Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post–World War Settlements - Softcover

Ripsman, Norrin M.

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0271023988 ISBN 13: 9780271023984

Publisher: Penn State University Press, 2002

Synopsis

When theorists explain how democracies conduct foreign policy, they tend to ignore or downplay differences and assume that democratic governments all behave similarly. Challenging this assumption, Norrin Ripsman breaks down the category of "democracy" to argue that differences in structural autonomy among democratic states have a lot to do with how foreign security policies are chosen and international negotiations are carried out. Concluding with an examination of the implications of these findings for security policy in contemporary democracies, Peacemaking by Democracies combines innovation in international relations theory with careful primary research in historical archives.

About this title

About the Author

Norrin M. Ripsman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Concordia University.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

PEACEMAKING by DEMOCRACIES

THE EFFECT OF STATE AUTONOMY ON THE POST-WORLD WAR SETTLEMENTSBy NORRIN M. RIPSMAN

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2002 The Pennsylvania State University
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-271-02398-4

Contents

Acknowledgments......................................................................................................................viiIntroduction.........................................................................................................................11 Domestic Opinion and Democratic Foreign Security Policy............................................................................272 The Domestic Decision-Making Environments of Great Britain, France, and the United States After Two World Wars.....................633 The Post-World War I Settlement, 1919..............................................................................................914 The Post-World War II Settlement, 1945-1954........................................................................................1315 Structural Autonomy and Democratic Foreign Security Policy: Conclusions and Implications...........................................221Bibliography.........................................................................................................................241Index................................................................................................................................261

Chapter One

Domestic Opinion and Democratic Foreign Security Policy

What effect do democratic political institutions have on foreign security policy? Does public and parliamentary input into the policy process improve or hinder foreign policymaking in democratic states? Are these effects relatively uniform across democracies, or does the domestic impact on policy vary in different democratic states? While scholars give different answers to the first two questions, the conventional wisdom is that the domestic impact on policy is similar in different democratic states. Therefore, "democracy" is treated as a powerful analytical category for foreign policy analysts. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is wrong because it ignores the differences between democracies that can cause the domestic impact on foreign security policy to vary considerably across democratic states.

I will begin by showing that, despite their well-known disagreements, the leading schools of international relations theorists share this problematic assumption of democratic uniformity. Traditional realists, for example, contend that democracies are decidedly inferior to their autocratic or oligarchic counterparts in the international arena because they must compromise between pursuit of the national interest and the dictates of lay public opinion and the legislature. Liberals counter that an informed electorate and its principled parliamentary representatives convey indispensable advantages, particularly in policy implementation, international bargaining, and the integrity of the policymaking process, which nondemocratic regimes do not enjoy. Meanwhile, structural realists, or neorealists, assume that democracies-indeed all states-will behave in similar ways internationally, since they are compelled either to pursue the national interest in an anarchical international system or to perish.

I will then explain why we need a more nuanced model of foreign policymaking in democratic states that takes into account the distinctive political arrangements or domestic decision-making environments of different democratic states. The alternative model I present contends that the degree to which the foreign policymakers of a democratic state are affected, either positively or negatively, by domestic opinion depends primarily upon the degree of structural autonomy the foreign policy executive receives from its institutional structures, decision-making procedures, and prevailing procedural norms. Beyond these structural differences, I will also demonstrate that the leadership strategies employed by foreign policymakers-in particular their willingness to manipulate the secrecy of international negotiations to deceive their domestic opposition-cause further variance in the impact of domestic opinion on the foreign security policies of democracies. By unpacking the conventional category of "democracy" in this manner, I correct a fundamental misconception in the security literature that has inspired poorly specified theories-such as the democratic peace theory-and generated faulty policy advice.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify what the term "democracy" means for the purposes of this discussion. Conventional writings on foreign policy employ the terms "democratic," "liberal," "liberal/democratic," and sometimes "republican" almost interchangeably to denote regimes that can broadly be described as modern democracies. At the most basic level, democracy implies popular sovereignty-that is, that the ultimate source of authority resides within the people as a whole. Because they are sovereign, the constituents of the regime have the authority to determine policy, or at least set the limits within which policy must be conducted. In keeping with popular sovereignty, democracies share certain procedural norms, including: virtually universal suffrage, freely contested elections, public accountability of government officials, constitutional limitations on their power, open access to information, and public expression of preferences. Nonetheless, as William J. Dixon observes, states that may be termed democratic can vary significantly in the nature and character of the institutions through which public participation is exercised and the values that permeate the popular culture. This chapter probes the implications of popular sovereignty for the conduct of foreign relations.

