence and corruption in legal institutions such as the lower courts or the police. Some expand the access of poor or immigrant clients to law through pro bono activities or legal aid offices. And some check illegal or unethical behavior by their clients.

I share many of Gordon's values.71 But I become uneasy when he seems to confound exhortation with explanation. First, he focuses on the aberrational behavior of a small minority of lawyers—as if economists constructed a theory of entrepreneurial activity based on Mobil's funding of "Masterpiece Theater" or Ben and Jerry's efforts to save tropical rain forests. Second, much of the evidence for "independence" concerns not the core of the professional role, but the margin—what lawyers do after they have billed 2,000 hours a year. The public interest fellowships funded by Skadden & Arps are the perfect example of lawyers' schizophrenic ability to dissociate the most aggressive corporate representation from pro bono contributions.72 Third, lawyers' charitable activities are quantitatively insignificant, whether measured in pro bono hours or cash contributions to legal aid, per lawyer or in the aggregate. Fourth, much of the activity promotes elite culture (museums, opera) rather than social change.73 Fifth, legal academics may tend to exaggerate the potential of law schools to nurture the ideal of independence. But repeated studies have confirmed that law schools transform incoming law students who voice a (romantic and superficial) identification with social justice into lawyers who choose material rewards, professional prestige, career stability, and technical proficiency.74

Most perplexing, however, is Gordon's central claim that lawyers can and should independently evaluate the means and ends of their clients. The ideal of independence contains a basic ambiguity: Should lawyers substitute their own ends or only make strategic judgments about means? In Charles Derber's terms, should they resist ideological or only technical proletarianization?75 The quixotic search for a universal class disinterestedly pursuing the common good has been repeatedly disappointed: Aristocrats rarely display noblesse oblige; the bourgeoisie are associated less with Enlightenment universalism than with the horrors of industrial capitalism; the proletariat may be classless, but they are also xenophobic, racist, and sexist; civil servants are petty bureaucrats; artists and intellectuals are self-absorbed.76

Corporate lawyers are particularly unlikely candidates for the role of universal class. Frank Munger's study of the emerging bar in nineteenth-century West Virginia mining towns reveals its strong class loyalties.77

Michael Katz, who operates an eviction mill for Los Angeles landlords and claims to have 10 percent of the market, boasted: "I'm a hired gun, bottom line. Somebody pays me money to go out there and fight their battle with this tenant. I like the fight." He threatens tenants with a bad credit rating to make them pay, even if they are not legally obligated because the premises are uninhabitable.78 Recent exposes of large firms reveal little to inspire respect.79 Ronald Gilson offers an economic explanation for why lawyers cannot restrain clients from engaging in strategic litigation.80 Robert Nelson's study of four Chicago firms revealed that individual lawyers derive 20 to 60 percent of their income from a single client—surely a strong disincentive for "independence." Their identification with clients was so strong that few had ever perceived an ethical dilemma in representation.81 Two leading American law firms paid fines of $45 million and $50 million to settle government charges of complicity in the savings and loan scandal (which cost Americans hundreds of billions of dollars).82 Recent research has shown how solicitors take advantage of errors or incompetence by adversaries and find or carve loopholes in regulatory and tax regimes.83

The situations where lawyers do shape, resist, or even disregard client wishes are even more troubling. Heinz and Laumann found that lawyer claims of independence varied inversely with firm size.84 Recent research has shown that family lawyers transform their clients' goals while counseling them about divorce.85 Small-town American lawyers are more likely than their urban counterparts to dominate one-shot clients and refrain from alienating repeat players.86 Personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers sell out their clients in cutting package deals with insurance adjusters.87 Legal aid lawyers and public defenders also may display greater loyalty to repeat players in the courtroom (judges and opposing counsel) than to their one-shot clients.88 Between the wars, Japan and Germany required lawyers to place the public good above representation of clients.89 Communist states granted legal aid only to promote "governmental and social interests."90 There is no escape from the basic paradox that lawyers who enjoy the greatest rewards of money, status, and power also are the most heteronomous, while those at the bottom of the professional hierarchy are most autonomous.91 Ironically, the principled refusal to promote immoral ends is less likely to be found among lawyers, who claim to be professionals, than advertising models, who have no such pretensions but may refuse to promote cigarettes or alcohol.92

Those claiming to oppose from within—prosecutors solicitous of defendants' rights, environmentalists purporting to keep their corporate employers honest—may have access to power, but they rarely exercise it.93 Too often the protestations of public interest sound like rationalizations for a comfortable life. If Gordon and others are looking for sites of

resistance to public and private power, surely it makes more sense to study their opponents (trade unionists, civil rights organizations, feminist groups, environmentalists, consumer and welfare advocates), oppositional lawyers (in legal aid and public defender offices and public interest firms), and dissident professional associations (National Lawyers Guild, National Legal Aid and Defenders Association).94 Many of these lawyers emphasize their fidelity to oppressed and despised clients—not their independence.

Nor do professional associations urge independence. When Armand P. D'Amato was convicted of mail fraud for billing Unisys $32,500 for consulting work he never did as part of a scheme to influence his brother, Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), an amicus brief was filed on his behalf by the New York State Bar Association, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, New York State Trial Lawyers Association, New York Criminal Bar Association, and New York Civil Liberties Union. Arthur Liman, a leading Wall Street lawyer who wrote it, condemned the "overcriminalization of the law." Sentencing D'Amato to five months, U.S. District Judge Jacob Mishler acknowledged that only "one out of 100 would say 'no' to the deal that Mr. D'Amato entered into."95

Others defend the professional project in terms of its potential to permit and encourage lawyer altruism. English barristers justify their monopoly of higher court advocacy on the ground that only they have sufficient "independence"—an assertion most solicitors find insulting and unfounded. Solicitors, in turn, claim that the monopoly rents they reap from conveyancing are necessary to subsidize their undercompensated legal aid practice.96 But most solicitors do hardly any legal aid work, and the few who do a great deal perform little conveyancing.97 Terence Halliday argues that bar associations are "Beyond Monopoly" and have entered a "concordat" with society to do good works.98 The metaphor seems inapt. Law (and other professions) is beyond monopoly only in the sense of such trendy phrases as postcolonial, postmodern, postindustrial, postcapitalist, postcommunist, and postapartheid. In each instance, the past is deeply embedded in the present (from which it may be barely distinguishable). Lawyers devote less energy to defending their monopoly today only because it is so well entrenched.

Alan Paterson closely follows Halliday but draws his metaphor from the Enlightenment, positing a "social contract" in which the state ensures the profession "reasonable rewards" in return for altruism.99 He bemoans the fact that heightened competition in recent decades has made lawyers into hired guns. (It also cut conveyancing costs nearly in half—exposing solicitors' monopoly rents.)100 But lawyers were hired guns long before competition intensified. Sir George Allen was eulogized on

his 1952 retirement from Allen & Overy, the leading City firm he had founded: "He completely identified himself with his client... always gave himself wholeheartedly to the client's interests."101 And the Law Society repaid state support of its anticompetitive rules not with an outpouring of altruism but by opposing salaried legal aid and law centres.102

