Interests, Institutions & Information – Domestic Politics & International Relations: Domestic Politics and International Relations - Hardcover

Milner, Helen V

3.29

28 ratings by Goodreads

9780691011776: Interests, Institutions & Information – Domestic Politics & International Relations: Domestic Politics and International Relations

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 069101177X ISBN 13: 9780691011776

Publisher: Princeton University Press, 1997

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Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that "domestic politics matters." Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations.

Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.

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Review:

"[This book] brings us back to the politics of domestic-level analyses to balance the emphasis on economics. It also provides important insights into questions concerning the foreign policy behavior of different regime-types. . . This is a powerful work that . . . gives us a new lens through which we may examine issues central to the field."--Political Science Quarterly

Synopsis:

Presents a theory of domestic politics, showing how it affects international outcomes. In developing this rational choice theory, the text argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is misleading. It describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as legislature and executive). A model is constructed based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. The model is illustrated by the question of co-operation between nations.

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