Intended for postgraduates and researchers in economics, statistics, maths and engineering, this book presents an extensive and updated treatment of static and dynamic non-cooperative game theory. It emphasizes the interplay between dynamic information patterns and the structural properties of several different types of equilibria. Features of this second edition include new theoretical developments, several illustrative examples and exercises, and an extensive list of references.
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This text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. Fully revised in 1995, this edition features new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium.
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Book Description Academic Press, 1982. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Bookseller Inventory # P110120802201