This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. The authors indicate substantial real-world applications, and exercises for students (with solutions) are provided at the end of each chapter.
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"It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics."--Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University
Inés Macho-Stadler is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. He gained his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ecole Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris) J. David Pérez-Castrillo is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. He gained his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ecole Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris)
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