pergamon brassey's international defense publishers inc washington (9 results)

Hard Cover. Condition: Very Good. Dust Jacket Condition: Fine. Second Edition, Revised. 274 pages. Light stain on foredge of a few pages at the rear of the text block. Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall.

Hardcover. First Printing. Octavo; VG-/G; black spine with white and light yellow; first printing; dust jacket exterior shows slight shelf wear; minor edge wear; cloth exterior has minimal wear; tight binding; strong boards; textblock exterior edges have creamy tone; interior clean; pp 244; inscribed by author. 1359567. FP New Rockville Stock.

Hardcover. Condition: Good+. Dust Jacket Condition: No DJ. 1st Edition. 261 pps. Gilt titles: sp. Illust. w/ b/w maps & photos (listed). Green cloth bds. Interior leaves are clean and tight. Military history. Includes appendixes I-IV & index. The rigorous Royal Marine operations in the Falkland War against the Argentine Army, April-June 1982. A clean copy.

Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Dust Jacket Condition: Very Good. Inscribed to the previous owner and signed by the author on the half title page. Slight discoloration to pages. Several close tears along the DJ edges and tips. Some wear along the DJ edges and tips. Minor wear along the edges and tips of the book itself. Some rubbing wear to DJ covers along with creases and/or wrinkles at some spots. Inscribed by Author(s).

Hard Cover. First Printing. Joseph G. Whelan and Michael J. Dixon. 486 pages. Pages clean, white and tight. Original owner's name at top of front free endpaper. Green cloth with read lettering on spine. Green dust jacket. Top corners lightly bumped. VG/VG.

4to. pp. 190. profusely illus. biblio. wrs.

Hardcover. Condition: Good. First Printing [Stated]. x, 221, [1] pages. Ink marks to text noted. Ink notations on rep. Foreword by Richard Helms. Includes chapters on Proud Service; Early Years; The Beedle Smith Era; Academic Interlude; The Watch on Asia; Singapore; Back to Headquarters; Back in the Fast Lane; The Raborn Episode; The Golden Helms Years; The Nixon Decline; and Afterthoughts. The Unknown CIA brings readers into the world of the scholars, researchers, and analysts who provide the facts upon which U.S. national security decisions are based, revealing what working for "the Company" is really like. Perhaps the greatest service this book performs is to portray the workaday operations and internal atmosphere of the Agency. It describes with the pride of an intelligence professional the unwavering objectivity and dedication to accuracy of the mostly unknown intelligence analysts. This is indeed "the unknown CIA". Derived from a Kirkus review: Patriotic memoirs from Smith, former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA. CIA business, Smith suggests, is not transacted by a Blackford Oakes sort of operative or via John le Carre's-style novelistic twists. Rather, it is conducted by dedicated intelligence analysts--"men and women sitting at desks sorting, sifting, and patterning secret evidence into a matrix" that carries conviction. Smith, himself one such desk man, was present at the creation of the CIA in 1947. He quickly went on to work at the higher levels of the CIA through such crises as the U-2 fiasco, the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War in the Mideast, the Vietnam War, and the sinking of the CIA's reputation in the mid-1970's. But in portraying the workaday operations and the internal atmosphere of the agency, Smith manages to restore some of its luster, Recapping the more damning public perceptions, he opines that the "CIA is not like that. Nor, I might add, is the KGB." In fact, he states, "anyone who entertains seriously the notion that CIA could assassinate a leader or topple a foreign government contrary to White House order or permission simply does not understand how power is disposed in Washington." Smith has kind words for his directors (Walter Bedell Smith: "a man of genuine brilliance, great personal force, and organizational genius"; Richard Helms, whose "leadership enabled the CIA to become a unified, cohesive organization"). Smith points an accusing finger at Nixon, whose "mean-spirited, trust-no.one-but-ourselves, us-against-them siege mentality" precipitated the public denigration of the CIA. A solid, fascinatingly inside-look.