Michael Burrage is most profoundly hostile to sociological critiques of the professional project.103 He vigorously defends the efforts of lawyers to raise their status, attributing the "extremely high" "standard of honour" of the English Bar and its "non-competitive, disinterested style of work" to its high social standing. (Most barristers would be dismayed to be characterized as noncompetitive.) This is a peculiar argument to advance at the end of the twentieth century. The legal profession, perhaps more than others, pursued collective mobility by deliberately excluding aspirants on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, and gender. Lord Mansfield boasted in the nineteenth century about "keeping out the vermin." The explicit purpose of the Law Society's preliminary examination in Latin and Greek (required in 1835) was to exclude "men who have traveled up the gutter from Fleet Street to the Law Institution."104 Harry S. Drinker, author of the first American code of legal ethics in 1908, echoed these sentiments, condemning "Russian Jew-boys" who had come "up out of the gutter [and]... were merely following the methods their fathers had been using in selling shoe-strings and other merchandise." Harlan Fiske Stone, Columbia Law School dean and Supreme Court Justice, deplored "the influx to the bar of greater numbers of the unfit," who "exhibit racial tendencies toward study by memorization" and "a mind almost Oriental in its fidelity to the minutiae of the subject without regard to any controlling rule or reason." (Racists have since inverted this anti-Semitic slur by denigrating Asian-American students for their resemblance to Jews.) Elihu Root (ABA president, founding partner of a leading Wall Street law firm, and Cabinet member) and Dean Swan of Yale Law School opposed the admission of immigrants, especially Jews.105 The Lord Chancellor's Office limited the appointment of Jews and Catholics to the bench until well after World War II.106

Burrage is particularly distressed by the increasing role of universities as the entry route into the profession and the declining role of apprenticeship, which he endows with a unique capacity to instill ethical values. This is both ahistorical and without empirical foundation. The superior honor he attributes to barristers (compared with solicitors) cannot be explained by apprenticeship since, until recently, pupillage was a voluntary six months and articles a mandatory five years! (Articles still are twice as long as pupillage.) Nor is it clear how barristers' honor can be reconciled with the late return of briefs or perfunctory conferences with legally aided defendants prior to a plea bargain.107 Barristers preserve

their honorable contempt for trade only by relying on working-class clerks to tout for solicitors' business. And the apprenticeship Burrage values so highly has repeatedly been condemned as exploitative and lacking pedagogic value.108 The one indubitable advantage of apprenticeship over the university is the opportunity for discrimination. Ethnoreligious minorities entered the American profession in significant numbers only when law schools displaced apprenticeship in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Women entered legal professions on the Continent (where university was the entry route) earlier than they did in England (where apprenticeship barred the door). And women and racial minorities have entered the common law professions in the last two decades through the university door.109 A recent study confirmed that solicitors' firms strongly discriminate against black law graduates in granting articles.110

IV. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS

Several decades after first applying their discipline to analyze substantive law, economists have belatedly addressed legal institutions and processes, including the profession itself. They have posed both micro issues (such as structures of production) and macro (the relation between lawyers and economic productivity).

The large law firm has attracted disproportionate interest, perhaps because of its social prominence, economic rewards, rapid growth, and dramatic transformation.111 Several competing interpretations have been advanced. Charles Derber has adapted class analysis to argue that professionals are subjected to ideological proletarianization (by being forced to embrace the goals of their clients or superiors) while successfully resisting technical proletarianization (by being permitted to retain artisanal control over instrumental decisions about how to realize those goals).112

More recently, however, other researchers have observed a more conventional proletarianization. Oversupply (the result of poor articulation between the rigid qualification process and economic cycles of expansion and contraction) has forced lawyers to perform highly routinized tasks for German insurance companies, with no prospect for advancement.113 Increasing numbers of American law graduates can find only part-time or temporary work that is brokered by employment agencies.114 Greater use of computers to conduct research and generate legal forms has led to either the replacement of lawyers by paralegals or the creation of a substratum of lawyers with little decisional responsibility or client contact.115 John Hagan and his associates have portrayed these developments as the emergence of class relations within the legal profession, highlighting the

overrepresentation of women in the lower classes.116 It is noteworthy that accountants—often the precursors of change in the legal profession—have adopted the corporate form, selling equity interests to raise capital for expansion, and hiring nonaccountant subordinates (including lawyers).117

Critical observers have interpreted the emergence and growth of large firms as the exploitation of subordinated labor, noting that fee-earning employees (paralegals, contract lawyers, associates, and salaried partners in America; articled clerks, assistant solicitors, nonequity partners, and legal executives in England) generate substantially more in billings than they cost in salary or overhead. Neoclassical economists, not surprisingly, interpret the same facts in terms of efficiency. Some explain the lengthy apprenticeship and denial of partnership to all but a small fraction as deterrents to opportunism and shirking.118 Galanter and Palay argue that partners own surplus "reputational capital," which they rent to associates,119 but, although they portray law firms as pyramid schemes where partner greed drives unsustainable growth, firms actually grow at very different rates.120 One problem with economic models is that they disregard the complexities of human behavior. Growth may be motivated by competition for social status or the lack of other accepted measures of quality and success. The 1994 dissolution of Shea and Gould, which had more than 350 lawyers at its zenith, was attributable less to quarrels about money (although these were acute) than to struggles for status and power within the firm and personality conflicts among inflated egos.121

It may not matter much whether some large-firm lawyers are exploiting others—few observers are deeply troubled by the suffering of lawyers who earn more than $100,000 a year. It is more important to develop and test models of the relation between lawyers and the economy. What generates the demand for lawyers? Why do they seem so much more numerous and prominent in some societies than others—the United States and Japan usually being represented as the extremes. What is their impact on the economy? Do they enhance productivity and facilitate exchange (as Willard Hurst argued nearly half a century ago)? Or are they parasites, not just unproductive but actually a drag on the economy? An extreme and poorly substantiated case for the latter view (a classic "big lie" popularized by Dan Quayle) has prompted a barrage of criticism, which may have the desirable effect of stimulating more sophisticated economic analysis of the profession,122

V. CONCLUSION

Although many of these theoretical controversies were joined after the initial publication of the empirical data presented in the following

national and synthetic essays, the exchanges can be illuminated and refined by comparative study of legal professions. Indeed, such comparison is indispensable. Furthermore, these debates point to the kinds of additional information necessary to test the theories. I hope readers will be encouraged to formulate their own theoretical frameworks for understanding the legal profession, test them against the accounts presented here, and be provoked to conduct the research suggested by lacunae and ambiguities.

NOTES

Once again I am grateful to Philip Lewis for thoughtful and detailed criticism of this essay.

Royal Commission on Legal Services, 1979; Abel, 1982; the conference papers appeared in Thomas, 1982. I offered a critical synopsis of Larson, 1977 in a review essay, Abel, 1979.

Hence the criticism of Larson's theory—that professions long antedate the triumph of modern capitalism—is beside the point. See Sterett, 1990; Sugar-man, 1993: 262. Nevertheless, capitalism vastly expands and utterly transforms the market for lawyers' services.

In 1979, New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission allowed medallion owners to lease their vehicles. In the next ten years, the value of a medallion tripled, to $140,000. Drivers now pay owners about $90 for a twelve-hour night shift and spend another $20 on gas. Most do not start earning any money for themselves until they have worked seven hours. More than 90 percent are foreign-born. Dangerous driving has emerged as the leading consumer complaint, up 166 percent from 1985 to 1992 (Fragin, 1994).

Abel, 1986.

Berends, 1992: 177; Schurr, 1990; Shapiro, 1990: 689. Public lecturing failed to professionalize in the nineteenth century (Scott, 1983), yet some people today make an excellent living giving lectures or hosting or appearing on radio and television talk shows.

Pue, 1989, 1990.

Abel, 1985a, 1986, 1988a ; Arthurs et al., 1988; Murray, 1988; Weisbrot, 1988, 1990.

Paterson, 1988.

See the criticisms of Berends, 1992:166 and Shapiro, 1990: 697-698.

See, e.g., Brante, 1990; Collins, 1990a ; Fox, 1984; Geison, 1984b ; Gelfand, 1984; Goldstein, 1984; Hellberg, 1990 (Swedish veterinarians); Kocka, 1990; McClel-land, 1990 (Germany); Ramsey, 1984; Siegrist, 1990b ; Torstendahl, 1990b ; Weiss, 1984.

