The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
This book deals with two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form and presents two new descriptive theories, the Negotiation Agreement Area and the Proportional Division Payoff Bounds (PDPB). The evaluation of data for two-person games leads to a new descriptive theory called Negotiation Agreement Area which combines the influence of power and justice norms. The main emphasis of the book is on a new descriptive theory for three-person games, the PDPB. Comparison with other theories on the basis of 3088 plays of different games shows that the PDPB are significantly more successful in prediction than other theories. The PDPB concept is a modification and extension of Selten's Equal Division Payoff Bounds. The determination of the bounds is based on general principles and not on the estimation of parameters. From aspiration levels which depend on power, justice norms, and other reasonable principles the negotiation process leads to a proportional division of the prize.
"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.
£ 6.92 shipping from Germany to U.S.A.
Destination, rates & speedsSeller: books4less (Versandantiquariat Petra Gros GmbH & Co. KG), Welling, Germany
Broschiert; Condition: Gut. 165 S. Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 315. Seller Inventory # 2206673
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 18673408-n
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # ABLIING23Mar3113020169273
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.
Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. This book deals with two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form and presents two new descriptive theories, the Negotiation Agreement Area and the Proportional Division Payoff Bounds (PDPB). The evaluation of data for two-person games leads to a new descriptive theory called Negotiation Agreement Area which combines the influence of power and justice norms. The main emphasis of the book is on a new descriptive theory for three-person games, the PDPB. Comparison with other theories on the basis of 3088 plays of different games shows that the PDPB are significantly more successful in prediction than other theories. The PDPB concept is a modification and extension of Selten's Equal Division Payoff Bounds. The determination of the bounds is based on general principles and not on the estimation of parameters. From aspiration levels which depend on power, justice norms, and other reasonable principles the negotiation process leads to a proportional division of the prize. The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9783540524830
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Antiquariat Bookfarm, Löbnitz, Germany
Softcover. 177 S. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. 3540524835 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 900. Seller Inventory # 2347812
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 18673408
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Condition: New. In. Seller Inventory # ria9783540524830_new
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Chiron Media, Wallingford, United Kingdom
Paperback. Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 6666-IUK-9783540524830
Quantity: 10 available
Seller: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condition: New. pp. 184. Seller Inventory # 2648036357
Quantity: 4 available
Seller: Majestic Books, Hounslow, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 184 46 Figures, 67:B&W 6.69 x 9.61 in or 244 x 170 mm (Pinched Crown) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam. Seller Inventory # 44778970
Quantity: 4 available