Review:
'Verbeek's research overcomes an often noted difficulty that theories of foreign policy decision making require data that is seldom available. He carefully reconstructs the decisions of the British inner cabinet during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and applies insights from the study of small group behavior. The result is a book that not only contributes to our theoretical knowledge but also offers explanations for the remarkable actions of Prime Minister Anthony Eden and his close associates during a critical international episode. It makes for fascinating reading.' Charles F. Hermann, Texas A&M University , USA 'This is a prime example of political psychology at its best: tracing the role of individuals, groups and bureaucratic organisations in a complex political decision-making process. Verbeek successfully explains why British policymakers pursued such a foolish course of action during the Suez crisis by carefully examining their worldviews, their interactions as a group, and the impact of bureaucratic politics in the British foreign and defense policy arena. This thorough yet concise and well-written study compares, contrasts and weighs the explanatory potential of classic theories of foreign policy decision-making. It is a must for all students of foreign policy analysis, international relations and political psychology.' Paul 't Hart, Leiden University, Netherlands and Swedish Defence College, Sweden 'Although much studied, the Suez Crisis has long remained a puzzle. This fascinating and carefully researched volume by Bertjan Verbeek throws new light on how small group decision-making shaped a costly outcome that few anticipated and fewer desired.' Michael W. Doyle, Princeton University, USA and author of Ways of War and Peace '...a notably superior addition to the fast-growing corpus of works on and around Britain's luckless stab at regime change and pre-emptive self-defence in the Middle East of 1956.' International Affairs 'Verbeek...gives the reader useful synopses of major models and constructs in international relations and the social psychology of group dynamics.' Political Psychology 'The book provides a challenging mix of history and theory and makes an important contribution...' The European Legacy 'It is a well researched study, which throws new light on how small groups decision making process shaped the outcome of a critical international episode. Students of foreign policy analysis, international relations and political philosophy will find the book worthwhile to go through.' USI Journal 'Bertjan Verbeek's book on the decision-making process that led to the Suez crisis is both a useful contribution to the literature on how governments make decisions and a timely reminder of the continuing importance and interest of the affair.' Journal of Cold War Studies
Synopsis:
This work provides an innovative approach to the question of why the Suez Crisis erupted. Bertjan Verbeek applies a foreign policy analysis framework to British decision making during the crisis, providing a full foreign policy analysis of this important event. Moreover, the book offers a new interpretation of British decision-making during the crisis. Many existing studies of Suez emphasize the role of the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and often focus on the matter of collusion with Israel. This study demonstrates that small group dynamics in the institutional context of cabinet decision-making in the British political system are much more important. The study offers the possibility of determining more precisely the interrelationship between systemic constraints on states' behaviour and the actual behaviour of states under such constraints.
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