On contemporary differences between American and German legal education, see Ostertag, 1993.

On the role of the state in the development of the legal profession, see Karpik, 1988 (France); Konttinen, 1991 (Finland).

Compare Abel, 1985a with Abel, 1988b .

On the lack of historical fit, see Siegrist, 1986; on the differences among contemporary European legal professions, see Tyrrell and Yaqub, 1993.

Burrage, 1990a : 445; for a picture of the very different situation before perestroika, see Huskey, 1986; Shelley, 1991.

See Abel, 1994. On the unified Germany, see Blankenburg, n.d.

Halliday, 1987.

Abel, 1989a; Bishop, 1989.

New York Times B12, May 15, 1994. The reference to Tijuana recalls the era when Mexico offered quick divorces to Americans unable to obtain them at home because of the fault requirement.

New York Times B10, February 4, 1994; Al3, February 9, 1994.

New York Times A1, November 22, 1993.

Los Angeles Times A1, January 1,1994.

Los Angeles Times E1, September 7, 1993.

E.g., Dzienkowski, 1989: 470.

This is the answer to Osiel's insistence on "the remarkable reluctance of lawyers in many countries to seize the new opportunities that private industry offered them," 1990: 2039.

See, e.g., Powell, 1993.

Sarat and Felstiner (1986; 1995) nicely capture the tension between the individual client's fervent hope for legal certainty and the lawyer's self-interested manipulation of uncertainty.

For a critique of aggressive lawyering, see Kagan, 1994.

See, e.g., Goriely and Kempson, 1995. American corporations have deliberately reduced the number of law firms they use in order to increase their leverage in fee negotiations. New York Times. §3 p5, July 4, 1993; B10, July 9, 1993.

See, e.g., Seron, 1992, 1993, 1996. Germany long has had far more widespread legal expense insurance.

Abel, 1989a . Legal need studies have been conducted in many other countries, including the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia.

New York Times B11, March 1, 1991.

New York Times B11, March 26,1993.

New York Times B14, June 7, 1991; see also Los Angeles Times A3, February 22, 1993: "Injured? Larry Parker got me $2.1 million," "Accidente? Call 1-800-7-DINERO."

New York Times B11, May 25, 1990.

Los Angeles Times A3, August 22, 1994.

New York Times C1, December 11, 1991.

New York Times All, April 13, 1994 (GAO statistics based on analysis of 2.4 million claims); New York Times Al0, March 19, 1993 (T2 Medical Inc.).

New York Times §3 p1, February 14, 1993.

New York Times §4 p2, April 10, 1994.

New York Times 17, March 3, 1991.

Abbott, 1991; Åmark, 1990; Bishop, 1989; Brazier et al., 1993; Collins, 1990a, 1990b; Goodrich, 1990; Murphy, 1988, 1990; Ramsay, 1993; Rosen, 1992; Sander and Williams, 1989; Stager and Foot, 1989; Stephen, 1995; Sugarman, 1995; Thomas, 1992; Willock, 1992.

Los Angeles Times A1, July 6, 1993, Al, July 8, 1993; New York Times B10,

July 9, 1993. A Virginia lawyer, angered by the Miller ad, wrote, produced, and paid to run a spoof in which a cowgirl lassos "Philip Millerd" (a play on Philip Morris, Miller's parent company) and condemns him for the health effects of cigarettes. New York Times B12, January 21, 1994.

See Ripps, 1993; Schneyer, 1993. On the role of elite bar associations in elevating status, see Powell, 1989.

Burrage, 1995; Osiel, 1990: 2027.

Arthurs et al., 1988; Dingwall, 1989; Ledford, 1990; Pue, 1989: 73-74; Siegrist, 1990a. On the tortuous path to collective action, see Halliday et al., 1993.

Schneyer, 1989, 1992.

Shamir, 1993, 1994; Harrington, 1983.

Seron, 1992, 1993, 1996; see also Cain, 1994; Van Hoy, 1993.

Abbott, 1988; see also Karpik, 1990. Kritzer (1991a ) urges that professions be compared in terms of relative institutionalization, a concept that appears to combine social structural and cognitive variables. Auerbach (1990) suggests that Jewish preoccupation with religious law is related to Jewish overrepresentation among secular lawyers.

That this usefully forces comparison across occupational categories is shown by Heinz et al. (1993), who study Washington lobbying by lawyers and other representatives.

Erlanger et al., 1987; Felstiner and Sarat, 1992; Ingleby, 1992; Kressel, 1985; McEwan et al., 1994; Sarat and Felstiner, 1986, 1988a , 1988b , 1995. Berends (1992) both urges such studies and has conducted them, but unfortunately they are available only in Dutch.

McCahery and Picciotto, 1994; Sugarman, 1993, 1994b; Wheeler, 1991.

Kritzer, 1990.

Kritzer, 1991b ; Flood, 1991.

Sugarman, 1994a .

Hartmann, 1993, 1994.

Rogowski, 1994.

Bancaud and Boigeol, 1994.

Jamous and Peloille, 1970; Johnstone and Hopson, 1967. Abbott, 1988 cites both of these but also makes strong claims for the novelty of his own schema.

Osiel, 1990: 2055-2056.

Shapiro, 1990: 703, 709.

Sterett, 1990: 369.

Halliday, 1987: 28-43.

Harrington, 1994; Torstendahl, 1990a ; Larson, 1990; Svensson, 1990; Becher, 1990; Elzinga, 1990.

Los Angeles Times Al8, February 19, 1994. For a critique of lawyer self-regulation, see Wilkins, 1992.

See Abel, 1994; Dezalay, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994a , 1994b, 1994c ; Dezalay and Trubek, 1994; Flood, 1994, 1995; Flood and Skordaki, 1992, n.d.; Miller and Power, 1992, 1994; Olgiati, 1994; Trubek et al., 1994; Veenswijk, 1994; Whelan and McBarnet, 1992.

Local legal professions within federal polities have sometimes engaged in similar competition.

On the interaction between law and accounting, see Bromwich and Hop-wood, 1992.

Gordon, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1990; Gordon and Simon, 1992; see also ABA Journal, 1994; American Bar Association, 1986; Brint, 1994; Croft, 1992; Elkins, 1992; Glendon, 1994; Harrington, 1994; Indiana Law Journal, 1988/89; Kelly 1994; Kronman, 1993; Linowitz, 1994; Luban, 1984, 1988, 1993; Nelson and Trubek, 1992a ; Simon, 1988, 1993.

Gordon, 1984: 67.

Abel, 1989b , 1989c .

Caplan, 1993. Nelson and Trubek (1992b ) offer legal services as evidence of professionalism; once again, however, fewer than one percent of American lawyers provide legal services, and they are paid by the state, not the profession.

Handler et al., 1978.

Erlanger and Klegon, 1978; Stover, 1989; Granfield, 1992; Granfield and Koenig, 1992.

Derber, 1982. Freidson (1992) leaves this ambiguity unresolved. On the possibility of a "universal class," see Derber et al., 1990.

Osiel actually titles a section of his review essay "Lawyers as Aristocrats" (1990).

Munger, 1994.

Los Angeles Times §1 p1, June 10, 1985.

Lisagor and Lipsius, 1988; Kumble and Lahart, 1990; Eisler, 1990; Caplan, 1993. On the role of lawyers in helping clients evade law, see McBarnet, 1984, 1988, 1991a , 1991b , 1994.

Gilson, 1990. See also an unpublished paper by economists Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil," described in New York Times B12, March 25, 1994.

Nelson, 1988: 251.

