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Book Description Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. If either determinism or indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompa. Seller Inventory # 446922885
Book Description Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right, and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. Seller Inventory # 9780521039185