Representation and Reality (Representation and Mind series) - Softcover

Putnam, Hilary

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0262660741 ISBN 13: 9780262660747

Publisher: MIT Press, 1991

Synopsis

Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind. Hilary Putnam is Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard University.

About this title

Review:

-- Richard Rorty, University of Virginia

-- Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York

" This clear, powerfully argued, and thoroughly accessible book is fascinating, and no one with a serious interest in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language can afford not to study it." -- Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York

" "Representation and Reality" is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it." -- Richard Rorty, University of Virginia

& quot; This clear, powerfully argued, and thoroughly accessible book is fascinating, and no one with a serious interest in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language can afford not to study it.& quot; -- Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York

& quot; Representation and Reality is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it.& quot; -- Richard Rorty, University of Virginia

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""Representation and Reality" is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it."--Richard Rorty, University of Virginia

"This clear, powerfully argued, and thoroughly accessible book is fascinating, and no one with a serious interest in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language can afford not to study it."--Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York

"With striking candor, Putnam exposes the factors that have shaped his thinking about intentionality. Since that thinking has had a great influence, this book is full of valuable insights into current philosophical methods, foibles, and aspirations. As usual, he sets a hard task for his colleagues: figuring out how to agree with just 90 percent of what he says."--Daniel Dennett, Tufts University

Synopsis:

The author, one of the first philosophers to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radical view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. He argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.

About this edition

• Publisher: MIT Press
• Publication date: 1991
• ISBN 10: 0262660741
• ISBN 13: 9780262660747
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 156