They were Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (the largest law firm in the United States, excluding the multinational Baker & McKenzie) and Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (two of whose name partners are a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a Columbia Law School Professor). New York Times C1, September 29, 1993.

Wheeler, 1991, 1994; McBarnet and Whelan, 1991, 1993; see also Mann, 1985.

Heinz and Laumann, 1982: chap. 4, 1994.

Sarat and Felstiner, 1986, 1988a , 1988b , 1995; Felstiner and Sarat, 1992; McEwan et al., 1994.

Landon, 1985, 1988, 1990; Engel, 1987; see also Johnsen, 1992.

Rosenthal, 1974.

Katz, 1982; McIntyre, 1987; Flemming, 1989.

Haley, 1982; Reifner, 1982.

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. See Abel, 1985b : 531.

Solomon (1992) details the contradiction between lawyers' search for autonomy and their obsession with money. The latest example is an entrepreneurial California lawyer who, for $300 and proof that the buyer has obtained a $1 million recovery, will send "a handsome certificate, printed on heavy cream paper

and complete with gold scales-of-justice seal and a legend attesting to 'exceptional skill, experience and excellence in advocacy.'" In the first nine months he had seventy-five takers. The Inner Circle of Advocates, founded for the same purpose twenty years ago, has preserved its exclusivity through a humerus clausus of 100. New York Times B18, May 6, 1994.

Compare Los Angeles Times §IV p1 (May 2, 1989), New York Times 17 (July 13, 1988) (models refusing cigarette and other advertisements) and New York Times C1 (April 25, 1994) (pharmacists refusing to stock cigarettes) with New York Times A1 (November 20, 1992) (the 175 lawyers at Shook, Hardy & Bacon of Kansas City devote 20 percent of their time to tobacco company liability defense and fought to oppose the Surgeon General's warnings). U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor boasted that the Clinton Administration abandoned the Reagan and Bush Administration's policy of aggressively promoting American tobacco exports. When asked how he reconciled this with his own representation (in private practice) of the Beverly Hills Restaurant Association in its fight against an anti-smoking ordinance, he replied: "I see no contradiction in that and I'm not defensive about it at all. Obviously when you're a lawyer in a corporate practice, in 99.9 percent of the cases, there is no ideology or philosophy involved." The Nation 556, April 25, 1994.

Salokar, 1992 (Solicitor General). Gordon and Simon (1992) find solace in Rosen's (1989a ) claim that some house counsel restrain clients. The dilemma of the good lawyer in a bad role is a staple of media presentations, see Chase, 1986; Post, 1987; Rosen, 1989b .

Alfieri, 1993; Aron, 1989; Cain, 1994; Cain and Harrington, 1994b ; Green-berg, 1994; Kessler, 1987; Lawrence, 1990; López, 1992; Schärf, 1994; Scheingold, 1988, 1994; Tushnet, 1994. For an account of Santa Monica City Attorney Robert M. Myers, who was fired for refusing to draft and enforce an ordinance criminalizing homelessness, see Fulton, 1993. His replacement, Marsha Jones Moutrie, announced: "1 come in the door with no particular substantive agenda. I intend to work hard at being a very good lawyer for the city." Outlook Mail Al, December 29, 1993.

New York Times B12, March 21, 1994.

Osiel (1990: 2013-2014) makes this argument more generally.

Abel 1989a ; Goriely and Kempson, 1995.

Halliday, 1987. Does he really mean to hold up the concordat between the Papacy and the Italian state as something to be emulated?

Paterson, 1995. This extends Panglossian law and economics to the macro-level.

Domberger and Sherr, 1989.

Quoted in Flood, 1995.

Goriely and Kempson, 1995.

Burrage, 1990b .

Both quoted by Sugarman, 1995.

Abel 1989d : 85; Auerbach, 1976: 107, 127.

Stevens, 1987, 1988.

Abel, 1988c : 188; Baldwin and McConville, 1977; McConville et al., 1994.

Abel, 1988c : 53-56, 149-156.

The literature on discrimination against women in the legal profession is enormous. For some recent accounts, see Chambers, 1989; Drachman, 1989, 1993; Eaves et al., 1989; Epstein, 1993; Gellis, 1990/91; Hagan, 1990a , 1990b; Hagan and Kay, 1995; Hagan et al., 1991; Mattesich and Heilman, 1990; Menkel-Meadow, 1994; New York Law School Law Review, 1990; Roach, 1990; Scott, 1987; Skordaki, 1995b ; Stanford Law Review, 1988; Weiss and Melling, 1988. A recent survey by the Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles (427 respondents out of 1100 members) found that three out of five believed women received less desirable work than did men and three out of four felt that women were held to higher standards. Los Angeles Times D1, March 10, 1994·

(Johannesburg) Weekly Mail & Guardian 37, April 29, 1994.

See Flood, 1995; Lee, 1992; Thomas, 1992.

Derber, 1982.

Hartmann, 1993.

New York Times B13, May 3, 1991.

Calhoun and Copp, 1988; Clark, 1992; Clark and Economides, 1988; Katsh, 1989; Sherr, 1990.

Hagan, 1990a , 1990b ; Hagan et al., 1988, 1991; Hagan and Kay, 1995.

New York Times C1, June 14, 1990.

Gilson and Mnookin, 1985, 1989; see also Carr and Mathewson, 1990. Daniels (1992, 1993) offers a more complicated account, which I find more satisfactory; see also Nelson, 1994.

Galanter and Palay, 1992. I find this hypothesis unfalsifiable because the authors offer no index of "reputational capital" other than the partnership income it purports to explain·

Sander and Williams, 1992.

New York Times 17, January 29, 1994; Al, February 7, 1994.

Compare Magee et al., 1989 and Magee, 1992, n.d. with Clark, 1991; Cross, 1992a, 1992b; Epp, 1992a, 1992b ; Gilson, 1984, 1992; Heymann, 1991; Olson, 1992; Sander, 1992.

REFERENCES

ABA Journal. 1994. "Identity Crisis," 80 ABA Journal 74 (December)·

Abbott, Andrew· 1988. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

____. 1991. “The Order of Professionalization," 18 Work and Occupations 355.

Abel, Richard L. 1979. "The Rise of Professionalism," 6 British Journal of Law and Society 82.

____. 1982. "The Politics of the Market for Legal Services," in P. A. Thomas, ed., Law in the Balance: Legal Services in the Eighties. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

____. 1985 a. "Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions: An Exploratory Essay," 1985 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1.

____. 1985 b. "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid under Advanced Capitalism," 32 UCLA Law Review 474.

____. 1986. "The Decline of Professionalism?" 49 Modern Law Review 1.

____. 1988 a. "United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism," in Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society , Vol. 1: The Common Law World. Berkeley: University of California Press.

____. 1988 b. "Lawyers in the Civil Law World," in Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society , Vol. 2: The Civil Law World · Berkeley: University of California Press.

____. 1988 c. The Legal Profession in England and Wales. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

____. 1989 a. "Between Market and State: The Legal Profession in Turmoil," 52 Modern Law Review 285.

____. 1989 b. "The Contradictions of Legal Professionalism," in School of Justice Studies, Arizona State University , eds., New Directions in the Study of Justice. New York: Plenum.

____. 1989 c. "Taking Professionalism Seriously," 1989(1) Annual Survey of American Law 41 .

____. 1989 d. American Lawyers . New York: Oxford University Press.

____. 1994. "Transnational Law Practice," 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review 737.

ÅAmark, Klas. 1990. "Open Cartels and Social Closures: Professional Strategies in Sweden, 1860-1950," in Burrage and Torstendahl , 1990.

American Bar Association, Commission on Professionalism. 1986. ‘... In the Spirit of Public Service': A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism. Chicago: ABA.

