Integrity and the Virtues of Reason: Leading a Convincing Life - Softcover

Scherkoske, Greg

Softcover

ISBN 10: 131650235X ISBN 13: 9781316502358

Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 2015

Synopsis

Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics.

About this title

Review:

'... contributes significantly to the literature on integrity, with novel, well-argued proposals and extremely clear organization ...' S. E. Forschler, Choice

'Scherkoske's book makes a distinctive contribution to the literature on integrity ... It will reward close reading by those interested not only in integrity itself, but also in virtue theory more generally, the epistemology of disagreement, the epistemology of testimony, speech act theory and normative ethics. Scherkoske's writing is a model of constructive engagement with his many philosophical interlocutors ... his conception of integrity, and of what it takes to lead a 'convincing life' ... is deserving of serious consideration.' Andrea C. Westlund, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

'... this book marks an important advance for the literature on integrity. It will serve as essential reading for anyone interested in this elusive virtue and this account will no doubt be one that anyone attempting to defend an alternative view of integrity must respond to. It will also be of interest to anyone working in ethics or epistemology, particularly those seeking to understand the difference between moral and epistemic virtues.' Alfred Archer, Philosophy

Book Description:

Many claim that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may, but Scherkoske argues that integrity relies on convictions being justifiable and probably correct. His original and surprising argument that integrity is an epistemic rather than a moral virtue is of great interest to scholars and students of ethics.

About this edition

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication date: 2015
• ISBN 10: 131650235X
• ISBN 13: 9781316502358
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 276