Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) - Hardcover

Adolph, Christopher

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 110703261X ISBN 13: 9781107032613

Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 2013

Synopsis

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

About this title

Review:

'Adolph has written a timely book for students of monetary policy, central banking, and comparative political economy. The main messages are accessible to a wide audience and have implications not only for economics, but also for law and sociology.' Anne-Caroline Hüser, International Journal of Constitutional Law

Book Description:

Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.

About this edition

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication date: 2013
• ISBN 10: 110703261X
• ISBN 13: 9781107032613
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 390