Alfieri, Anthony V. 1993. "Impoverished Practices," 81 Georgetown Law Journal 2567 .

Aron, Nan. 1989. Liberty and Justice for All: Public Interest Law in the 1980s and Beyond. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Arthurs, Harry W., Richard Weisman, and Frederick H. Zemans. 1988. "Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism," in Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society, Vol. 1: The Common Law World Berkeley: University of California Press.

Auerbach, Jerold S. 1976. Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America ·New York: Oxford University Press.

____. 1990. Rabbis to Lawyers: The Journey from the Torah to the Constitution ·Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Baldwin, John, and Michael McConville. 1977. Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty . London: Martin Robertson.

Bancaud, Alain, and Anne Boigeol. 1994. "A New Judge for a New System of Economic Justice?" in Dezalay and Sugarman , 1994·

Becher, Tony. 1990. "Professional Education in a Comparative Context," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Berends, Miek. 1992. "An Elusive Profession? Lawyers in Society," 26 Law & Society Review 161.

Bishop, William. 1989. "Regulating the Market for Legal Services in England: Enforced Separation of Function and Restrictions on Forms of Enterprise," 52 Modern Law Review 326.

Blankenburg, Erhard. n.d "The Purge of Lawyers: After the Breakdown of the East German Communist Regime" (unpublished).

Brante, Thomas. 1990. "Professional Types as a Strategy of Analysis," in Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990.

Brazier, Margaret, Jill Jovecy, Michael Moran, and Margaret Potton. 1993. "Falling from a Tightrope: Doctors and Lawyers between the Market and the State," 41 Political Studies 197 .

Brint, Steven. 1994. In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bromwich, Michael, and Anthony Hopwood, eds. 1992. Accounting and the Law. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall; London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.

Burrage, Michael. 1990 a. "Advokatura: In Search of Professionalism and Pluralism in Moscow and Leningrad," 15 Law & Society Inquiry 433.

____. 1990 b. "Introduction: The Professions in Sociology and History," in Bur-rage and Torstendahl , 1990.

____. 1995. "Looking Backwards into the Future: Of the Status of Solicitors," in Skordaki , 1995 a.

Burrage, Michael, and Rolf Torstendahl, eds. 1990. Professions in Theory and History: Rethinking the Study of the Professions . London: Sage.

Cain, Maureen. 1994. "The Symbol Traders," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a.

Cain, Maureen, and Christine B. Harrington, eds. 1994 a. Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression. Buckingham: Open University Press.

____. 1994 b. "Introduction," in Cain and Harrington , 1994a.

Calhoun, Craig, and Martha Copp. 1988· "Computerization in Legal Work: How Much Does New Technology Change Professional Practice?" 4 Research in the Sociology of Work 233 .

Caplan, Lincoln. 1993. Skadden : Power, Money, and the Rise of a Legal Empire . New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Carr, Jack, and Frank Mathewson. 1990. "The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm," 33 Journal of Law and Economics 307 .

Chambers, David L. 1989. "Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family," 14 Law & Social Inquiry 251 .

Chase, Anthony· 1986. "Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of American Attorneys," 1986 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 281 .

Clark, Andrew. 1992. "Information Technology in Legal Services," 18 Journal of Law and Society 13 .

Clark, Andrew, and Kim Economides. 1988. "Technics and Praxis: Technological Innovation and Legal Practice in Modern Society," 15 Sociologia del diritto 41 .

Clark, R. 1991. "Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?" 61 Fordham Law Review 275 .

Cocks, Geoffrey, and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds. 1990. German Professions, 1800-1950. New York: Oxford University Press.

Collins, Randall. 1990 a. "Changing Conceptions in the Sociology of the Professions," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

____. 1990 b. "Market Closure and the Conflict Theory of the Professions," in Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990.

Croft, Colin. 1992. "Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal for a Deliberative Moral Community," 67 NYU Law Review 1256 .

Cross, Frank B. 1992 a. "The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System," 70 Texas Law Review 645 .

____. 1992b . "Law versus Economics?" 17 Law & Social Inquiry 653 .

Daniels, Ronald J. 1992. "The Law Firm as an Efficient Community," 37 McGill Law Journal 801 .

____. 1993. "Growing Pains: The Why and How of Law Firm Expansion," 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 147.

Derber, Charles. 1982. Professionals as Workers : Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism. Boston: G. K. Hall.

Derber, Charles, William A. Schwartz, and Yale Magrass. 1990. Power in the Highest Degree: Professionals and the Rise of a New Mandarin Order . New York: Oxford University Press.

Dezalay, Yves. 1990. "The Big Bang and the Law: The Internationalization and Restructuration of the Legal Field," 7 Theory, Culture & Society 279.

____. 1991. "Territorial Battles and Tribal Disputes," 54 Modern Law Review 792 .

____. 1992. Marchands de droit . Paris: Feyard.

____. 1994 a. "Professional Competition and the Social Construction of Markets," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

____. 1994 b. "Technological Warfare: The Battle to Control the Mergers and Acquisitions Market in Europe," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

____. 1994 c. "The Forum Should Fit the Fuss: The Economics and Politics of Negotiated Justice," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a.

Dezalay, Yves, and David Sugarman, eds. 1994. Professional Competition and the Social Construction of Markets . London: Routledge.

Dingwall, Robert. 1989. Review of "The Legal Profession in England and Wales," 23 Sociology 309.

Domberger, Simon, and Avrom Sherr. 1989. "The Impact of Competition on Pricing and Quality of Legal Services," 9 International Review of Law and Economics 41 .

Drachman, Virginia G. 1989. "'My "Partner" in Law and in Life': Marriage in the Lives of Women Lawyers in Late 19th- and Early 20th-Century America," 14 Law & Social Inquiry 221.

____. 1993. Women Lawyers and the Origins of Professional Community in America : The Letters of the Equity Club, 1866 to 1890. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Dzienkowski, John S. 1989. "The Regulation of the American Legal Profession and Its Reform" (review of American Lawyers), 68 Texas Law Review 451.

Eaves, David, I. E L. Png, and J. Mark Ramseyer. 1989. "Gender, Ethnicity and Grades: Empirical Evidence of Discrimination in Law-Firm Interviews," 7 Law and Inequality 189.

Eisler, Kim. 1990. Shark Tank: Greed, Politics, and the Collapse of Finley Kumble. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Elkins, James R. 1992. "The Moral Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy," 21 Capital University Law Review 736 .

Elzinga, Aant. 1990. "The Knowledge Aspect of Professionalization: The Case of Science-based Nursing Education in Sweden," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Engel, David M. 1987. "The Ovenbird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community," 18 Law & Society Review 551.

Epp, Charles R. 1992 a. "Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?" 17 Law & Social Inquiry 585.

____. 1992 b. "Toward New Research on Lawyers and the Economy," 17 Law & Social Inquiry 695.

Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs. 1993. Women in Law , 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Erlanger, Howard S., and Douglas A. Klegon. 1978. "Socialization Effects of Professional School," 13 Law & Society Review 11 .

Erlanger, Howard S., Elizabeth Chambliss, and Marygold S. Melli. 1987. "Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context," 21 Law & Society Review 585 .

Felstiner, William L. E, and Austin Sarat. 1992. "Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions," 77 Cornell Law Review 1447.

Flemming, Roy B. 1989. "If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public Defenders in America's Criminal Courts," 14 Law & Social Inquiry 393.

Flood, John. 1991. "Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers' Work," 25 Law & Society Review 41.

____. 1994. "The Cultures of Globalization: Professional Restructuring for the International Market," in Dezalay and Sugarrnan, 1994.

