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In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.
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"Inadvertent Escalation makes a truly unique, original contribution to security issues and should make defense planners grapple with conventional and nuclear linkages in future conflicts. Posen's answer gives wisdom to innocent defense planners as they venture forth into a post-Cold War world." Military ReviewAbout the Author:
Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Security Studies Program at MIT. He is the author of The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (winner of the Furniss Award and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award), Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, and Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, all from Cornell.
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Book Description Cornell University Press, U.S.A., 1992. Hardcover. Condition: New. Dust Jacket Condition: New. 1st Edition. New- First Ed. Hardback. New- DJ. Near perfect unused condition. Very faint thin pressure mark across the front of the black boards.The book appears unread. Tight clean book. DJ has very slight shelfwear at the top spine edge and lower front edge. DJ iside edges have been reinforced with what appears to be non-yellowling archival tape. No marks, stamps or stickers inside or out. Beautiful book. Seller Inventory # 025754
Book Description Cornell University Press, 1992. Condition: New. book. Seller Inventory # M0801425638
Book Description Cornell University Press, 1992. Hardcover. Condition: New. Seller Inventory # DADAX0801425638