Since, as we shall see, both liberal advocates and realist critics of democratic foreign policy address their arguments to the consequences of mass public opinion and legislative review for the making of foreign security policy, this chapter will do the same. Consequently, less attention will be devoted to the problem of particular interests and lobby groups than to the influence of the legislature and the lay electorate as a whole.

How Does Domestic Opinion Affect Foreign Policy? Conventional Answers

The Traditional Realist Perspective: Domestic Opinion as an Unfortunate Constraint

In his classic Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that while democracy was promising as an instrument of domestic prosperity and order, it lacked the ability to conduct foreign affairs on equal footing with authoritarian regimes. He wrote:

As for myself, I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments.... Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law in all classes of society: all of these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and they are precisely the qualities by which a nation, like an individual, attains a dominant position.

In his view, the imprudence and impulsiveness of mass public opinion and the institutional encumbrances of representative democracy were insurmountable obstacles for democratic states, whose consequences could be profound. Perhaps it was with these concerns in mind that classical theorists of democracy, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, argued that foreign policy should not be governed by the same liberal/democratic principles that must constrain domestic policy. Rousseau contended that "what matters principally to every citizen is the observance of the laws internally, the maintenance of private property, and the security of the individual. As long as all goes well with regard to these three points, let the government negotiate and make treaties with foreign powers." Locke similarly concluded that foreign affairs "must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have the power committed to them, to be managed to the best of their skill and ability."

Inspired by Tocqueville's pessimism, pioneers of the "realist" school of international politics, such as Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, and George Kennan, viewed the foreign security policy process as the Achilles' heel of democracies, or "the democratic malady." These traditional realists concluded that public input into the policy process and cumbersome democratic procedures would necessarily undermine the national interest-the rational basis of all foreign policy. Indeed, Morgenthau charged, "a foreign policy carried out under democratic control must fall short of the rational requirements for good foreign policy; for it must satisfy emotional preferences whose satisfaction is incompatible with meeting those requirements." Hence, democratic states tailor policies to public whims, rather than to international requirements, which is folly in a hostile international environment. Furthermore, as Kennan maintained, the democratic form of government "goes far to rule out the privacy, the flexibility, and the promptness and incisiveness of decision and action, which have marked the great imperial powers of the past and which are considered necessary to the conduct of an effective world policy by the rulers of a great state."

According to traditional realists, public opinion in democratic states is inward looking, seeking to improve the quality of domestic life rather than focusing on international military issues. Consequently, the mass electorate and the legislature tend not to interfere with the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. At critical junctures, however, when a substantial change in policy is required, public opinion and powerful voices in the legislature emerge to veto a new course. When this occurs, policymakers must endure endless legislative debates and the time-consuming process of overcoming the natural inertia of "large scattered varied multitudes of persons" who comprise the electorate. As a result, democracies make the transition from peace to war and from war to peace very slowly, and they reconcile with former enemies only with great difficulty and bitterness. Thus, for traditional realists, popular European support for appeasing Hitler in the 1930s, American reluctance to enter World War II, and overwhelming Western public pressure to impose a punitive peace settlement on Germany after World War I are all symptomatic of democratic politics. Contemporary realist Jean-Franois Revel laments: "[D]emocracy tends to ignore, even deny, threats to its existence because it loathes doing what is needed to counter them. It awakens only when the danger becomes deadly, imminent, evident. By then, either there is too little time left for it to save itself, or the price of survival has become crushingly high." In a similar vein, Kennan likened democracies to dysfunctional prehistoric beasts:

But I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of the prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath-in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.

Overall, traditional realists identified the following shortcomings of democracies in the international arena, which result from public control over policy and time-consuming democratic processes:

1. They tend to under-invest in military capability, since the public favors domestic spending and lower taxes. Hence, their ability to deter potential adversaries is undermined, and they are usually unprepared for the military involvements that are thrust upon them.