____. 1995. "Conquering the World: Multinational Practice and the Production of Law," in Skordaki, 1995 a.

Flood, John, and Eleni Skordaki. 1992. Corporate Failure and the Work of Insolvency Practitioners: Professional Jurisdiction and Big Corporate Insolvencies . London: ACCA.

____. n.d. "The Role of Informal Rule-Making by Accountants and Lawyers in Mega-Insolvencies" (unpublished).

Fox, Robert. 1984. "Science, the University, and the State in Nineteenth-Century France," in Geison, 1984 a.

Fragin, Sheryl, 1994. "New York's Terror Taxis, Explained," New York Times , August 21, §3 p9.

Freidson, Eliot. 1992. "Professionalism as Model and Ideology," in Nelson et al., 1992.

Fulton, William. 1993. "Saint Bob," California Lawyer 51 (February).

Galanter, Marc, and Thomas Palay. 1992. Tournament of Lawyers : The Transformation of the Big Law Firms. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Geison, Gerald L., ed. 1984a. Professions and the French State , 1700-1900. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

1984. "Introduction," in Geison, 1984a.

Gelfand, Toby. 1984. "A 'Monarchical Profession' in the Old Regime: Surgeons, Ordinary Practitioners, and Medical Professionalization in Eighteenth-Century France," in Geiaon, 1984a.

Gellis, Ann. 1990/91. "Great Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, a commentary on state studies," 66 Indiana taw Journal 941 .

Gilson, Ronald J. 1984. "Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing," 94 Yale Law Journal 239.

____. 1990. "The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective," 49 Maryland taw Review 869 .

____. 1992. "How Many Lawyers Does It Take to Change an Economy?" 17 Law & Social Inquiry 635.

Gilson, Ronald, and Robert Mnookin. 1985. "Sharing among the Human Capitalists: An Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits," 37 Stanford Law Review 313.

____. 1989. "Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns," 41 Stanford taw Review 567 .

Glendon, Mary Ann. 1994. A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Goldstein, Jan. 1984. "'Moral Contagion': A Professional Ideology of Medicine and Psychiatry in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France," in Geison, 1984a.

Goodrich, Chris. 1990. "A Problematic Profession" (review of American Lawyers and three other books), The Nation 205 (February 12).

Gordon, Robert W. 1983. "Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920," in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies in America . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

____. 1984. "'The Ideal and the Actual in the Law': Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910," in Gerard W. Gawalt, ed., The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America·Westport, Conn .: Greenwood Press.

____. 1988. "The Independence of Lawyers," 68 Boston University Law Review 1.

____. 1990. "Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling," 49 Maryland Law Review 255.

Gordon, Robert W., and William H. Simon. 1992. "The Redemption of Professionalism," in Nelson et al., 1992.

Goriely, Tammy, and Elaine Kempson. 1995. "Access to Social Justice: The Development of Legal Aid and Advice Services in the Area of Poverty Law," in Skordaki, 1995a.

Granfield, Robert· 1992. Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of taw at Harvard and Beyond. New York: Routledge.

Granfield, Robert, and Thomas Koenig. 1992. "Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard Law School and the Social Production of Elite Lawyers," 33 Sociological Quarterly 503.

Greenberg, Jack. 1994. Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution . New York: Basic Books.

Hagan, John. 1990a. "The Gender Stratification of Income Inequality Among Lawyers," 68 Social Forces 835.

____. 1990b. "Gender and the Structural Transformation of the Legal Profession

in the United States and Canada," in D. M. Klen and J. Glass, eds., Changes in Societal Institutions. New York: Plenum.

Hagan, John, and Fiona Kay. 1995. Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers' Lives. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hagan, John, Marjorie Zatz, Bruce Arnold, and Fiona Kay. 1991. "Cultural Capital, Gender, and the Structural Transformation of Legal Practice," 25 Law & Society Review 239.

Hagan, John, Marie Huxter, and Patricia Parker. 1988. "Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and Mobility Among Toronto Lawyers," 22 Law & Society Review 9.

Haley, John Owen. 1982. "The Politics of Informal Justice: The Japanese Experience, 1922-1942," in Richard L. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice , Vol. 2: Comparative Studies. New York: Academic Press.

Halliday, Terence C. 1987. Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Halliday, Terence C., Michael J. Powell, and Mark W. Granfors. 1993. "After Mini-realism: Transformations of State Bar Associations from Market Dependence to State Reliance, 1918 to 1950," 58 American Sociological Review 515 .

Handler, Joel E, Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, and Howard S. Erlanger. 1978. Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights. New York: Academic Press.

Harrington, Christine B. 1983· "The Formation of a New Specialty: The Administrative Bar." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Denver (June 2-5).

____. 1994. "Outlining a Theory of Legal Practice," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a.

Hartmann, Michael. 1993. "Legal Data Banks, the Glut of Lawyers, and the German Legal Profession," 27 Law & Society Review 421.

____. 1994. "Bank Lawyers—A Professional Group Holding the Reins of Power," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

Heinz, John P, and Edward O. Laumann. 1982. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar . New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Chicago: American Bar Foundation.

____. 1994. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar, rev. ed. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hellberg, Inga. 1990. "The Swedish Veterinary Profession and the Swedish State," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Heymann, Philip. 1991. "Considering the Costs and Benefits of Lawyering in Drafting Legislation or Establishing Precedents," 36 Villanova Law Review 191 .

Huskey, Eugene. 1986.·Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State : The Origins and Development of the Soviet Bar 1917-1939. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Indiana Law Journal. 1988/89. "Symposium: The Growth of Large Law Firms and Its Effect on the Legal Profession and Legal Education," 64 Indiana Law Journal 423-600.

Ingleby, Richard. 1992. Solicitors and Divorce. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jamous, H., and B. Peloille· 1970. "Professions or Self-Perpetuating Systems? Changes in the French University-Hospital System," in J. A. Jackson, ed., Professions and Professionalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Johnsen, Jon T. 1992. "Rural Justice: Country Lawyers and Legal Services in the United States and Britain," 17 Law & Social Inquiry 415 .

Johnstone, Quintin, and Dan Hopson, Jr. 1967. Lawyers and Their Work: An Analysis of the Legal Profession in the United States and England. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Kagan, Robert A. 1994. "Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry," 19 Law & Social Inquiry 1 .

Karpik, Lucien. 1988. "Lawyers and Politics in France, 1814-1950: The State, the Market, and the Public," 13 Law & Social Inquiry 707.

____. 1990. "Technical and Political Knowledge: The Relationship of Lawyers and Other Legal Professions to the Market and the State," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Katsh, M. Ethan. 1989. The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law. New York: Oxford University Press.

Katz, Jack. 1982. Poor People's Lawyers in Transition . New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Kelly, Michael. 1994. Lives of Lawyers : Journeys in the Organizations of Practice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kessler, Mark. 1987. Legal Services for the Poor: A Comparative and Contemporary Analysis of Interorganizational Politics. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Kocka, Jürgen. 1990. "'Bürgertum' and Professions in the Nineteenth Century: Two Alternative Approaches,' in Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990.

Konttinen, Esa. 1991. "Professionalization as Status Adaptation: The Nobility, the Bureaucracy, and the Modernization of the Legal Profession in Finland," 16 Law & Social Inquiry 497.

Kressel, Kenneth. 1985. The Process of Divorce: How Professionals and Couples Negotiate Settlements. New York: Basic Books.

Kritzer, Herbert M. 1990. The Justice Broker: Lawyers and Ordinary Litigation. New York: Oxford University Press.

____. 1991a. "Abel and the Professional Project: The Institutional Analysis of the Legal Profession," 16 Law & Social Inquiry 529.

____. 1991b. Let's Make a Deal . Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Kronman, Anthony T. 1993. The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kumble, Steven J., and Kevin J. Lahart. 1990. Conduct Unbecoming: The Rise and Ruin of Finley, Kumble. New York: Carroll & Graf.

