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Excerpt from Continuous Time Stopping Games With Monotone Reward Structures
The existing literature on continuous time non-zero - sum stopping games mentioned above, with the exception of Morimoto uses stochastic environments that have the Markov property. Morimoto [1986] considers cyclic stopping games. The purpose of this paper is to provide an existence theorem for Nash equilibria for a class of non-zero-sum non-cyclic stopping games in a non-markov environment. We basically extend the discrete time analysis of Mamer [1987] to a continuous time setting. Some properties of a symmetric Nash equilibrium are also characterized.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate an N - person continuous time non-zero - sum stopping game. Reward processes are optional processes that may be unbounded and can take the value - 00 at t +00. A martingale approach is adopted in Section 3 to show the existence of optimal stopping policies of players under fairly general conditions. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with monotone payoff structures is proved in Section 4 by using Tarski's lattice theoretic fixed point theorem. We show in the same section that, for a symmetric stopping game, there always exists a symmetric equilibrium when the reward processes satisfy a monotone condition. Moreover, a symmetric equilibrium.
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This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
The existing literature on continuous time non-zero - sum stopping games mentioned above, with the exception of Morimoto uses stochastic environments that have the Markov property. Morimoto [1986] considers cyclic stopping games. The purpose of this paper is to provide an existence theorem for Nash equilibria for a class of non-zero-sum non-cyclic stopping games in a non-markov environment. We basically extend the discrete time analysis of Mamer [1987] to a continuous time setting. Some properties of a symmetric Nash equilibrium are also characterized.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate an N - person continuous time non-zero - sum stopping game. Reward processes are optional processes that may be unbounded and can take the value - 00 at t +00. A martingale approach is adopted in Section 3 to show the existence of optimal stopping policies of players under fairly general conditions. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with monotone payoff structures is proved in Section 4 by using Tarski's lattice theoretic fixed point theorem. We show in the same section that, for a symmetric stopping game, there always exists a symmetric equilibrium when the reward processes satisfy a monotone condition. Moreover, a symmetric equilibrium.
About the Publisher
Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com
This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
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- PublisherForgotten Books
- Publication date2018
- ISBN 10 1334018367
- ISBN 13 9781334018367
- BindingPaperback
- Number of pages42
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Continuous Time Stopping Games With Monotone Reward Structures
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Book Description Paperback. Condition: New. Print on Demand. Excerpt from Continuous Time Stopping Games With Monotone Reward Structures. About the Publisher, Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. This text has been digitally restored from a historical edition. Some errors may persist, however we consider it worth publishing due to the work's historical value. The digital edition of all books may be viewed on our website before purchase. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781334018367_0
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