Hardcover. Condition: Very good. Dust Jacket Condition: Very good. First Printing [Stated]. x, 221, [1] pages. Foreword by Richard Helms. Inscribed by author on title page. DJ has slight wear, soiling, and sticker residue at back. Inscribed to Paul Grove, possibly the noted Congressional Staffer who handles State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The author rose to become Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. Derived from a Kirkus review: CIA business, Smith suggests, is conducted by dedicated intelligence analysts. Smith, himself one such desk man, was present at the creation of the CIA in 1947 (after a stint as an English professor at Williams College). He quickly went on to work at the higher levels of the CIA through such crises as the U-2 fiasco, the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War in the Mideast, and the Vietnam War. He portrays the workaday operations and the internal atmosphere of the agency. Smith has kind words for his directors (Walter Bedell Smith: "a man of genuine brilliance, great personal force, and organizational genius"; Richard Helms, whose "leadership enabled the CIA to become a unified, cohesive organization"). Smith points an accusing finger at Nixon, whose "mean-spirited, trust-no.one-but-ourselves, us-against-them siege mentality" precipitated the public denigration of the CIA. A solid, fascinatingly inside-look. Smith had a long and stellar career from the CIA's early days as an analyst, estimator, and head of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI); he ended his service with a prestigious foreign assignment. Jack Smith, as he was known throughout his career, was born on July 4, 1913. Smith graduated with distinction from Miami University of Ohio in 1937. He attended graduate school at Cornell University on a full scholarship and earned a Ph.D. in English Literature. After graduating, Smith taught at Williams College until the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. With the beginning of U.S. involvement in World War II, Smith signed on with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)-the predecessor of today's CIA. He worked for the OSS as a researcher and writer. After World War II, the OSS was abolished and its functions were transferred to the State and War departments. It wasn't long before President Harry S. Truman realized that the nation needed a central intelligence organization, and in January 1946 he issued an Executive Order establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The creation of the Central Intelligence Agency followed in September 1947, as ordered by the National Security Act. Smith was offered a position in the fledgling CIG and soon was editing the Daily Summary-an analytic publication that CIG and then CIA prepared for President Truman. From 1957 to 1962, Smith served on the Board of National Estimates, an arm of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), which was responsible for preparing estimates of foreign intentions. As a member of the elite Board-the predecessor to today's National Intelligence Council-Smith worked closely with Sherman Kent. Kent-often called the "father of intelligence analysis"-is credited with developing the techniques and methods used in intelligence analysis today. In the early 1960s, then-Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) Ray Cline made Smith the director of Current Intelligence and then his deputy. In 1966, Richard Helms-an alumnus of Williams College and then deputy to DCI William Raborn-recommended Smith to succeed Cline as DDI. Smith served as DDI from 1966 to 1971, a period that included the Arab-Israel Six-Day and Vietnam wars. During both wars, Smith was responsible for the analysis and dissemination of intelligence. One of Smith's first achievements in the position was the establishment of the Office of Strategic Research (OSR). CIA analysts in OSR would produce all-source, independent, strategic assessment of military developments and trends. In 1971, Smith was ready for a change. DCI Helms sent Smith t.

Hardcover. Condition: Very good. Dust Jacket Condition: Very good (). First Printing [Stated]. x, 221, [1] pages. Slight creasing to bottom edge of dust jacket. Foreword by Richard Helms. Inscribed by the author on title page. Inscription reads "For Genia and David, Fellow-Spooks. Russell Jack Smith." DJ has slight wear and soiling. The author rose to become Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. Derived from a Kirkus review: CIA business, Smith suggests, is conducted by dedicated intelligence analysts. Smith, himself one such desk man, was present at the creation of the CIA in 1947 (after a stint as an English professor at Williams College). He quickly went on to work at the higher levels of the CIA through such crises as the U-2 fiasco, the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War in the Mideast, and the Vietnam War. He portrays the workaday operations and the internal atmosphere of the agency. Smith has kind words for his directors (Walter Bedell Smith: "a man of genuine brilliance, great personal force, and organizational genius"; Richard Helms, whose "leadership enabled the CIA to become a unified, cohesive organization"). A solid, fascinatingly inside-look. Reflecting on his career long after he retired, Smith was asked which job was most satisfying. He responded immediately, "I must say, I enjoyed it all." With the beginning of U.S. involvement in World War II, Smith signed on with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)-the predecessor of today's CIA. The creation of the Central Intelligence Agency followed, as ordered by the National Security Act. From 1957 to 1962, Smith served on the Board of National Estimates, which was responsible for preparing estimates of foreign intentions. In the early 1960s, then-Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) Ray Cline made Smith the director of Current Intelligence and then his deputy. Smith served as DDI from 1966 to 1971, a period that included the Arab-Israel Six-Day and Vietnam wars. When Smith retired in late 1973, colleagues described him as one of the best all-round substantive analysts in the Intelligence Community. He received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for a career of significant contributions to the Agency and the analytic profession. His greatest contribution was his memoir, The Unknown CIA. Many historians agree that it is the best reflection on and explanation of a career in intelligence analysis. Derived from a Kirkus review: Unabashedly patriotic memoirs from Smith, former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA. CIA business, Smith suggests, is not transacted by a Blackford Oakes sort of operative or via John le Carre's-style novelistic twists. Rather, it is conducted by dedicated intelligence analysts--"men and women sitting at desks sorting, sifting, and patterning secret evidence into a matrix" that carries conviction. Smith, himself one such desk man, was present at the creation of the CIA in 1947. He quickly went on to work at the higher levels of the CIA through such crises as the U-2 fiasco, the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War in the Mideast, the Vietnam War, and the sinking of the CIA's reputation in the mid-1970's. But in portraying the workaday operations and the internal atmosphere of the agency, Smith manages to restore some of its luster, Recapping the more damning public perceptions, he opines that the "CIA is not like that. Nor, I might add, is the KGB." In fact, he states, "anyone who entertains seriously the notion that CIA could assassinate a leader or topple a foreign government contrary to White House order or permission simply does not understand how power is disposed in Washington." In the meantime, Smith has kind words for his directors (Walter Bedell Smith: "a man of genuine brilliance, great personal force, and organizational genius"; Richard Helms, whose "leadership enabled the CIA to become a unified, cohesive organization"). Surprisingly, Smith points an accusing finger at Nixon, whose "mean-spirited, trust-no.one-but-ourselves, us-against-them siege mentality" precipitated the public denigration of the CIA. A solid, fascinatingly inside-look.