Landon, Donald. 1985. "Clients, Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Law Practice," 1985 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 81.

____. 1988. "LaSalle Street and Main Street: The Role of Context in Structuring Law Practice," 22 Law & Society Review 213.

____. 1990. Country Lawyers: The Impact of Context on Professional Practice. New York: Praeger.

Larson, Magali Sarfatti. 1977. The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis . Berkeley: University of California Press

____. 1990. "In the Matter of Experts and Professionals, or How Impossible It Is to Leave Nothing Unsaid," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Lawrence, Susan. 1990. The Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Ledford, Kenneth F 1990. "Conflict Within the Legal Profession: Simultaneous Admission and the German Bar, 1903-1927," in Cocks and Jarausch, 1990.

Lee, R. G. 1992. "From Profession to Business: The Rise and Rise of the City Law Firm," 18 Journal of Law and Society 31.

Linowitz, Sol, with Martin Mayer. 1994. The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Lisagor, Nancy, and Frank Lipsius. 1988. A Law Unto Itself: The Untold Story of the Law Firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. New York: Morrow.

López, Gerald P. 1992. Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Luban, David. 1984. "The Adversary System Excuse," in David Luban, ed., The Good Lawyer . Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld.

____. 1988. Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

____. 1993. "Are Criminal Defenders Different?" 91 Michigan Law Review 1729.

Magee, Stephen P 1992. "The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp," 17 Law & Social Inquiry 667·

____. n.d. The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations: Lawyers vs. the U.S. Economy.

Magee, Stephen P., William A. Brock, and Leslie Young. 1989· "The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations: Lawyers as Negative Externalities," in Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, Kenneth. 1985. Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mattesich, Paul, and Cheryl Heilman. 1990. "The Career Paths of Minnesota Law School Graduates: Does Gender Make a Difference?" 19 Law and Inequality 59.

McBarnet, Doreen. 1984. "Law and Capital: The Role of Legal Form and Legal Actors," 12 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 233.

____. 1988. "Law, Policy, and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively Implement Egalitarian Policies?" 15 Journal of Law and Society 113.

____. 1991a. "It's Not What You Do But the Way You Do It," in David Downes, ed., Unravelling Criminal Justice . London: Macmillan.

____. 1991b. "Whiter Than White Collar Crime: Tax, Fraud Insurance and the Management of Stigma," 42 British Journal of Sociology 323.

____. 1994. "Legal Creativity: Law, Capital and Legal Avoidance," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a.

McBarnet, Doreen, and Christopher Whelan. 1991. "The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control," 54 Modern Law Review 848.

____. 1993. "Beyond Control: Law Management and Corporate Governance,"

in Joseph McCahery, Sol Picciotto, and Colin Scott, eds·, Corporate Control and Accountability. Oxford: Clarendon; New York: Oxford University Press.

McCahery, Joseph, and Sol Picciotto. 1994. "Creative Lawyering and the Dynamics of Business Regulation," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

McClelland, Charles E. 1990. "Escape from Freedom? Reflections on German Professionalization, 1870-1933," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

McConville, Mike, Jacqueline Hodgson, and Lee Bridges· 1994. Standing Accused: The Organization and Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McEwan, Craig A., Lynn Mather, and Richard J. Maiman. 1994. "Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce Practice," 28 Law & Society Review 149.

McIntyre, Lisa J. 1987. The Public Defender: The Practice of Law in the Shadows of Repute . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Menkel-Meadow, Carrie·1994. "Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering," 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review 621.

Miller, Peter, and Michael Power. 1992. "Accounting, Law and Economic Calculation," in Bromwich and Hopwood, 1992.

____. 1994. "Calculating Corporate Failure," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

Munger, Frank. 1994. "Miners and Lawyers: Law Practice and Class Conflict in Appalachia, 1872-1920," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a.

Murphy, Raymond. 1988. Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

____. 1990. "Proletarianization or Bureaucratization: The Fall of the Professional?" in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Murray, Georgina. 1988. "New Zealand Lawyers: From Colonial GPs to the Servants of Capital," in Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society , Vol. 1: The Common Law World. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Nelson, Robert. 1988. Partners with Power . Berkeley: University of California Press.

____. 1994. "The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society," 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review 345.

Nelson, Robert L., and David M. Trubek. 1992a. "Introduction: New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession," in Nelson et al., 1992.

____. 1992b. "Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context," in Nelson et al., 1992.

Nelson, Robert L., David M. Trubek, and Rayman L. Solomon, eds. 1992. Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

New York Law School Law Review. 1990. "Symposium on Women in the Law-yering Workplace: Feminist Considerations and Practical Solutions," 35(2) New York Law School Law Review (special issue).

Olgiati, Vittorio. 1994. "Process and Policy of Legal Professionalization in Europe: The De-Construction of a Normative Order," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

Olson, Mancur. 1992. "Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?" 17 Law & Social Inquiry 625.

Osiel, Mark J. 1990. "Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs," 103 Haroard Law Review 2009.

Ostertag, Jürgen R. 1993. "Legal Education in Germany and the United States—A Structural Comparison," 26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 301.

Paterson, Alan A. 1988. "The Legal Profession in Scotland: An Endangered Species or a Problem Case for Market Theory?" in Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society, Vol. 1: The Common Law World . Berkeley: University of California Press.

____. 1995. "Professionalism and the Legal Services Market," in Skordaki, 1995a.

Post, Robert C. 1987. "On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass," 75 California Law Review 379.

Powell, Michael. 1989. From Patrician to Professional Elite: The Transformation of the blew York City Bar Association . New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

____. 1993. "Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking," 18 Law & Social Inquiry 423.

Pue, W. Wesley. 1989. "'Trajectories of Professionalism?': Legal Professionalism After Abel," 1989 Manitoba Law Annual 57.

____. 1990. "Moral Panic at the English Bar: Paternal vs. Commercial Ideologies of Legal Practice in the 1860s," 15 Law & Social Inquiry 49.

Ramsey, Ian M. 1993. "What Do Lawyers Do? Reflections on the Market for Lawyers," 21 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 355.

Ramsey, Matthew· 1984. "The Politics of Professional Monopoly in Nineteenth-Century Medicine: The French Model and Its Rivals," in Geison, 1984a.

Reifner, Udo. 1982. "Individualistic and Collective Legalization: The Theory and Practice of Legal Advice for Workers in Prefacist Germany," in Richard L. Abel ed., The Politics of Informal Justice, Vol. 2: Comparative Studies. New York: Academic Press.

Ripps, Stephen R. 1993. "Law Firm Ownership of Ancillary Businesses in Ohio—A New Era?" 27 Akron Law Review 1.

Roach, Sharon L. 1990. "Men and Women Lawyers in In-House Legal Departments: Recruitment and Career Patterns," 4 Gender and Society 207.

Rogowski, Ralf. 1994. "German Corporate Lawyers: Social Closure in Autopoietic Perspective," in Dezalay and Sugarman, 1994.

Rosen, Robert. 1989a. "The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment, and Organizational Representation," 64 Indiana Law Journal 479.

____. 1989b. "Ethical Soap: L.A. Law and the Privileging of Character," 43 University of Miami Law Review 1229.

Rosen, Sherwin. 1992. "The Market for Lawyers," 35 Journal of Law & Economics 215.

Rosenthal, Douglas E. 1974. Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge? New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Royal Commission on Legal Services. 1979. Final Report . London: HMSO (Cmnd 7648).

Salokar, Rebecca M. 1992. The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law . Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Sander, Richard H. 1992. "Elevating the Debate on Lawyers and Economic Growth," 17 Law & Social Inquiry 659.

