Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - Softcover

R.H.S. Stolfi (author)

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0806125810 ISBN 13: 9780806125817

Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993

Synopsis

"According to received wisdom, the turning point of WW II in Europe was the battle of Stalingrad, but Stolfi argues persuasively that the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of Russia, was the decisive event. Barbarossa began in June 22, 1941; by mid-August the Germans had defeated eight of nine Soviet field armies and were in a position to capture Moscow and win the war in Europe. But then Hitler made what Sotlfi regards as his most momentous decision of the War: he ordered Army Group Center to veer southward into the Ukraine, despite the objections of several of his generals. With the subsequent loss of German momentum, the Soviets Gained time to mobilize and eventually drove the invader out of Russia. The author demonstrates that the führer was strategically ultraconservative, primarily interested in improving the "siege lines" that ringed the Fatherland and that his diversion into the Ukraine was an expression of this. Stolfi, who teaches European history at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, has written a credible reevaluation of the war."--Publishers Weekly "Stolfi makes an excellent case that the decision to give the defenders of Moscow time to regroup-and the advantage of bad weather-rendered it impossible for Germany to win the war, and thus was THE crucial decision of the last 50 years. His book is a work of scholarship, backed to the hilt by contemporary sources."--Rapport R.H.S. Stolfi is Professor Emeritus of Modern European History at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and the author of Hitler: Beyond Evil and Tyranny.

About this title

From the Back Cover:

How close did Germany come to winning World War II? Did Hitler throw away victory in Europe after his troops had crushed the Soviet field armies defending Moscow by August 1941? R. H. S. Stolfi offers a dramatic new picture of Hitler's conduct in World War II and a fundamental reinterpretation of the course of the war. Adolf Hitler generally is thought to have been driven by a blitzkrieg mentality in the years 1939 to 1941. In fact, Stolfi argues, he had no such outlook on the war. From the day Britain and France declared war, Hitler reacted with a profoundly conservative cast of mind and pursued a circumscribed strategy, pushing out siege lines set around Germany by the Allies. Interpreting Hitler as a siege Fuhrer explains his apparent aberrations in connection with Dunkirk, his fixation on the seizure of Leningrad, and his fateful decision in the summer of 1941 to deflect Army Group Center into the Ukraine when both Moscow and victory in World War II were within its reach. Unaware of Hitler's siege orientation, the German Army planned blitz campaigns. Through daring operational concepts and bold tactics, the army won victories over several Allied powers in World War II, and these led to the great campaign against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. Stolfi postulates that in August 1941, German Army Group Center had the strength both to destroy the Red field armies defending the Soviet capital and to advance to Moscow and beyond. The defeat of the Soviet Union would have assured victory in World War II. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered the army group south to secure the resources of the Ukraine against a potential siege. And a virtually assured German victory slipped away. Thisradical reinterpretation of Hitler and the capabilities of the German Army leads to a reevaluation of World War II, in which the lesson to be learned is not how the Allies won the war, but how close the Germans came to a quick and decisive victory--long before the United States was drawn into the battle.

Synopsis:

Offers a new picture of Hitler's conduct in World War II and a reinterpretation of the course of the war. Stolfi argues that but for one fateful decision by Hitler, which gave the defenders of Moscow time to regroup, Germany could have won the war in the summer of 1941.

About this edition

• Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
• Publication date: 1993
• ISBN 10: 0806125810
• ISBN 13: 9780806125817
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 294