2. They are war averse; consequently, they are slow to respond when force is required to prevent a hostile state from disrupting the balance of power. Furthermore, their well-known reluctance to go to war encourages revisionist states to act aggressively, without fear of reprisal.

3. They tend to place universalist ideology above interests, making democracy and human rights their priorities, rather than concrete material interests, in order to enlist public support.

4. They lack flexibility, since it takes a considerable amount of time to mobilize public and legislative opinion in support of policy changes.

5. They frequently project disunity and dissension, because of public debate over policy ends. This interferes with their ability to send clear signals to potential adversaries.

6. They are incapable of secrecy, which hinders them in critical negotiations and deprives them of the element of surprise that is essential in military operations.

7. They are averse to limited war, since public passions, when stirred up, rarely give way to moderation. This hinders reconciliation with former enemies even when the Balance of Power requires them to do so.

While traditional realists were critical of democratic foreign policy, they viewed these serious shortcomings as the necessary price to pay for a form of government that is in all other respects preferable to authoritarian government. Kennan, for example, emphasized that his critique was not offered for the purpose of making the U.S. foreign policy process less democratic. Instead, he stressed the importance of being aware of these weaknesses and avoiding both commitments that are unlikely to be met and arenas in which democracies will be at a disadvantage. Morgenthau concluded that the best way to cope with this democratic handicap is through skillful leadership, which can generate public support for rational policies by resorting to clever deception and emotional appeals. In his study of American foreign policy, Alexander George is less cynical than Morgenthau, suggesting that the president can overcome domestic constraints on a rational and coherent foreign policy by generating "policy legitimacy." He can do this by providing both a normative justification (which demonstrates the desirability of the policy) and a cognitive plan (to persuade the public of the feasibility of his plan). Perhaps for these reasons, recent empirical examinations of many traditional realist claims regarding the foreign policy behavior of democratic polities have concluded that public opinion acts more reasonably than traditional realists assume.

Clearly, the traditional realist conclusion was that, by their very nature, democratic political institutions handcuffed the foreign policy process. They did not consider whether different types of domestic institutions or democratic systems were more susceptible than others to the problems they identified, since they assumed that the only way for democratic leaders to overcome them, if at all, was through leadership strategies.

The Liberal Perspective: Domestic Opinion as an Enabler and a Necessary Check on Power

Like traditional realists, liberal international relations scholars also conclude that public opinion and democratic processes necessarily constrain foreign policymakers. Nevertheless, they view democratic constraints as functional since they prevent leaders from subverting the foreign policy process for their own interests, thereby allowing policy to reflect true national interests. In addition, judicious democratic constraints convey distinct advantages in policy implementation and international bargaining that put democracies on a better footing internationally than their nondemocratic counterparts.

Classical liberals have long argued that democratic control over foreign affairs will prevent the pursuit of policies that might be in the parochial interests of leaders, or are consistent with their ideological visions, but that are inimical to the true national interest. Immanuel Kant and Baron de Montesquieu, for example, contended that in authoritarian regimes leaders abuse the foreign policy apparatus to further their own interests, rather than the national interest. In republican regimes, however, public input serves as a constraint on the ambitions of state leaders. Kant writes:

If, as must be so under this constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always impending. On the other hand, in a government where the subject is not a citizen holding a vote ... the plunging into war is the least serious thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen, but the owner of the state, and does not lose a whit by the war, while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure palaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on war for the most trifling reasons as if it were a kind of pleasure party.

Consequently, according to Montesquieu, democracies tend in general terms to be more peaceful since the people are less inclined to sanction a war for which they will bear the costs. Echoing the eighteenth-century liberals, former United States Secretary of State Elihu Root asserted: "When foreign offices were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be gainer by the change, for while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion."

(Continues...)

Excerpted from PEACEMAKING by DEMOCRACIESby NORRIN M. RIPSMAN Copyright © 2002 by The Pennsylvania State University. Excerpted by permission.
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Edition details

• Publisher: Penn State University Press
• Publication date: 2002
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0271023988
• ISBN 13: 9780271023984
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 280