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Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? Philosophers have often raised this question in assessing the plausibility of particular moral theories. But it is a pressing question whatever one's moral outlook. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence - requirements grounded directly in other people's need for assistance. Given this, there is a forceful case for thinking that we are morallyrequired - not only collectively, but also as individuals - to devote a substantial proportion of what we have to helping the poor.One way to present this case is by means of a simpleanalogy: an analogy between giving money to an aid agency and rescuing a needy person directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this analogy in detail, discussing the ways in which it is politically and metaphysically simplistic. However, there remains an important truth in the simple analogy. It is that we are morally required to help. In one way, our world imposes a radical separation between its rich and poor inhabitants: our material circumstances are starklydifferent. In another way, however, it does not: the human experiences and fulfilments of rich and poor are fundamentally the same. This is an important part of the case for thinking that theirwelfare grounds requirements of beneficence on us to help them. But Part II shows that it is also part of the case for limiting those requirements. Drawing attention to the range of goods that ground requirements on us to help each other, Cullity argues that these requirements only make sense on the assumption that a life of a certain kind - a life that is not restricted in an extremely demanding way - is one that it is not wrong for us to live. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence - requirements grounded directly in other people's need for assistance. This book examines, refines, and defends an argument of this form, and then identifies its limits. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780199258116
Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? Philosophers have often raised this question in assessing the plausibility of particular moral theories. But it is a pressing question whatever one's moral outlook. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence - requirements grounded directly in other people's need for assistance. Given this, there is a forceful case for thinking that we are morallyrequired - not only collectively, but also as individuals - to devote a substantial proportion of what we have to helping the poor.One way to present this case is by means of a simpleanalogy: an analogy between giving money to an aid agency and rescuing a needy person directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this analogy in detail, discussing the ways in which it is politically and metaphysically simplistic. However, there remains an important truth in the simple analogy. It is that we are morally required to help. In one way, our world imposes a radical separation between its rich and poor inhabitants: our material circumstances are starklydifferent. In another way, however, it does not: the human experiences and fulfilments of rich and poor are fundamentally the same. This is an important part of the case for thinking that theirwelfare grounds requirements of beneficence on us to help them. But Part II shows that it is also part of the case for limiting those requirements. Drawing attention to the range of goods that ground requirements on us to help each other, Cullity argues that these requirements only make sense on the assumption that a life of a certain kind - a life that is not restricted in an extremely demanding way - is one that it is not wrong for us to live. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence - requirements grounded directly in other people's need for assistance. This book examines, refines, and defends an argument of this form, and then identifies its limits. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780199258116
Book Description Gebunden. Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence - requirements grounded directly in other people s need for assistance. This book examines, refines, and defends an argument of this form, and then identifies its limits.How much a. Seller Inventory # 594422065