Modelling the Mind - Hardcover

 
9780198249733: Modelling the Mind

Synopsis

SEE AUTHOR'S BLURB FOR LEAFLETS This collection of papers by distinguished philosophers, psychologists, and physiologists reflects an interdisciplinary approach to the central question of cognitive science: how do we model the mind? Among the questions explored are the relationships (theoretical, reductive, and explanatory) between philosophy, psychology, computer science, and physiology; what should be asked of models in science generally, and in cognitive science in particular; whether theoretical models must make essential reference to objects in the environment; whether there are human competences that are resistant, in principle, to modelling; whether simulated thinking and intentionality are really thinking and intentionality; how semantics can be generated from syntactics; the meaning of the terms `representation' and `modelling'; whether the nature of the `hardware' matters; and whether computer models of humans are `dehumanizing'.

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Review

'This high powered collection also has a nicely original essay by Margaret Boden on artificial intelligence.' David Cohen, New Scientist, 20 April 1991

'This interesting collection of eleven essays brings together some of the papers which were read on two occasions, the Turin Conference on 'Human Mind - Artificial Mind' in Italy, 1985, and the Oxford University Cognitive Science Seminars around the same time.' Stefan E. Cuypers, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 168

Synopsis

SEE AUTHOR'S BLURB FOR LEAFLETS This collection of papers by distinguished philosophers, psychologists, and physiologists reflects an interdisciplinary approach to the central question of cognitive science: how do we model the mind? Among the questions explored are the relationships (theoretical, reductive, and explanatory) between philosophy, psychology, computer science, and physiology; what should be asked of models in science generally, and in cognitive science in particular; whether theoretical models must make essential reference to objects in the environment; whether there are human competences that are resistant, in principle, to modelling; whether simulated thinking and intentionality are really thinking and intentionality; how semantics can be generated from syntactics; the meaning of the terms 'representation' and 'modelling'; whether the nature of the 'hardware' matters; and whether computer models of humans are 'dehumanizing'.

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