Sander, Richard H., and E. Douglass Williams. 1989. "Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market," 14 Law & Social Inquiry 431.

____. 1992· "A Little Theorizing about the Big Law Firm: Galanter, Palay, and the Economics of Growth," 17 Law & Social Inquiry 391.

Sarat, Austin, and William L. E Felstiner. 1986. "Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office," 20 Law & Society Review 93.

____. 1988a. "Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction," 22 Law & Society Review 737.

____. 1988b. "Legal Realism in Lawyer/Client Communication," in Anne Walker and Judith Levi, eds., Language in the Judicial Process . New York: Plenum.

____. 1995. Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process . New York: Oxford University Press.

Schärf, Wilfried. 1994. "Para-legals and Prefiguration: Working in Black Townships towards a Post-Apartheid South Africa," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a .

Scheingold, Stuart. 1988. "Radical Lawyers and Socialist Ideals," 15 Journal of Law and Society 122.

____. 1994. "The Contradictions of Radical Law Practice," in Cain and Harring-ton, 1994a .

Schneyer, Theodore. 1989. "Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," 14 Law & Social Inquiry 677.

____. 1992. "Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code," in Nelson et al., 1992.

____. 1993. "Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study," 35 Arizona Law Review 363.

Schurr, Carolyn. 1990. "Monopoly" (review of American Lawyers ), 76 American Bar Association Journal 100.

Scott, Donald M. 1983. "The Profession That Vanished: Public Lecturing in Mid-Nineteenth Century America," in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies in America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press·

Scott, Joan Norman· 1987. "A Woman's Chance for Law Partnership," 71 Sociology and Social Research 119.

Seron, Carroll. 1992. "Managing Entrepreneurial Legal Services: The Transformation of Small-Firm Practice," in Nelson et al., 1992.

____. 1993. "New Strategies for Getting Clients: Urban and Suburban Lawyers' Views," 27 Law & Society Review 399.

____. 1996. The Business of Practicing Law: The Work Lives of Solo and Small-Firm Attorneys. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Shamir, Ronen. 1993. "Professionalism and Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers and Administrative Law, 1933-1937," 27 Law & Society Review 361.

____. 1994. Managing Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the New Deal . Durham: Duke University Press.

Shapiro, Martin. 1990. "Lawyers, Corporations and Knowledge," 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 683.

Shelley, Louise. 1991. "Lawyers in the Soviet Union," in Anthony Jones, ed., Professions and the State: Expertise and Authority in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press·

Sherr, Avrom. 1990· Review of "The Legal Profession in England and Wales" (and three other books), 53 Modern Law Review 406.

Siegrist, Hannes. 1986. "Professionalization with the Brakes On: The Legal Profession in Switzerland, France and Germany in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," 9 Comparative Social Research 267.

____. 1990a. "Professionalization as a Process: Patterns, Progression and Discontinuity," in Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990.

____. 1990b. "Public Office or Free Profession? German Attorneys in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in Cocks and Jarausch, 1990.

Simon, William H. 1988. "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering," 101 Harvard Law Review 1083.

____. 1993. "The Ethics of Criminal Defense," 91 Michigan Law Review 1703.

Skordaki, Eleni, ed. 1995a. Social Change and the Solicitors' Profession . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

____. 1995b. "Glass Slippers and Glass Ceilings: Women in the Legal Profession," in Skordaki, 1995a.

Solomon, Rayman L. 1992. "Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism," in Nelson et al., 1992.

Stager, D., and D. Foot. 1989. "Lawyers' Earnings under Market Growth and Differentiation, 1970-80," 22 Canadian Journal of Economics 235.

Stanford Law Review. 1988. "Project: Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates," 40 Stanford Law Review 1209.

Stephen, Frank H. 1995. "Assessing Post-War Growth: Factors Affecting the Number of Practising Solicitors," in Skordaki, 1995a.

Sterett, Susan. 1990. "Comparing Legal Professions," 15 Law & Social Inquiry 363.

Stevens, Robert B. 1987. "A View from the Lord Chancellor's Office," [1987] Contemporary Legal Problems 181.

____. 1988. "The Independence of the Judiciary: The View from the Lord Chancellor's Office," 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 222.

Stover, Robert V. 1989. Making It and Breaking It: The Fate of Public Interest Commitment during Law School. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Sugarman, David. 1993. "Simple Images and Complex Realities: English Lawyers and Their Relationship to Business and Politics, 1750-1950," 11 Law and History Review 257.

____. 1994a . "Who Colonized Whom? Historical Reflections on the Intersection between Law, Lawyers and Accountants in England," in Dezalay and Sugar-man, 1994.

____. 1994b . "Blurred Boundaries: The Overlapping Worlds of Law, Business and Politics," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a.

____. 1995. "'The Best Organised and Most Intelligent Trade Union in the Country': The Private and Public Life of the Law Society, 1825-1914," in Skordaki, 1995a .

Svensson, Lennart G. 1990. "Knowledge as a Professional Resource: Case Studies of Architects and Psychologists at Work," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

Thomas, Philip A., ed. 1982. Law in the Balance: Legal Services in the Eighties. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

____. 1992. "Thatcher's Will," 19 Journal of Law and Society 1.

Torstendahl, Rolf. 1990a. "Introduction: Promotion and Strategies of Knowledge-Based Groups," in Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990.

____. 1990b . "Essential Properties, Strategic Aims and Historical Development: Three Approaches to Theories of Professionalism," in Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990.

Torstendahl, Roll, and Michael Burrage, eds. 1990. The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State and Strategy. London: Sage Publications.

Trubek, David M., Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan, and John R. Davis. 1994. "Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas," 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review 407.

Tushnet, Mark V. 1994. Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 . New York: Oxford University Press.

Tyrrell, Alan, and Zahd Yaqub. 1993. The Legal Professions in the New Europe . Oxford: Blackwell.

Van Hoy, Jerry. 1993. "Prepackaged Law: The Political Economy and Organization of Routine Work at Multi-branch Legal Services Firms." Ph.D. dissertation, sociology, Northwestern University.

Veenswijk, Virginia Kays. 1994. Coudert Brothers: A Legacy in Law: The History of America's First International Law Firm 1853-1993 . New York: Truman Talley Books/Dutton.

Weisbrot, David. 1988. "The Australian Legal Profession: From Provincial Family Firms to Multinationals," in Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society, Vol. 1: The Common Law World. Berkeley: University of California Press.

____. 1990. Australian Lawyers . Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Weiss, Catherine, and Louise Melling. 1988. "The Legal Education of Twenty Women," 40 Stanford Law Review 1163.

Weiss, John H. 1984. "Bridges and Barriers: Narrowing Access and Changing Structure in the French Engineering Profession, 1800-1850," in Geison, 1984a .

Wheeler, Sally. 1991. "Lawyer Involvement in Commercial Disputes," 18 Journal of Law and Society 241.

____. 1994. "Capital Fractionalized: The Role of Insolvency Practitioners in Asset Distribution," in Cain and Harrington, 1994a .

Whelan, Christopher, and Doreen McBarnet. 1992. "Lawyers in the Market: Delivering Legal Services in Europe," 18 Journal of Law and Society 49.

Wilkins, David. 1992. "Who Should Regulate Lawyers?" 105 Harvard Law Review 799.

Willock, Ian D. 1992. "Tomorrow's Lawyers in Scotland," 19 Journal of Law and Society 146.

Continues...

Excerpted from Lawyers in Society: An Overviewby Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, editors Copyright © 1996 by Richard L. Abel and Philip S. C. Lewis, editors. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Edition details

• Publisher: University of California Press
• Publication date: 1996
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0520203321
• ISBN 13: 9780520203327
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 350