Through a close inspection of empirical evidence, the authors wish to show how high-level policymakers are beset by complex decision-making tasks that the rational and systemic perspective fails entirely to take into account. This book focuses on the contributions of both cognitive psychology and the analysis of bureaucratic politics to the understanding of foreign policy decisions made by individuals, small groups, and large organizations. Two recent events are investigated: the fall of the Shah of Iran (1979), and the Iran-Contra affair (1986). This work offers new evidence through a detailed examination of primary sources, particularly internal government documents, messages, and reports newly declassified by the National Security Archive in Washington. Most of this material has not been accessible to previous writers.
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Review:
For those seeking a painless introduction to the literature on the application of theories of cognitive psychology and bureaucratic politics to foreign policy makine, this slim volume will be welcome indeed. It should interest historians from many fields, but the authors clearly have their eyes on historians of American foreign relations (and their students)....What makes this work so attractive is the clarity of the writing and the absence of jargon.--David A. Welch "Journal of American History "
...a welcomed effort...its goal is admirable. We can only hope that this short book represents the beginning rather than the end of a reseach programme.--David A. Welch
Synopsis:
Focuses on the understanding of US foreign policy decisions made by individuals, small groups and large organisations in relation to two events in recent history: the fall of the Shah of Iran (1979) and the Iran-Contra affair (1986).
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