Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo - Hardcover

O'Hanlon, Michael; O™Hanlon, M

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0815716966 ISBN 13: 9780815716969

Publisher: Brookings Institution Press, 2000

Synopsis

After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo?

In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win.

The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.

About this title

Review:

"This is a serious and worthwhile study which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of American leadership and the NATO system in its first offensive war.... Daalder and O'Hanlon make clear that we have a lot to learn if we are going to engage in campai" --Newt Gingrich, "newt.org", 9/3/2000

"Must Read" --Lex Ticonderoga, "Today's Books / Public News Service", 12/5/2000

"thoughtful conclusions" -- "St. Louis Post-Dispatch", 1/9/2001

"This volume will prove to be one of the most comprehensive and thorough critiques of how and why NATO's decisions were made in Operation Allied Force." --Timothy Shaw, "Contemporary Security Policy", 3/20/2001

"It is by far the most comprehensive analysis of the Kosovo war so far." --Fiona Simpson, University of St. Andrews, "International Affairs", 4/24/2001

"Daalder and O'Hanlon chronicle in convincing and painful detail how NATO for more than a year tried hard to head off a military confrontation." --Christopher Civic, "Survival"

"Brookings Institution scholars Ivo H. Daalder (Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy) and Michael O'Hanlon (Technological Change and the Future of Warfare) analyze the [Kosovo] conflict in Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo. Their" -- "Publishers Weekly"

"An outstanding contribution to the study of U.S. foreign policy making." --Ryan Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University, "National Security Studies Quarterly"

.".. it is an excellent first generation study. The detailed chronology and documents in the appendixes are exceptionally valuable." --J.P. Dunn, Converse College, "Choice, vol. 38, no. 7", 3/1/2001

"Their account is heartening and sobering at the same time. It is heartening because the authors offer a number of fascinating and intellectually rigorous anlayses into the possible alternatives to NATO's approach." --Jamie Shea, Director of NATO's Office of Information and Press, "NATO Review", 7/1/2001

About the Author:

Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in International Security at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., USA. He is the coauthor, with James M. Lindsay, of America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2003).

Michael E. O'Hanlon is the director of research and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, USA, where he holds the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair. His books include The Science of War (Princeton University Press, 2009) and numerous Brookings books.

About this edition

• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Publication date: 2000
• ISBN 10: 0815716966
• ISBN 13: 9780815716969
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 344