Things That Happen Because They Should: A Teleological Approach to Action (Oxford Philosophical Monographs) - Hardcover

Stout, Rowland

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0198240635 ISBN 13: 9780198240631

Publisher: OUP Oxford, 1996

Synopsis

Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. Rowland Stout takes the opposite line in his account of action. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but Dr Stout argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.

About this title

About the Author

Rowland Stout is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Oriel College, Oxford. He was previously Lecturer in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Polytechnic of the South Bank, London; Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Leeds; and Lecturer in Philosophy at Merton College, Oxford.

From the Back Cover

Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. Rowland Stout takes the opposite line in his account of action. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but Dr Stout argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, that can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.

Edition details

• Publisher: OUP Oxford
• Publication date: 1996
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0198240635
• ISBN 13: 9780198240631
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 200