The Challenger Launch Decision – Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at Nasa, Enlarged Edition - Softcover

Vaughan, Diane

 
9780226346823: The Challenger Launch Decision – Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at Nasa, Enlarged Edition

Synopsis

When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. In a new preface, Vaughan reveals the ramifications for this book and for her when a similar decision-making process brought down NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003.

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About the Author

Diane Vaughan is professor of sociology and international and public affairs at Columbia University.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

The Challenger Launch Decision

Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA

By Diane Vaughan

The University of Chicago Press

Copyright © 2016 The University of Chicago
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-226-34682-3

Contents

List of Figures and Tables,
Preface to the 2016 Edition,
Preface,
One THE EVE OF THE LAUNCH,
Two LEARNING CULTURE, REVISING HISTORY,
Three RISK, WORK GROUP CULTURE, AND THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE,
Four THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE, 1981-1984,
Five THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE, 1985,
Six THE CULTURE OF PRODUCTION,
Seven STRUCTURAL SECRECY,
Eight THE EVE OF THE LAUNCH REVISITED,
Nine CONFORMITY AND TRAGEDY,
Ten LESSONS LEARNED,
Appendix A COST/SAFETY TRADE-OFFS? SCRAPPING THE ESCAPE ROCKETS AND THE SRB CONTRACT AWARD DECISION,
Appendix B SUPPORTING CHARTS AND DOCUMENTS,
Appendix C ON THEORY ELABORATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND HISTORICAL ETHNOGRAPHY,
Acknowledgments,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Index,


CHAPTER 1

THE EVE OF THE LAUNCH

NASA's Space Shuttle Challenger originally was scheduled for launch January 22, 1986. A crew of seven was assigned. Commander Richard Scobee, Pilot Michael Smith, and Mission Specialists Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, and Ronald McNair were astronauts. Gregory Jarvis, an aerospace engineer, and Christa McAuliffe, a teacher from New Hampshire, were payload specialists. McAuliffe's assignment — to teach elementary school students from space — gave the Challenger a special aura. Officially known as Space Transportation System (STS) mission 51-L, it became publicly identified as the "Teacher in Space" mission, despite the scientific and technical assignments of the other crew members. According to plan, Challenger would be the first launch of 1986. However, the launch date had to be "slipped" several times — first to January 23, then to January 25, then to January 26 — because seven launch delays over a 25-day period postponed the December launch of Columbia (STS 61-C). Setting a NASA record for false starts, STS 61-C was launched January 12.

Efforts for the January 26 Challenger launch from Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, Florida, were coordinated by the top technical managers and administrators in NASA's four-tiered launch decision chain. Among them were Jesse Moore, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington (Level I); Arnold Aldrich, Program Manager, Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas (Level II); William Lucas, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama; Stanley Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, Marshall; Lawrence Mulloy, Manager, Solid Rocket Booster Project, Marshall (Level III); and Allan McDonald, Director, Solid Rocket Motor Project, Morton Thiokol, Utah (Level IV). Following Columbia's precedent for delay, early countdown activities were terminated because the forecast indicated that weather at Kennedy would be unacceptable throughout the launch window. NASA rescheduled for January 27. That day, countdown was proceeding normally when microswitch indicators showed that the exterior hatch-locking mechanism had not closed properly. By the time it was fixed, the wind velocity exceeded the Launch Commit Criteria for allowable crosswinds at the Kennedy Space Center runway used in case of a return-to-launch-site abort. The launch was scrubbed at 12:36 P.M. and rescheduled for January 28 at 9:38 A.M. EST.

NASA personnel at the Cape first became concerned about cold temperature at

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